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ABSTRACT
The Socialization of Political Values
i
The Content of Official Education in Spain
1977
Richard Nuccio, B.A., University of Mass-
achusetts, M.A., Stanford University, Ph.D.,
University of Massachusetts
Directed byi Professor Howard J. Wiarda
•'Official" political socialization— the self-conscious
effort of governmental and political authority to structure
and, if possible, control the entrance of an individual into
political awareness--is a relatively neglected area of the
field of political socialization. This study focuses on the
"official" value structure of Spanish political authority
revealed in an examination of school textbooks written and
used in the Franco years. In three central chapters, analysis
of the textbooks is made regarding their Images of the State
—
its formal structure and definition; of the Individual—human
nature, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses; and of the
Citizen—obligations of the Citizen to society and to the
State.
In preparation for the textbook analysis two basic areas
of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted
and defined. The first of these concerns a typology of regimes
into which Franco Spain is to be fit. In Chapter I it is argued
that the prevailing "authoritarian regime" characterization
iv
of Spain systematically understates the class nature of the
Francoist dictatorship and hence deflects one's attention from
the more nefarious and pervasive aspects of social control
under Franco.
A second preliminary Chapter deals with a model of
socialization appropriate to the reality of Spanish ideology
revealed in the textbooks. Of particular concern is the role
of the State in modifyin^r and. indeed, "creating" values con-
sonant with its need for social control. Explored in this
Chapter is the way in which the family, a traditional institu-
tion and value of Spanish and Mediterranean political culture,
became a metaphor for a whole universe of political and social
relations under the Franco regime.
Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy
of social control and the specific mechanisms used to form and
channel popular political consciousness. Connections are drawn
between the counterrevolutionary origins of the Franco regime
and the ideas, values and models of personal and political
interaction promoted by "official" Spain.
In Chapter VII the ideological apparatus of Francoist
rule is placed in the changing political economic context of
Spain in the 1960's and 1970 's. The class nature of the Spanish
economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an adequate con-
ceptualization of the phenomenon of franauismo itself and to
speculation about the course of political and social change in
post-Franco Spain.
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PREFACE
This thesis, which began as a study of franquismo
yivente, has concluded as a study of franquismo histo'rico .
Research conducted under a Foreign Area Fellowship in Spain
in 1972-1973 has taken nearly four years (and three different
teaching positions) to be completed. My writing would have
perhaps been easier and my judgments less precarious had this
work been finished before Franco died. From the beginning I
have been in some ways writing a counter- thesis , a thesis
against the prevailing ways of understanding Spain which seemed
to help but still miss an aspect of Spanish reality. Therefore,
the passing of Franco from the scene and of franquismo from
the seat of power to the handmaiden of power has subjected ray
own way of looking at Spain to the harshest possible test--
that of events themselves. What has been written can and will
speak for itself. My own view is that until now (June 1977)
ray judgments have stood the test of events reasonably welli I
have been perhaps too pessimistic about the prospects for
liberal democracy in post-Franco Spain, yet, as James R. Kurth
has argued, the verdict of history is not yet in:
It will be remarkable indeed if a liberal
democracy is successfully established in Spain
by the government of King Juan Carlos, by a
sort of historical compromise between Marxist
parties and Bourbon monarchy. It would be the
first time in twentieth-century Europe that
an authoritarian regime has transformed itself
viii
into a stable democracy without the violent
overthrow of the top leadership. But it would
not be the first time that political events
in Spain have surprised and astonished the
rest of the world.!
* «
This dissertation owes a debt of gratitude primarily
to Howard Wiarda for his support, encouragement and example of
scholarly ideals and practice. It is indebted also to Amando
de Miguel, Amparo Almarcha and my other amigos del despacho
who literally made most of the textbook analysis possible.
Those who have read and provided thoughtful reflections on the
dissertation include William Connolly, Harvey Kline and Penny
GiB. All obviously have made a contribution to what I have done
well and all are hereby absolved of what is still lacking,
A year of pleasure and work in Spain was provided by
n
the Foreign Area Fellov/ship Program and the NDEA Title IV
Fellowships. Both the pleasure and the work were shared by
my wife Pamela who was willing to divert her own career •'this
one more time."
"Political Parallelisms in Southern Europe since 1815,"
paper delivered at the Conference on Southern Europe, Columbia
University, New York, March 21-23» 1977. p. 22.
CHAPTER I
-OFFICIAL" POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN
AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE REGIME
"Official- Political Socialization
As a sub-field or sub-discipline, political socializa-
tion has become particularly attractive and especially frus-
trating for political scientists. Attractive because it appears
at first glance to deal with politics on the most profound
level: by studying the process through which individuals are
introduced into a political system, the most basic elements of
politics—its situational definition, political behavior and
attitudes, the internalization of values—might be studied and
understood; frustrating because as in too many areas of poli-
tical science, the analytical tools have been found wanting and
the theoretical conceptualizations that might lead to under- '
standing, confused.
This study deals with a relatively neglected area of
political socialization, what I have chosen to call "official-
political socialization and which might be called political
education, indoctrination civics or "brainwashing- in other
contexts. In my view -official" political socialization is the
self-conscious effort of governmental and, more broadly, poli-
tical authority to structure and, if possible, control the
2entrance of an individual into political awareness. I say
individual because "official" political socialization is not
merely concerned with children, as in the more traditional
approaches to political socialization, but with adults as well
Who may immigrate into a new political system or be subject to
the demands of a changed regime. I use the phrase "political
awareness" as a purposely vague description of an individual's
relation to political authority which includes not only his
recognition or nonrecognition of specific political symbols
such as institutions or officials, but also the entire range
of attitudes and behavior which do or may influence what an
individual views as political and what activity or inactivity
he pursues in politics. The broadness of the definition is due
to the fact that I will be writing here about values and beliefs
that may not immediately be seen as political but which—
certainly in Franco Spain and perhaps, under reexamination, in
all countries—are inherently political.
The argument I wish to make begins with a rather narrow
focus on what might be called the "official" value structure
of Spanish political authority revealed in an examination of
school textbooks written and used in the Franco years, parti-
cularly those used in courses of political education or forma-
tion (formacion)
,
the more suggestive Spanish term. It is
perhaps important to emphasize that I am at this time not
concerned with the effects of political socialization! I am
not surveying students nor any other population. My aim is
rather_to document the view (and. because all textbooks are
government censored and approved, this is the "official" view)
presented in the textbooks^of three areas I believe aVe
Jm^prtant in understanding the 'natur^Tf politi^in Francoist
5pain^ These three areas include views of the Individual-
his nature, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses, the State-
its formal structure and definition, and the Citizen-that area
where the individual and the state meet and interact.
The reasons why I have chosen to study the content of
"Official" political socialization rather than its affects or
results are varied. First of all. there were pragmatic con-
siderations of my initial relative unfamiliarity with Spain and
the difficulties of mounting a large-scale study employing
survey techniques. Joined to this were the political realities
my interests and the kinds of questions I thought important
would have proved delicate if not dangerous to Spanish
authorities.
Thirdly, I was concerned that current social science
techniques could not insure that a study of political attitudes
would not prove more useful to the government in repressing
political expression than to the Spanish people in increasing
their freedom and combating an image promoted within Spain and
without—for reasons I hope to make clear in this work—that
Spaniards are somehow lacking in the basic prerequisites for
democratic government. This trepidation about the ethical
consequences of the methodological approach most associated
with the behavioral persuasion in political science is of
course simply my o^vn point of view and open to counter-claims.
However. I believe I can show-for Spain, at least-that there
are some reasons for questioning the validity of survey-
response approaches to political inquiry and. more importantly,
that the search for these reasons contributes to an understanding
of "official" political socialization.
Fourthly, what evidence that there is about the relation
between the content of political education (in this case,
civics) textbooks and resultant political attitudes suggests
that there is little measurable correlation between the two.^
Moreover, it does not require much logic to reason that no
matter what the content of a textbook, the way in which it is
presented by the teacher can mean a world of difference. This
was perhaps particularly true in Franco Spain where the
teachers of formacion politica were a special and separate
branch of the teaching profession fairly universally hated by
their pupils both for what they taught and the way in which
they taught it. But this is no problem. My concern is not
with the measurable impact of these courses but with documenta-
tion of the government's "official" view of what the content of
political socialization should be. As I will later show it is
Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political
Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the
United States," American Political Science Review
. 62, 3
(September 1968), pp. 852-867.
not necessary for the "official" view to be "bought" 100% to
have effect and be effective in a program of social control.
Finally, the approach taken in this study and its focus
on the "official" version of what constitutes political reality
is justified by my own interpretation of what C. Wright Mills
has called the Sociological Imagination. As I understand
Mills, the task of each generation of social scientists is to
ascertain the important and relevant areas for social inquiry
in their historical epoch and to make such study, if at all
possible, a contribution to humanity's struggle for greater
freedom and dignity by exposing those thoughts, movements or
structures which threaten this struggle. It is my conviction
that the ways in which political authority controls and manipu-
lates political reality are vitally important concerns both for
Spaniards as they seek a more just future and for the liberal
democracies as they face a rising authoritarianism built on
racial, ethnic and economic fears.
Although the argument of this work begins with the
textbooks themselves it extends both forwards and backwards
from the three chapters on the texts which form the centerpiece
of this research. In preparation for the texts two basic areas
of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted
and defined for my own purposes. The first of these areas, to
which most of the first Chapter is devoted, concerns the
typology of regimes into which Franco Spain is to be fit.
This is no mere exercise in terminological hair-splitting for
the way in which one conceptualizes the Spanish polity makes
sense or nonsense out of the textbook passages themselves, it
is my contention that the prevailing
"authoritarian regime-
characterization Of Spain systematically understates the class
nature of the Francoist dictatorship and hence deflects one's
attention from the more nefarious and pervasive aspects of
social control under Franco. Thus, much of the first Chapter
explores the question of whether Spain can be understood--in
class terms-as fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian,
A second preliminary Chapter deals with a model or
socialization that is similarly appropriate to the reality of
Spanish ideology revealed in the textbooks. There has long
been a debate in the socialization literature over the relative
importance of various socialization "agents" and the way in
which distinct agents promote "democratic" or "authoritarian"
citizenship values. Given less attention in the literature is
the role of the State in modifying, indeed, "creating" values
consonant with its need for social control. Spain under Franco^
is offered as a concrete example of such "value promotion."
Explored in the second Chapter is the way in which the family,
a traditional institution and value of Spanish and Mediterranean
political culture, became a metaphor for a whole universe of
political and social relations under the Franco regime.
Analysis of the textbooks as Images of the State, Indi-
vidual and Citizen form the empirical core of the thesis.
Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy
7of social control and the specific mechanisms used to form and
channel popular political consciousness. In th'is Chapter con-
nections are drawn between the counterrevolutionary origins of
the Franco regime and the ideas, values and models of personal
and political interaction promoted by "official" Spain.
In a final concluding Chapter the ideological apparatus
of Francoist rule is placed in the changing political economic
context of Spain in the 1960's and 1970 's. As in the original
discussion of regime typologies, the class nature of the
Spanish economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an
adequate conceptualization of the phenomenon of franouismo
itself and, most importantly, to speculation about the course
of political and social change in post-Franco Spain.
Agents of Political Socialization
The study of political socialization in the United
States could probably be more appropriately titled the study
of political conformity I its body of socialization theory aptly
2
called conformity theory. This is apparent from the emphasis
on consensus in the bulk of political socialization
2Robert Parks, Political Socialization (University of
Massachusetts! Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 19?^) in a
review of political socialization as a sub-field of political
science makes this same point in distinguishing between
political socialization—the inculcation of a society's norms
and values in an individual—and political education—the
development of critical awareness with acceptance based on
understanding and choice.
8research^ and from the definitions of political socialization
if
Itself where successful socialization is defined as the degree
to^which complete internalization of a society's values is
accomplished. Such a conceptualization of political sociali-
zation is consistent with my earlier definition of "official"
political socialization and probably exactly the way in which
the Spanish government under Franco liked to view the process
of political "formation."
For the purposes of this study there are, however, more
important aspects of the way in which political socialization
has been defined than its conformist nature. Among these are
3_ ^
; .
Greenberg, "Consensus and Dissent: Trends in
Political Socialization," in Greenberg, ed
.
, Political Social-ization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 1-10.
kOne of the more blatant, "value-free" and conformist
definitions is that by Roberta Sigel:
Political socialization is the gradual learning
of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted
and practiced by the ongoing political system.
The goal of political socialization is to
so train or develop individuals that they become
well-functioning members of the political society.
While the definition of a well-functioning member
will vary with the political system— from
obedient passive subject in one system to active
participating citizen in another—a well-func-
tioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes)
society's political norms and who will transmit
them to future generations.
—Sigel, ed
.
, "Political Socializationi
Its Role in the Political Process," The Annals .
361 (September I965), p. 2.
9Whether the process o. socialization is seen as reXativel,
oraera, or chaotic an., relate, to this, those influences
<agents which are tak-pn +^ kke to be the most important in this
process
.
On the first point-the degree of orderliness of social-ization-it is useful to becin with . •
, ^,
^ ""^^^ Greens tem's contrasting
definitions of political socialization,
is t^T^elllLr^^^^^ socialization
formation, vlluel and^f political in-
agents who have b^eS foS^^'^'\' instructional
responsibility! A Sroa^r ""^^f?^^ ''^^^ ^^is
encompass all politick? iL''''^''^^^^^" ^'^'^id
infonial, delibera^e^nH ^^^"^^^
stage Of th:\^^r:^e?^ V^P anned at every
ex
' ^^w-i-j-ui*jcix jiearn
?icL"bX°vj:rlichtri'"^ affects- poU-
relevant social a?«?,^Hi^™i"f.°^ politically
of politicallv ..fi "2"^^ ^"'^ ^l^* acquisition
istics" ^ relevant personality character-
Sigel as well refers to the unstructured nature of socializa-
tioni
ot^e; experiences" 'l^i?^ incidental to
irofte^rrij^
Although both authors seemingly recognize political
socialization as a random, unordered process and. as in the
illan,
^Sigel, "Political Socialization," p.
10
case or Sigel, nol. that significant political learning
occur in
"non-political.. contexts, it is hard to find a reflec
tion Of this recognition in either the research of these two
authors or in the field of political socialization in general.
For understandable, though perhaps
"unscientific," reasons
studies Of political socialization tend to concentrate on one
or .ore agents of socialization, the principal among these
being the family, the peer-group and the school. This brings
us then to my second point of interest, the relative influeno
of various socialization agents.
One part of the debate over relative ir,-n„„u Bi x influence concerns
Which Of the "big three"-family, peer-.roup or school-is
n.ost important. Davies? and Dawson and Prewitt^ argue for the
primacy of the family in the formation of children's political
culture. Others have argued that parents transmit party pre-
ference but only lend support to other attitudes acquired out-
side the family, primarily in school.
9
Some such as Margaret Mead have stressed other factors
such as the mass media, particularly television, as gaining
i.ation.^^SLlA^:i6lTLyLl^r!9^5):
^/^^l?'
rRoctnr..^*?;..??'^^''?
^""^ ^- ^^ewitt, Political SocializationIB stoni Little, Brown and Co., 196977^ ^ '
9
u ^ A ^'^1 Grannis, "The School as a Model of Society."
Hofl /T^^.''^;^^ Education Bulletin. I967 and R.D.
?rrh??^ /.u?^"^^^' Th e Development of Political Attitude.^in Children ( Chicago 1 Aldine, 196?).
11
more importance in a postfigurative society.^O m addition,
the picture can be complicated further by sticking to the
richness of the earlier definitions of political socialization
and insisting on a consideration of the "economical, historical
and structural context of society" in which socialization takes
place and the political and economic crises that may form
important socialization events.
To the bedevilment of operational definitions and indices
-but again being faithful to the original definitions-one can
continue to add complications to what should or must be studied
to understand political socialization. A particularly inter-
esting approach stresses the importance of "indirect'' sociali-
zation (political learning in "non-political" contexts) where
the experience of the individual is taken as the fundamental
quality of political socialization and self- or auto-socializa-
tion the explanatory variable. Indeed, a review of the
socialization literature leads one to the conclusion that the
Margaret Mead, Growinp- Up in New Guine;^ (New Yorki
W. Morrow, 1962; and Sex and Temperament in Three PrimitiveSocieties (New Yorki Dell, I963). ~"
.^^Inga Findl, "Family versus Peer-Group in Political
Socialization," paper presented at the Political Socializa-
tion Workshop of the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium
for Political Research, Mannheim, Germany, April 12-18,
1973.
12Pier Paolo Benedetti, "Les bases structurales de L*
'autosocialization politique de jeunes," paper presented at ECPR
Joint Sessions, April 12-18, I973.
12
empirical areas to be studied under political socialisation
need to be significantly if not constantly expanded on theor.t -
ical grounds. "^-^
Perhaps one last "complication" should be added to this
fleeting picture of political socialization which is a more
fundamental criticism of the theoretical bases of the entire
area. David Marsh, in an overview of the literature,!^ analyzed
what he believes to be three key assumptions implicit in poli-
tical socialization research to date. The first assumption is
that "adult opinions are in a large part the end product of
youthful political socialization. "1^ Marsh found little
empirical evidence to justify this assumption which is based
on an undemonstrated stability of personality dimensions, atti-
tudes and behavioral intentions. A second assumption discussed
by Marsh is that "adult behavior is shaped in part by attitudes
learned during childhood socialization. "^^ This assumption is
undermined by evidence which documents the lack of correspond-
ence between attitudes and behavior. Political socialization.
13
IMla.. p. 1. Professor Benedetti is not merely voic-ing his own opinion but reflecting the point of view of a team
of researchers from the Carlo Cattaneo institute of Italy.
1^
"Political Socialization: The Implicit AssumptionsQuestioned," British Journal of Political Science . 1. k(October 1971), pp. 453-465.
•^
^Ibid.
. p. /156.
•^^
Ibid. . p. 460.
13
80 dependent on the survey questionnaire, is then threatened
with irifeLevance if the true concern is how and ^hy people
behave the way they do rather than the attitudes or non-atti-
tudes-'-'^ measured by a questionnaire.
Finally, a third assumption—that "individual political
opinions (and more specifically their political behavior) have
an impact on the operation of a nation's government and poli-
tical life"—was questioned by Marsh. Here his criticism
oaitered on the relative importance of some people's behavior
over others as it affects the political system. Thus, for
Marsh, the study of adult and particularly elite behavior
would seem more appropriate to an understanding of the impact
of political socialization on the operation of the political
system.
The reason for all these "complications" is that a
concentration on Spanish "official" political socialization
builds on several of the points made in the previous pages.
First of all, for reasons to be made more clear in the next
chapter, the family plays a unique role in the Spanish sociali-
zation process, and I will be spending some time discussing
17
"•Non-attitudes" are "creations" of a questionnaire.
Forced to choose among alternative answers without a "Do not
know" response or "guessing" at a response a person can produce
a completed questionnaire which measures nothing,
•^
^Ibid. . p. 464.
Ik
its influence and "contribution" to "official" socialisation.
This is not. however, to deny the argument set out above for
the importance of "indirect" agents. I hope to make clear that
the importance of the Spanish family in the socialization pro-
cess comes not from any theoretical view of its role but from
the influence of the pattern of family relations which is con-
tinued and reinforced by "indirect" or "non-political" sociali-
zation experiences.
Marsh's criticisms of the assumptions or
-^untested
theories" which underlie much political socialization research
seem to me to be a further justification for my concentration
on "official" socialization. Although the textbooks I will be
using were intended for children and adolescent readers they
were written by and represent the thinking of their adult )q
authors. Moreover, these adult opinions about the substance
of political reality were those of the elite; elite in the
sense of their educational status and position in the adminis-^/
trative structure and also because these opinions or teachings
received both the religious and political imprimateura of
Spain's ruling class. These opinions were important to this
elite even if the individual Spaniard was not aware or con-
vinced of their effect on him.
The question of the relations among personality, atti-
tude and behavior raised by Marsh also seems to have bearing
on the approach of this study. I have already mentioned that,
in my mind, certain political realities and cultural traits
15
of Spain which I will detail in later chapters limit the
validity of attitudinal surveys. The objection might be raised
that a concentration on the ideas or ideals of political forma-
tion textbooks takes one as far away from real political
behavior as does reliance on studies of personality or attitude
What is more, I have said that my interest is not in the meas-
urable impact of the political formation courses but in the
documentation of their "official" content.
The resolution of these apparent contradictions is that
behavior in Spain, especially political behavior under the
Franco regime had, besides personality or attitude content, an
19element of coe:-cion. ^ Although I hope to show that the Franco
regime evolved a method of social control which reduced the
necessity for blatant physical repression, police state terror
was still always there, whether in the back or foreground, to
"guarantee" that certain types of behavior were either produced
or prevented whether or not the "personality" or "attitude"
factor of this behavior existed. What I am saying is that one
can think of this political process as a kind of crude stimulus
response model. The political formation textbooks, together
with other areas pointed to by the texts, formed the stimulus
19
'^I am not denying that there was "persuasion" as well
as "coercion" in the system although whether this "persuasion"
was accomplished through rational presentation of alternatives
or through the manipulation of various "enemies" (the Reds, the
Protestants, etc.) and the resulting fear is, I think, an open
question. However, I do accept that auto-censura (self-
censorship) contains a strong element of persuasion; it is
probably more subtle and nefarious because it does.
16
for the desired response; if this response was not forthcoming
(and the response could obviously be inactivity or depoliti-
cization). there remained more brutal methods of insuring
compliance. Thus, it was not necessary for a Spaniard to agree
with his political formation textbook that "organic democracy-
is the only way Spain can be governed, he could be made to per-
form his proper, "organic" role. Like most governments the
Franco regime tried to maintain a monopoly of legitimacy but,
unlike some, it had the "freedom" to define the legitimate
political arena very narrowly and enforce its definition by
almost any means necessary.
Therefore, this dissertation is concerned with political
behavior; not merely that produced by the textbooks through
persuasion or other means but also that behavior enforced by
the regime. It is, then, necessary to discover the content of
••official" political socialization in order to understand what
is expected and what will be enforced.
Fascist Spain- Authoritarian Spain
The "enforcemenl;» of political behavior just referred to
was done, of course, by a particular regime—that of Franco.
To understand the concern of this regime with political sociali-
zation in general and, more specifically, to be able to evaluate
the content of its "official" socialization, it is necessary to
draw a characterization of the regime that departs significantly
from the prevailing typology of Franco Spain.
To do so is to reopen a debate now nearly closed
i
17
whether Spain should be cla<5«!l <• f =^ i <C assified (meaning understood) as an
"authoritarian" or a "fascist" regime. The article which
established the terminology of "authoritarian" Spain and which,
in turn, has initiated a school of "authoritarian" analysis^^
was that bv Juan J t.itt?J o . imz, titled appropriately,
'An Authori-
tarian Regime I Spain.
In his article, Linz tried to establish a category of
political systems outside the democratic-totalitarian axis and
which was not to be considered as an incomplete form of totali-
tarian or democratic systems but as a distinct type which
resolves, in distinctive ways, "problems common to all political
systems, maintaining control and gaining legitimacy, recruiting
elites, articulating interests and aggregating them, making
decisions and relating to various institutional spheres like
the armed forces, religious bodies, the intelligentsia, the
20
+ r) T?^^^^^^ ^* Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.. ComDara-
w. Anaerson, The Political i^conomv of ly'iOdern Snaint Policv-fl^lakin^ in an Authority r1 an .Sj^^stem' (;:adis on 1970 ); Samuel P
i^Mo^f^^^o"? ^^^^ Authoritarian PntitiV.n Modem Society. The Dynamics, o f Estabii,c.hPd One-Partv|yg|erns (New York 1970); Susan Kaufman Purcell. "Decision -Making in an Authoritarian Regiir.ei Theoretical Implicationsfrom a ^lexican Case Study," World Politico . 25, 5 (October
^(^{l^ PP« 28-5^j Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of
Emergence of a '-Modernizinp-" Authoritarian
196^-1970 (New York, 1971)? Phillippe C. Schmitter. Inte:7¥stConflict and Political Chanfce in Brazil (Stanford, I97I)
.
21,Juan J, Lmz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," inErik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds.. Mass Politics. Studies in
Political Sociolof^y (New Yorki Free Press, 1973).
~~
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economy, etc. ^.^^ authoritarian regimes as
S^^^H^^^ systems with limited, not responsiblp
^^-^^^^^^ elaborate anS
'
ties)^^ithou?^? (but with distinctive mentali-
^i^^""^} intensive nor extensive politicalmobilization (except at some points in theirdevelopment); and in which a leader (Sr occas-
fCrmaiL\!rd^.f • '^'^^'^^^ P-er within
predictLl'e'onef^5^' ''"^'^ ^^^^^^^^
Although Linz's brilliant analyses of Spanish politics
and the contribution his authoritarian typology has made to
comparative politics is indisputable. I would like to suggest
in this section that Linz leaves out one important aspect of
politics in his definition-class-which limits its power to
give an understanding of the Franco regime. I believe that
Franco Spain can properly be classified as a fascist regime
and that, in fact, doing so will enable us to see more clearly
the role of "official" political socialization in maintaining
social control.
"Fascism" as a tool of analysis in political science
has certainly fallen into disfavor. Trevor-Roper, in an
article generally denying the validity of the word as a category
of political systems, rejects "fascism" as "a word which, by
now, is either precisely dated or a meaningless tera of abuse. "^^
22^
Ibid.
. p. 25-!^.
^^Ibid.
. p. 255.
24
H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in
S.J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (Londoni Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1968), p. 38.
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He argues, then, that "fascism" corresponds to a certain his-
torical period in the development (or retrogression) of Western
industrial nations that has passed forever. Secondly, on a
less "value-free" level, he states a belief that "fascism" has
become a catch word for those of a certain ideological persuasi
(presumably the left) who use it as an expletive for all thos
with whom they disagree (presumably on the right). I would
like to answer first Trevor-Roper's contention that the use of
the word "fascism" has become a mere matter of "name calling"
and. then, discuss whether it is an artifact of political dis-
course ,
The first point to acknowledge must be that the word
"fascism" has, in fact, been overused, primarily by those on
the left. "Fascism" is an emotionally charged word and its use
implies an attempt to call down moral outrage against the person,
behavior or system to which it is applied. While it might be
argued that stretching a concept such as "fascism" for the
short-run gain of moral opprobrium may have the long-run con-
sequence of the loss of the word's moral purchase, the moral or
value content of the concept cannot be a prima facie basis for
its rejection in analytical use. Such a rejection would be,
of course, the direction in which a "value-free" political
science would like to head but it is easily shown that "value-
less" concepts are not obtainable if even desirable. The
concept of "democracy," for example, has undergone immense
reformation from the Platonian "democracy" based on slavery
20
and the subjugation of "lesser" citizens such as women, to the
"mass democracy" of China, to the low participation "liberal
democracy" of the Anglo-American experience. As MacPherson
has pointed out^^ all those who do not define "democracy" as
merely a process^^ must accept the historical claim of a wide
variety of political systems to being democratic. Most liberals
writing on politics do take the value position that much of
the Third World and Socialist polities have misappropriated
the label of "democracy" but as MacPherson argues they stand
on weak historical grounds in wishing to restrict the concept
of "democracy" to the liberal democracies of Western Europe and
the United States. Yet few would argue for the banishment
of "democracy" from political science texts as merely an
emotionally charged, emotive concept nor, I believe, are there
many who would suggest it is a word limited to a certain his-
torical period (early Greece?, 19th century Europe?) long
passed.
To deal more fully with the rejection of "fascism" as
2'd
-"C.B. MacPherson, The Real V/orld of Democracv (New Yorki
Oxford University Press, 1972)
.
26Linz*s definition is, revealingly, a pluralist, pro-
cess definition!
We consider a government democratic if it supplies
regular constitutional opportunities for peaceful
competition for political power (and not just a
share of it) to different groups without excluding
any significant sector of the population by
force
.
—Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime," p. 25^.
21
LC
-C
an historical artifact I would like to turn to a longer dis-
cussion Of Trevor-Roper's article on "fascism." Essentially.
Trevor-Roper views "fascism" as a combination of two social
and political systems. "clerical conservatism" and "dynami
fascism." "Clerical conservatism" is viewed as the heir of
19th century aristocratic conservatism based on the Catholi
philosophical foundations of Pius IX and Leo XIII. It seeks
an ordered, hierarchical, undemocratic, 'corporative* state.
"Dynamic fascism" is for Trevor-Roper the only proper fascism
which occurs in those countries where the middle class is not
only frightened and radical but powerful; where industrializa-
tion has increased its size and made its values dominant for
the aristocracy and the lower middle class. He goes on to
state that:
. . .
fascism proper, what I have called
•dynamic fascism'— the cult of force, contemptu-
ous of religious and traditional ideas, the
self-assertion of an inflamed lower middle
class in a weakened industrial society— is
radically different from ideological conserv-
atism, the traditional 'clerical conservatism'
of the older regime, modified and brought up
to date for the twentieth century. Both were
authoritarian. Both defended social hierarchy.
But the difference betv^een them is as great as
that between the divinely consecrated absolu-
tism of the Stuart Kings and the naked, uncon-
secrated absolutism of Hobbes. Nevertheless,
these two different political forms are con-
stantly confused. They are confused in fact
—for both were brought together by common fear
of communist socialism in the 1920s. They were
27^
Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," pp. 25-26.
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confused by design, in order to attain power.
tW^o^^ .^"-^^ Hitler, would pose as conserva-ives, and 'conservatives,' like Franco, wouldpose as fascists.
. . . The two forms were also
confused m the vocabulary of the Left. Soci-
alists, hating both, easily treated them as
one, and denounced the rule of Dollfuss in
Austria, or Franco in Spain, or Horthy in
Hungary, as 'fascist.' This was excusable inthe 1930s when the confusion was general andpolitics required opposition to both. It isless excusable now, when fascism is dead and
our need is not to oppose but to understand .28
I would like to examine this last lengthy quotation from
Trevor-Roper to see if 'fascism' is, indeed, historically "dead"
and whether our current situation requires "understanding"
rather than "opposition."
It is clear from the quotation above that Trevor-Roper
does include the notion of 'class' in his definition of 'fascism
although the class element is less explicitly contained in
'clerical conservatism.' However, it is sufficently evident
here and even more so elsewhere in his article (p. 25) that he
views 'clerical conservatism' as a reaction to the rising lower
class consciousness of the 19th and early 20th centuries which
came to be embodied in and represented by socialism. "Social-
ism, the anti-clerical workers' doctrine of the twentieth
century, which had revealed its true character in Russia, must
not be allowed to succeed, "^^ Thus, at this level 'clerical
conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' are alike in that they are
^^Ibid.
. p. 28.
^^Ibid. . p. 25.
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reactions to a lower or working class consni rn^^npc..
.
The difference between 'clerical conservatism* and
•dynamic fascism' can be found by answering the question, reac-
tion by whom? In the case of 'dynamic fascism' the response
is generally "the middle class," perhaps modified by the words
-inflamed," "lower" or "new" t "So each stage in the rise of
European fascism can be related to a moment of middle-class
panic caused either by economic crisis or by its consequence,
the threat of socialist revolution. "^° Reaction by whom? in
the case of 'clerical conservatism' is not as clearly answered
by Trevor-Roper. "Clerical conservatism is the direct heir of
the aristocratic conservatism over which the liberal bourgeoisie
triumphed in the second half of the nineteenth century. "^-^ It
does appear, however, that the association of the aristocracy
and the Church would indicate the title of 'upper class' as
appropriate to this group. Therefore, as a first approximation
to Trevor-Roper's distinction between 'clerical conservatism'
and 'dynamic fascism' one might say that the former can be char-
acterized as a reaction to lower class consciousness by upper
class and traditional elites while the latter is a reaction
most associated with the middle class.
If, then, the "objects" of reaction (the lower classes)
^^Ibid.
. p. 24.
^•'• Ibid.
. p. 25.
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same
in 'clerical conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' are the
—differing in the class or classes which lead the reaction-
how would regimes characterized as one or the other differ?
They would, says Trevor-Roper, both be authoritarian and both
committed to maintaining social hierarchy. The differences for
Trevor-Roper would seem to stem primarily from the "civilizing"
influences of an upper-class-led reaction which avoided the
"excesses" of 'dynamic fascism' pursued by Nazi Germany:
Who can tell how Italian fascism would have
developed had it not been for the fatal depend-
ence^ on Nazi Germany? Mussolini might have
subsided, like Franco, into a mere Latin
dictator, preserved in power (if at all) by
electoral manipulation and diversionary
rhetoric— 'Nice, Savoy, Tunis, Malta' serv-
ing the one as Gibralter serves the other.
^Fascism' would then have a different defin-
ition, without racialism, without public
atheism, without Nordic nonsense or German
Schadenfreude. It was German power, and
that alone, which gave a hideous similarity
to national anti-communist movements .... 32
Thus, Trevor-Roper has come to the extreme conclusion that
•dynamic fascism' is just barely applicable to Mussolini's
Italy, Hitler's early inspiration; that 'dynamic fascism'
supposedly now dead was really only a distant nightmare, a
Teutonic aberration.
But is this conclusion historicallv acceptable? The
caveat must be observed that the "moral lapse" interpretation
of fascism and Nazism is characteristic of Liberal historians
Ibid. . p. 37
25
such as Benedetto Crocei
Fascism, Nazism, was a factor, or an intellec-
tual and moral disease, not confined to one
class, but pervading the minds and imaginations
and wills of men in general, a crisis bom of
the loss of faith not only in rational Liberal-
ism, but also in Marxism. .-^-^
Thus, although Trevor-Roper includes class as part of his
analysis, an "aberration" theory of fascism, which his ulti-
mately becomes, must rest on a rejection of class as a key
determinant in the rise of fascism,
A possible correction of this "exceptionist" view of
fascism is offered by Arno Mayer. He argues for distinguish-
ing among three variations of rightism: reaction, conservatism
and counterrevolution.
Conservatives are those who came to pov/er
under the rules of a system v/hich they find
changing. Their goal is to try to preserve
the rules because they satisfy their ambi-
tions and because conservatives have come to
believe in their internal goodness. Reaction-
aries are more decidedly ideological. They
wish not to preserve the rules that are
changing, but in fact to go back to even
older rules from an earlier time. Counter-
revolutionaries are those we generally call
fascist. They have, in fact, a whole new
set of rules, which puts the other two groups
into a dilemma. For conservatives and reac-
tionaries to make a coalition with the fascists,
they must violate their basic belief in rules
^-^Quoted by Angelo del Boca and Mario Giovana, Fascism
Today. A World Survey .^ trans, by P.H. Boothroyd (London?
.
Heinemenn, 1970) » p. 1
•
^\rno J. Maver. Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe.
1870-1956 > An Analytic Framework (New Yorki Harper and Row,
1971).
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willing to forgo their ideology. 35
Mayer's essential point is that. "Counterrevolution is
closely interlocked with revolution. "36 Fascism, then, is to
be analytically understood as the Right's response to the
threat of revolution by the Left, or what I described earlier
as rising lower class consciousness. In the twentieth century,
this revolution is a Communist one and thus Fascism is con-
ceptually the antithesis of Communism. However. Mayer is
careful to point out in his book that Fascism and Communism
are not mere variations of totalitarianism.
Except for a debate over whether totalitarianism was
historically unique or a version of older forms of tyranny or
dictatorship, Western intellectuals by the 1950 's had agreed
on a definition of totalitarianism as "legally unrestrained
government, dominated by a power-seeking charismatic leader
whose instruments for total control of polity, society, and
psyche include a single mass party, a rigid ideology, pseudo
elections, systematic terror, state monopoly of mass communica-
tions, and a centrally directed industrial economy. "^7 ^his
35_Summarized from Mayer by Alan Wolfe, "Waiting for
Rightyi A Critique of the 'Fascism' Hypothesis," Review of
Radical Political Economy 5, 3 (Fall 1973), p. 55.
36,,Mayer, Counterrevolution
, p. 9.
^
^Ibid
,
. p. 20.
2?
definition glossed over differences between the socioeconomic
causes and historical development of Fascism and Communism to
pose Communism—the post-war replacement of Fascism—as the
prime threat to Western parliamentarianism. Among the differ-
ences between Fascism and Communism which Mayer points out are
that (1) the Bolsheviks seized power from below as a relatively
small group of militants whereas the fascists in both Italy and
Germany seized power from the top in a virtual collaboration of
traditional elites; (2) the Bolsheviks held power against a
consistently hostile array of economic, political, social, bur-
eaucratic, and ecclesiastic elites at home and their supporters
abroad, while the fascists before and after their assumption of
political control, relied on the sanction and cooperation of
the "throne, the altar and the sword"; (3) an entirely new,
revolutionary elite of propertyless politicians and experts was
formed to carry out radical programs in the political economy
and society; the fascists, while forming a distinct political
class which held sway in the areas of politics and ideas,
mingled with an old ruling class that maintained its privileged
position in status, education and economics.
If Mayer is correct (and I believe he is) in distin-
guishing Fascism as the counterrevolutionary opposition to left
revolution it is a powerful argument against the position that
Fascism must be dismissed from social science as an historical
artifact. Only those who continue to maintain the "end-of-
ideology-thesis"—now thoroughly discredited by events— could
28
contena that revolution-an. necessarU.. counte.revolution-
no longer is a powerful ana contemporary force in worla events
If fascism, understooa broaaiy for now as counter-
revolution, must be recoffnizeri oog ea as a possible reality in a
revolutionary 20th century, it remains to be seen whether
fascism is a useful concept for analyzing.^ regimes,
Whether counterrevolution has in fact triumphea in its inevit-
able reaction to revolution.
For this I would like to turn to a scholar who believes
fascism to be such a useful concent rp . Gmo Germani in a variety
Of articles has set forth a conception of fascism which he
believes remains pertinent to the analysis of contemporary
polities. His view coinciaes with that of Mayer in seeing
fascism as a tenuous acoommoaation among blatant fascists
(counterrevolutionaries) ana other "new" groups, with sectors
Of the traditional
"establishment" (reactionaries ana conserva-
tives) with the aim of inducing a forced "demobilization" of
the lower class. 39 Germani maintains that these main functions
^VoTp''^f:/ffJ!!!"^,";.?"!"?--- " in S.J. Woolf , ea.
.
It;iy ;^d'spaS'"'S^^P°'H'\'-'^r °^ ^""^'^ Fascist 'Regimis.
ian Pol?ti?rt^'v.J «""ti"gton and C.H. Moore, Authorit^r-
n^ ^^Q ^"^^''ty (New York. Basic Books, 1970),pp. 339-379! "Social Change ana Intergroup Conflict." in I L
?resr\'Q641-' "^^-.Sr^^g""^"^^ (New^York. Sxfora ' UniveJsi^y
ffinf^A,
391-t08, ana Sociolo<ria ae 1^ Mn,^ern^,.MxJ(Buenos Aires i Paidos, 1969).
39Germani, "Political Socialization," pp. 3«tO-34l, Ger-man! s views of "integration," "mobilization" and "aemobilization"
are set forth in his own Soclolofria ana the Horowitz volume.
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of fascism may take on different political forms depending on
such factors asi
1. the ideolof^ical climate predominant at thenational and ^ the international level at theperiod m which the regime is established;
2. the position of the country within the in-ternational system, the characteristics ofthis system in terms of economic, political,
and military power differentials amon^
nations and the current international cleavages
and conflicts; ^
3. the degree of modernization (economic,
social, and political), already achieved bythe society (within the "middle range" broadlydefined
. .
. )
;
^,
the characteristics of the culture and of
the social structure and especially of the
stratification system as it has emerged fromprevious transition, and as shaped by otherlong-run historical factors;
5. the nature of the coalition cc-using the
various segments of the high class and elites,
and Its composition;
6. the role of the middle classes (varying
from ^ a dynamic one, as a mass basis for the
fascist movement, to a rather passive
participation in support of the regime);
7. the role of the army (to a great extent
determined by historical sociocultural
factors mentioned in 4. above ).^0
He goes on to distinguish between two variations of
fascism: "Classic" European fascism which assumed the form
of a one-party totalitarian state and other aborted or short-
lived European fascisms which became variations of an authori-
tarian form. Added as well are the "military" fascisms (espec-
ially in Latin America) which are military functional substi-
tutes for fascism.
^^
Ibid.
. p. 3^1.
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Clearly, Ger.ani is the .ost tolerant a.ong the authors
I have presented of the possibilities for divergent fo^s of
fascism Which still remain fascist (and can be usefully classi-
fied as such) in their essential subst^. a demobilization
Of the lower classes by some combination of upper and middle
Strata.
It may seem strange at first to speak of a "demobiliza-
tion occurring under fascism because of the image given us of
the mass rallies, parades, etc. which marked Nazism. But if one
focuses on any nation other than Hitler
-s Germany (and if one
will admit that fascism was a reality in other nations besides
Germany) the fundamental "clamping down" of the lower and work-
ing classes by the fascists is evident. Furthermore, if one
gives a qualitative aspect to "mobilization"'^^ where participa-
tion by virtue of increased suffrage or additional unionization
is qualitatively different from participation in mass rallies,
the case for a "demobilization" can be made even in
41 .
Linz, as might be anticipated, argues for "a fairly
narrow, specific definition of fascism as tssential in orde? todistinguish it from pseudo- or semi-fascisms and the varioustypes of authoritarian, non-democratic, conservative movements."In Discussion—Fascism and Society," Woolf, Nature of Fascism ,
p. lUo, —
'
ui-.- ^^^^^f^^ differentiates between "primary" and "secondary"mobilization in his schema and though it is not essential to myline of thought here one should refer to Germani's complete
-works listed earlier to get a proper idea of his theoretical
consistency.
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Germany.
And What does all this have to do with Spain and Lin.'s
-del Of authoritarian systems? I would maintain that the
Choice Of language we employ in describing political systems
will have an important impact upon the way in which one
approaches both the study of these systems and the value posi-
tion one takes in the interpretation of their political structure
and internal dynamics .'^'^ Thus, I reject both of Trevor-Roper's
contentions that fascism must inevitably become merely a matter
Of name-calling and that contemporary social scientists should
or could "understand" and not •6ppose."'^5
begins to%T,%\tr,tlltJ!'.ll bS^Ss^^^f'm^Tn^'f'"^ '^^^ ,
elual y-baT^^
ko£^Lih t° r
"
Union/L"'pre?erab!?ftrfS: ^^"-^"^^ - ^-"t
in William^l ^riino^^i^' ^^^^f^^^' "Theoretical Self-Consciousness,"
and PolUicai Th^o^v ^r^"- ^l^"" "^^^ Social Strunt.rp
'
^g g iitic l e ry (Lexington, Mass.i D.C. Heath. 1974)—
^
^0^^^^^ contested Concepts " in P ax"^"^'
Prentice Hall 1^/''''''' (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
the Self-^^ni:. 121-146; Alasdair Maclntyre, Ap:ainst
rh^r?p^^I??o l^"^- ^^^^ Schocken Books, 19?l)i
S^fJ^^- '"'/I^^^^^'P'^^t^'^^^^^ Sciences of Man," Review
?n Pni f "^g P^^^ PP- ^-^1' Charles Taylor, "Neut^fllt^
pp. 16-59?
Connolly and Gordon, Social Structure .^
pv.in^. ^Ti^^ I reject a definition of fascism so narrow as toexclude it from the analysis of contemporary political systems
I support Wolfe ("Waiting for Righty") in his view ?hat ifis Aot
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However, although I would not reject the term fascism
on the grounds that it has a certain moral content, I would not
argue for its use as a typification of the Spanish system
unless it contributed to an understanding of its dynamics as
an ongoing polity. I believe that Linz's definition concen-
trating (in Germani's words) on the "form" rather than the
•Substance" of the Spanish system lacks an important "ideological"
dimension which Mayer and Germani include. By focusing only on
Spain's authoritarian political aspects, in other words, the
Linz typology misses a critical part of the Spanish system,
namely its pattern of class dominance, a pattern defined here
as "Fascist."
I would expand further on this point by reference to
Jean Blondel's typology of systems offered in Comparing Poli-
tical Systems. Blondel seeks to compare countries along
three dimensions
i "participation," "means of government" and
"ideology." He views "participation" as the number of people
who take part in decision-making which may be represented by
a dimensional continuum from ideal "democracy" of participation
by all to pure "monarchy" of decision-making by one individual.
The dimension of the "means of government" runs from a "liberal"
to be used lightly as mere invective. As for the possibility
of divorcing study from commitment (or fact from value) advocated
by Trevor-Roper, one need only peruse the literature of the pre-
ceeding footnote to see the irresponsibility as well as faulty
scholarship required for such an undertaking,
Blondel, Comparing: Political Systems (New Yorki Praeger,
1972).
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Diagram I
Source: Blondel, Comparing: Political Systems , p. kO,
ideal where policy is the product of discussion and imple-
mented through persuasive Tnean^ to an "authoritarian" endpoint
with decisions made arbitrarily and executed through coercion.
A third dimension, "ideology," refers to one's position on a
conservative-radical continuum with "conservative" referring
to a position denying movement towards greater socioeconomic
equality and "radical," stressing such egalitarianism.
As can be seen from the diagram, an authoritarian-
conservative regime (where Franco Spain is placed by Blondel) is
characterized by low participation, authoritarian "means and
3^
a conservative ideology stressing severe social and economic
inequality. Blondel thus adds to his typology the facets of
class and ideology seen by Germani and Mayer as important in
distinguishing among polities of right and left and which are
glossed over by the catch-all terminology of "authoritarian
regime." To expand on this point I would like to suggest cer-
tain inadequacies found in Linz's definition of an authoritarian
regime
.
Pluralism
A main feature of authoritarian regimes according to Linz
is their limited pluralism: certain group interests are forcibly
prevented from political expression. Yet a broad category such
as authoritarianism gives one no indication of the nature of
the ruling groups or, in turn, what groups they seek to exclude.
Linz himself cites as an example that religion is a group
interest forcibly excluded in Turkey and Mexico and labor one
such group in Spain, Yet no counterpoise more striking than
traditional religion and a labor movement could be found in the
twentieth century to illustrate the differences between two
regimes such as Spain and Mexico. Even after acknowledging the
authoritarian nature of Mexico's current system, ' one must
still be impressed by and analytically concerned with the
fundamental though incomplete transformation produced by the
^''^Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracyi A Critical
View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971 )•
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Mexican revolution in contrast to the reinstatement of tradi-
tional interests such as the Church and the Crown in Franco
Spain. In Mayer's terms, Franco Spain and Mexico tend towards
opposite poles of a spectrum; in Blondel's, Mexico, a populist
system, and Franco Spain, an authoritarian-conservative one, are
separated by their quite different positions on all three
dimensions of participation, means and ideology; for Linz,
they are both "authoritarian regimes."
Mentality versus Ideolop-y
Linz in seeking to separate Franco Spain from the cate-
gory of totalitarian polities, suggests that authoritarian
regimes are characterized by "mentalities" rather than "ideolo-
gies." The difference between the two is for Linz as follov/s:
• • • ideolorries . , . are systems of thought
more or less intellectually elaborated and
organized, often in written form, by intellec-
tuals, pseudointellectuals
, or with their
assistance;
. . . mentalities
. , . are ways
of thinking and feeling, more emotional than
rational, that provide non-codified ways of
reacting to situations. Ideologies have a
strong, Utopian element; mentalities are
closer to the present or the past. Totalitar-
ian systems have ideologies
. . . while authori-
tarian regimes are based more on distinctive
mentalities which are difficult to define. ^^-9
Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to draw the
outlines of an official Francoist ideology, the task of demon-
^8
Based on a distinction drawn by Theodor Geiger; cited
by Linz, "Spain."
^^Linz, "Spain," p. 25?.
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strating the internal consistency of Francoist political
thought must be left for later chapters. However, here one
might challenge the distinction drawn between "ideologies" and
"mentalities." Consider, for example, the contrast between
the following passages from Wolfe and that quoted above from
Linz
:
Fascism is also characterized by a de-
emphasis on doctrine, leading to a worship
ol the ^spontaneous and the irrational.
Mussolini said it well: 'No dogmal Disci-
Jir+v.^'^^^i''?^-' '^'^y program is action,not thougnt.' Or, 'We think with our blood.'
similarly, as Neumann /Behemoth (New York:Harper Torchbooks, 1966/ points out, leaders
01 Hitler's Germany continually sacrificedideology to practice, Neumann in fact goesfurther by claiming that National Socialism
was guided by no political thought at all.
Mussolini, he suggests, at least had a tradi-
tion of pragmatism to fall back upon, while
the German fascists did not even have that.
No known absolutistic or counterrevolutionary
theory fits National Socialism, because
. . .it has no theory of society .' -^"^
Fascism, as Neumann pointed out, goes
about as far as a capitalist country can go
in relegating ideolo^cy to a minimal role.°
The moment is important, and nothing must
stand in the way of expediency, Albert
Speer's memoirs testify to this; Hitler is
pictured as a total opportunist, one whose
moods determined policy. Since moods change,
so must the policies. The worship of the
spontaneous and the irrational, so central
to the fascist experience, became ends in
themselves . -^l
As can be seen from these two passages, Linz's charac
Wolfe, "V/aiting for Righty," p. ^9.
Ibid.
. p. 57,
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terization of "mentalities" as emotional and irrational can be
accommodated quite well in an explanation of totalitarian
Germany and the pragmatism, state planning and worship of
technocratic solutions which form the ideology of the end-of-
ideology thesis^2 ^^^^^ authoritarian ^p.^n. one
can, therefore, turn Linz's distinction on its head and argue
that while the consistency and comprehensiveness of the Franco
regime's theory of society may distinguish it from Nazi Germany,
it does not form the basis for the distinction between authori-
tarian and totalitarian polities which Linz attempts to draw.
Apathy versus Mobilization
This feature of authoritarian regimes is clearly for
Linz an important difference between authoritarian and totali-
tarian regimes. Yet as I have suggested earlier, borrowing from
Germani and Mayer, a demobilization of the lov/er class is the
raison d'ete for fascist movements and, if one does not focus
exclusively on Nazi Germany, such a demobilization is apparent.
This is not to argue that there are not differences among coun-
tries such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy and
Franco Spain but that such differences should not obscure the
sociological event of demobilization which was central to the
counterrevolutionary movements in each. Germani, for example,
has shown in his article on the political socialization of
youth in Spain and Italy, the dilemma created for the regimes
52Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideologyi A Dissent
and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review . 60
(March I966).
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by the need to gain adherents a,»ong youth while maintaining
control and. likewise, of promoting an ideal of social justice
While repressing labor."
^^^^^^ ^^^^
differences between Spain and Italy are explained by the fact
that Spain was not on a war-footing and therefore
' did not require
the active support needed in Italy. Differences in mobilization
can also be accounted for by remembering that Franco came to
power as a result of his defeat of revolutionary forces in the
Civil War and the systematic elimination of opposition in the
"terror years" immediately after the dictatorship was installed.
^As Linz mentions, regimes such as Spain are characterized
by a depolitici7,.tion of public life in the sense that apathy-
is created and, if necessary, enforced. However, this depoli-
tioization in some areas is accompanied by a desired or unde-
sired politicization of other areas such as sports which are
used by the regime to divert energies and produce false con-
sciousness •^S and previously innocuous functions such as the
presentation of new publications or even death announcements . 5^
53Germani, "Political Socialization," pp. 3^3-344.
5kFor an interesting look at political assassination afterthe war see Jesus M de Ivliguel, "El suicidio en Espana," Hevistagspanola de la Opinion Puh1
i
or
, 18 (I969), pp. 195-233 in whichde i^'Jiguel---in typical "between-the-lines" fashion—examines
several theories" of "suicide" in an attempt to explain the
unexpected rise m so-called "suicides" after the Civil War.
55
T.^' •
Eyaristo Acevedo, Carta Abierta a un Hinrhp (Madrid 1Ediciones 99, 1973).
56t1 was present at several book presentations which
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Thus While the population n,ay not be actively mobilized on
behalf Of the regime, there is an active effort to depoliticize
and channel people in ways which will be supportive of the main-
tenance of control by the rulers.
There are. then, reasons why Spain may not have been
forced as far into the internal contradition faced by Italy and
other fascist states of culling mass support while carrying out
counterrevolutionary demobilization. Also the "apathy produced
or encouraged by regimes such as Spain is not an indication of
a lack of control of political leadership over the ruled but
of the fact that this conscious and constant control can
successfully be maintained without more totalitarian measures.
As Germani has argued:
• • •
even^if the more heterogeneous composition
or the ruling coalition determines the 'limitedpluralism' which defines in Linz's terms the
authoritarian version, such 'pluralism' cannot
extend beyond the limits and the interests of
coalition itself, that is, it still must
operate within the system . Outside it, the
rigid repressive controls of the authoritarian
regime operate as efficiently and oppressively
as any totalitarian-like type of control. 5°
afford the opportunity to political dissidents not yet exiled
of gathering without obtaining a permit and discussing politicalissues a semi-public forum. Another example of Spanish poli-
tical ingenuity was when after the death of Salvador Allende in
Chile, Spanish leftists published announcements in the necro-
philia section such as "Salvador Allende, We Salute his Life and
Work," which expressed a public opinion otherv/ise impossible to
make and politicized even the obituaries. The government soon
caught on, however, and forbid any such announcements in the future.
57The mechanism of such control is explained more fully in
Chapter VII.
Germani, "Political Socialization , " p. •
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Toward a Conceptualization of the Franco
Regime
In this section I would like to summarize my objections
to the
-authoritarian'' typology expounded by Linz and then move
on to a richer conceptualization of Franco Spain as a "type" of
political system.
Although as mentioned near the beginning of this dis-
cussion Of "authoritarian" regimes, Linz seeks to view the
"authoritarian" type as distinctive from democratic or totali-
tarian polities and not a half-way system between the two, it
appears that many of the inadequacies of his definition stem
from an acceptance of a false dichotomy dra^m by this democratic-
totalitarian continuuni. Impressed by the obvious difference
between the intense repression of Nazi Germany and the relative
••looseness" of the Spanish regime, Linz has tried to "rescue "^^
Franco Spain from a category he sees as overly restrictive and
analytically dysfunctional. Yet within this category of "totali-
tarianism" there are two types of polities—not one— whidi while
superficially alike are vastly different in their mode of coming
I'^se the word "rescue" to imply some normative moti-
vation behind the attempt to remove Franco Spain from the category
of fascist or totalitarian systems. By this I do not in theleast question Juan Linz's excellent scholarship or commitment
to liberal democratic values. I mean to suggest only that like
any social scientist including myself he seeks moral and rationaljustifications for his actions. Thus I would maintain that
there are ethical and normative considerations behind his view
that Franco Spain v/as less nefarious than fascist and communist
systems he sees as totalitarian just as there are similar com-
mitments behind my more critical view.
to power, the ruling apparatus they created and the social and
economic goals they pursue, similarly, a category of •authori
tarian" regimes subsumes important differences between countri
such as Franco Spain and Mexico.
These differences basically revolve around the issue of
ideology, the purpose for which certain regimes have been
established and the goals which they more or less effectively
pursue. Thus in concentrating on the "means of government"-
the ways in which governmental policy is produced and imple-
mented-the category of "authoritarian" regimes tends to leave
out considerations of the content of such policies and whether
a regime arose as a reaction to rising demands for greater
socioeconomic equality or to pursue (or channel) such goals.
This typology deemphasizes as well the depoliticization
and demobilization which are central concerns of regimes of
the "reactionary," "conservative" or "counterrevolutionary"
type such as Spain; it deflects one's attention from the ideo-
logical apparatus of social control necessary to such demobili-
zation and leads one instead to concentrate on surface simi-
larities of form over differences in substance .
I would like to present therefore an alternative con-
ceptualization of Spain, based primarily on Blondel's typology
of authoritarian-conservative systems. First, I would like
to lay out the general conditions which Blondel sees as
60mu ^ T
1
^
The following is taken from Chapter 13 of Blondel,
Comparing Political Systems .
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supportive o. an authoritarian conservative re.i.e. t.en tnespec... roaas to power „hic.
.a.
.e taKen
.roups reacting
to these conditions and, finallv +h= 4. .structures or attributesthat are characteristic of such systems.
5'or(wh|thl?'t'hrs'^,?5 is
servltiv:':\^i*b^?af^d%';^ScJIt f'L'd\°Sauthoritarian, or povulUfV^^r^ f ^fairly rapidlv who^ +k ^ decreasing
ential but their role in thrJ^'^-''-^^
Drocpcjc TO aIZZ . ^ aecision-makini=-
?ondil!ons con??ibu?f'to"' f"" socioeconomic
emctivenesTo^rt'he'^^s^tL'al^en^L^ff!?!"^
pr^hab^illtror:''la^.^!o^e?°f3"^^y--ai
'
In addition to the evolving breakdown of the status quo
described above by Biondel there are new demands for development
and change
:
Authoritarian conservative systems
. . tendto appear when demands for socioeconomic de-
Tffc^-^ (and indeed for participation orliberalization) begin to be fairly lar^e andconstitute a challenge of some magnitude,
«nd r^.""^^^ '^^^^ challenge is so stringa so buttressed by an extensive party andgroups, or when change has become so widely
?ion^l^^A
that the legitimacy of the tradi-
dw?ndLd S""^^ effectively
as set o,.? ?n PH r''''?^ 5^"^? Blondel a specific meaning
^?ouDs exnrpS.^^''^^^^ ^
Of his book. Briefly stated
, communal
f?0UDs havP rr.Lf?^\^'^" relationships while association.!group e a particular aim or set of aims. Communal groups,
^3
One can see here then the view of such regimes as
being reactive to a rising lower class consciousness described
earlier in reference to Mayer and Germani.
Blondel sees three ways in which the movements reacting
to such conditions can come to power: (1) directly from a
traditional conservative system in which a challenge to the
leadership is developing and a greater degree of "imposition"
or repression is required than heretofore; (2) by a "pre-emptive
strike" to prevent an alleged leftist take-over by a new right-
wing elite which sees the traditional system then in power as
incapable of preserving important traditional values; (3) in
reaction to an existing liberal democratic, populist or radical
authoritarian system which is seen as pursuing dangerous
radical goals but which has not yet gained sufficient le^-itiraacy.
Regardless of the way such a regime has come to power
it will seek to return to the values of the past and to a con-
figuration of structures that characterized previous (in some
cases even mythical) political systems. However, the attempted
return to the past encounters two immediate problems. First
of all, to the degree that the traditional social structure
the more traditional types, are further divided into customary
groups, such as tribes, families or ethnic groups, and institu-
tional groups, such as military or bureaucratic organizations.
Associational groups can be characterized as protective . such
as trade unions, or promotional
. such as peace movements or con-
sumer
^
groups
. Communal groups when challenged by the more modern
associational groups may at times form dependent associations
which move into the political arena in ways not amicable to the
communal groups themselves. An example of this would be the
Christian Democratic parties fostered by the Church to counter
the electoral power of threatening secular associations.
based on ethnic, regional or religious groups has been under-
mined
,
demands
.ay be ™ade through new groups of a ™ore associ-
ational nature such as parties or unions Thu=. », iftus, a great deal
Of imposition
.ay he required. Secondly, opposition
.ay arise
«ithan the ruling coalition of co..unal groups fro. loyalty to
a deposed king or leader or due to uneasiness with the degree
of imposition required to maintain rule.
One solution to these problems would be the creation
Of a party. Yet the authoritarian conservative regi.e, oli-
garchical in nature, is loath to i.plant a party which has
extensive roots in the population. It prefers a desendent
party, one superimposed on the social structure fro. above.
Only where the challenge to its rule comes primarily fro.
associational groups (as in more
-developed" polities where
the threat of socialist revolution see.s real) will true mass
parties be developed.
In the absence of support from a party, the military
and possibly the bureaucracy will become important props to the
regime. Yet here the regime must meet two important conditions,
the military must remain tied to the traditional values of the
communal groups while at the same time its nationalistic aspira-
tions for the country must not be frustrated by a lack of
development. In this delicate balance of. at times, contra-
dictory tensions, a popular^^ leader embodying a pattern of
«oonr^+
^^o^b^edly means "popular" in the sense of hisacceptance by the important members of the ruling coalition andgroups rather than mass or charismatic appeal.
•^5
hxerarcMcal an. aiscipUnea aut.orU. consistent „Uh t.e
The importance of leadership is. in fact, for Blondel
a .e. feature of authoritarian-conservative
re.i.es. Because
the.r ol.,archic nature, hierarchy and discipline are at aPre^xu.. The unquestioning acceptance of the fa.ily or tri.al
head Which prevailed in the traditional polity has heen hro.en
<^own and
.
.
restoration or maintenance of oligarchical
values is the practical proof that a leader can he the guide
that the society requires to save it fro.
-chaos and subversion. •
indeed, in the absence of constitutional structures, which
dependence on the leader discourages in these systems, the head
Of an authoritarian-conservative regime becomes all important
and the maintenance of the system after his death depends in
large part on the ability of the social structure to control
a large part of the population.
"Official" Political Socialization,
Traditional Social Norms and Social Control
The above description and analysis of the dynamics of
an authoritarian-conservative regime goes far toward providing
an adequate conceptualization of Franco Spain. In contrast to
Linz-s discussion of "authoritarian" regimes, Blondel emphasizes
the reactionary or counterrevolutionary (and. one may infer,
the class) nature of the dictatorship installed in I939.
^16
Moreover, one can see that along with whatever prag^atis. is
necessary to promote economic growth. Franco Spain was also
marked by a cohesive view or theory of society which sought a
return to a glorified (and probably non-existent) past and tc
a traditional social structure which had
^-^.nxtuU^
lion. Even given the
-success" of the Nationalist cause in
destroying those opposed to this
-vision" during and after the
Civil War. there still remained to the Franco regime the task
of reinstating traditional norms and values.
The remainder of this thesis will attempt to explore
this effort through an analysis of the "official" political
socialization adopted by the regime to promote those areas
Where traditional social norms prevailed, to reestablish tradi-
tional authority where it had been rejected and to eliminate
or repress what it could not control through less blatant
means
.
There remains one last question to resolve: which side
of the debate shall we favor—authoritarian or fascist Spain?
It is clear to me that Franco Spain was not, fortunately, Nazi
Germany. The conservatives and reactionaries in Spain seem to
have succeeded in doing what their counterparts in Germany never
didt they used the counterrevolutionaries—the fascists— to
defeat a threatening social revolution and then "domesticated"
them as no one ever domesticated Hitler. The Spanish right's
collaboration with fascism was a success i it paid them well.
ret to ignore the reality of this collaboration is to
misunderstand Franoo Spain. If the Soviet Union of 1920 1940
and 1970 is Co™,unist. if china, Cuba and North Vietnam are
Coinmunist, then surely Franco Snflin t+ ty r bpai , Italy and Germany, in
their essential nature, were Fascic^t rir.^I ifcj r is . One may add modifiers
if desired, "... a clerical-military semi-fascism. ... -63
My point here has been only to set the stage for a more careful
analysis of this regime's ideology and of its remarkably effec-
tive methods Of social control. Perhaps the debate is best
resolved in the reading of what follows.
^3
Ppc.^o^ o^^^A/^^^^n^^^', "^"^""^ Sociological Considerations onFascism and Class," m Woolf, Nature of Fnsnic^ni
, pp. 97-103.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN HISPANIC
REGIME
«^ «
Whenever I try to sustain what is forme a fascinating hypothesis that the authoritar-ianism of the political system is actually aconsequence of the authoritarianism of thesocial system, especially at the level of the
LnJJ^
school. I find very few in favor ofthis proposition. It usually bothers the
rightists because it supports a criticism ofthe sacrosanct and institutionalized bour-
PSif^.^^^^^y-, displeasing to theleftists to think that the political factor
can have less importance than is ordinarilybelieved.
^
And nevertheless everything brinss
one to think that in the early socialization
or Spaniards there have been planted some
authoritarian ingredients which are quite
strong and correspond to what one then sees
exercised in the political system.^
This chapter begins with the precisely stated dilemma
posed above by Amando de Miguel i is Spanish society more
authoritarian than the government itself? It will require
more than one chapter to address this suggestive query. How-
ever, the response must build on the outlines of political
socialization in an Hispanic culture which this chapter
attempts
•
The Imperial Family
Sl)ain as a nation, like conservative and religious
,
^Amando de Miguel, Espana. Marca Registrada ( Barcelona
i
Kairos, 1971), pp. 119-120.
^9
elements in other societies, talks about the "crisis" of the
family. As the authors of a Foessa Foundation study argue,
however, the question is not-at least for Spain-whether the
family will disappear but if the traditional family, charac-
teristic of Spain, will be transfom.ed For the family unit
is in Franco Spain not only an agent of primary socialization
but the pattern upon which other social experiences are based.
Social change is at least made more dif-ricult
—in present circumstances—when the family
environment rests on a rigid nonr, of an authori-tarian type. Especially when familial relations
are converted into the model and archetype of
other relations (industrial, political, etc.)
which are not familial. Paternal
i
jc, then
the result, a form of living together v/hich
is not exactly the most apt and legitimate in
a modem industrial society. It v/ould be
acceptable to us to speak of the crisis of thefamily if at the same time the imperialism ofthe family is recognized.
3
The consequences of this imperial family in the process of
political socialization is the area to which I would like to
turn next.
The Family as Socialization Agent
There is little agreement among political scientists
over v/hich of several agential factors is the most important
in the process of political socialization. Part of this lack
2 - ^ ^
Fundaci^on Foessa^, Informe Sooiolop-ico sobre la situacion
social de Esmna (Eurame'rica
, 1970), p. 473,
^Ibid
.
. p. k9k.
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Of .,re„ is no debt attributable to the fact that there
is little in the way of theory to explain or relate different
aspeots Of the socialisation process. Much of the theori.in,
that is done is of a ,,,,t^
,,,, speculation is
.adein an attempt to explain findings in which see agents are
-re Closely correlated with various operational definitions
Of politics. Thus, for example, political scientists find a
high correlation between a person's own party identification
and his recollection of his parents party identification.
Fro. this finding a nheory of the importance for political
socialisation (defined as party identification) of the family
or early socialization experiences is constructed. Yet it
seems doubtful that such a piece-meal approach to theory will
have much success in explaining the complicated picture of
socialization presented briefly in the last chapter and in
giving an over-arching theory to relate early socialization to
late, the influence of social events on individual attitudes
and behavior or the self-selection of external events and
experiences to constitute an internal construction of political
reality.
Although theoretical conceptualizations that define
these relationships are generally lacking, it is not the case
that there are none at all. One of the more comprehensive of
such theories and one which is concerned with the richness and
complexity of the person as a social being is that by Berger
and Luokmann, The Social Construytlrin of RsalltY -'^
J-
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckraann, The Social
51
Berger and Luckmann view society as existing in an
Objective and subjective reality understood in ter.s of an
ongoing dialectical process composed of the three
.o.ents of
extemalization, objectivation and internalization. The
beginning of this process is the internalization of an external
world as the person constructs the objects of an external real-
ity into a subjective reality. The process which forms this
comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into
the objective world of a society or a sector of it is defined
as socialization.5 In this framework. £rifflar^.^ocialization
is defined as "the first socialization an individual undergoes
in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society.
Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts
an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objec-
tive world of his society. "6 i„ ^his view, then, primary
socialization is usually (though not always) the most important
one for an individual since the basic structure of subsequent
secondary socialization will resemble that of primary sociali-
zation.
In Berger and Luckmann's view, the "significant others"
(those in charge of socialization) for the child will normally
and naturally be his or her parents and the generalized family.
Conptruct.1on of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Rnowio^^^(Garden City, New York. Doubleday, 1966). ^^^-^^f^V 9T tSnoy/lfdgft
^Ibid
.
. p. 130.
^Ibid. . p. 130.
Obviously, then, the family takes on extreme importance as
socialization agent
»
r.r>r.y.i
P^f"^ary socialization there is no
regaled one with tmJ f ^5^^
inherent in Se situatforS k ^^^^^^^J^ge
Obvious cS;seqL"^L'^?ha1.
'al?foSgh^\\'^e
Ms socia??L?io^'^-r?^'^^ P^^^e^' Of
the ^^1^^ "^^^^ ^^^l^s who setrules of the game. The child can plav
sistfnce ^^J\^"^!?^^iasm or with sSuen re-
ared Thff);/^^'^'.^^"^" gameroun . is has an important corrollar?Since the child has no choice in tJe selection
with ?hP^^f^^^"^ identificationthem IS quasi-automatic. For the same
Sarrea^Uv'?.'""""'^^?''^^ theif^ar^Tc-uia reality is quasi-inevitable. The child
ficLroth^^.'^^'^'" ^^^^^ o^ his si^i-
^^^""^ ^'^^y possible worlds.
Pv^^?^^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^o^ld, the onlyexistent and only conceivable world, the world
.
tout court. It is for this reason that theworld internalized in primary socialization
nLa 4-^^^ '"''f? ^i"""^^^ entrenched in conscious-
o^!? ^^^^^Vorlds internalized in secondarysocializations. However much the orie-inal
sense of inevitability may be weakened in
subsequent disenchantments
, the recollection
01 a never-to-be-repeated certainty—the
certainty of the first dawn of reality—still
adheres to the first world of childhood. Pri-
mary socialization thus accomplishes what (in
nindsight, of course) may be seen as the mostimportant confidence trick that society plays
on the individual—to make appear as necessity
what is m fact a bundle of contingencies, andthus to make meaningful the accident of hisDirth
.
(
Jbig,
, pp. 13^-135
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a
This is not to argue, of course, for the primacy of the
family or that the family is some ultimate predictor variabl
that "explains" all later life attitudes or behavior. It is
theory which attempts to order the process by which an indi-
vidual enters the swirl of realities called society and to
place the family as the first agent which filters or reflects
this greater reality for the child.
An important question also is whether the family as an
institution is more or less authoritarian than other sociali-
zation agents. ^The earliest systematic response to this question
was that of Marxism which saw the nuclear family as being tied
intimately to capitalism and its reactionary property relations.
^
Others have also seen a correspondence between modern, indus-
trialized society and the nuclear family and either condemned
it as vitally implicated in the oppression of women, or
asserted its functional role in maintaining the stability of
modern social arrangements ."'•^ Another condemnation of the
Q
I am referring here to "authoritarianism" in a general
sense as an emphasis on uncritical acceptance of authority, the
use of manipulation as opposed to persuasion in human relations
and the reaching of decisions through arbitrary means which do
not and should not involve those who are affected by the
decisions
.
9
-^Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private
Property and the State (New Yorki International Publishers.
1972).
'^Among those who have argued for the abolition of the
(nuclear) family as a key necessity for female liberation are
Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. The Case for Feminist
Revolution (New Yorkt Bantam Books, 1972) and Gerraaine Greer,
The Female Eunuch (New Yorki McGraw Hill, 1970).
5^
(nuclea.)
.a»Uy has oo.e rro„ t.e schooX or anti-ps.cMatry
w OH in U3 exploration o. tHe
.ooial an.. espeoialX..
.a.iXiaX
aspects Of psychosis and schizophrenia has co„e to see the
(nuclear) family as an unheal thv infi.n y influence. Here the family's
role as a primary socialization a^ent in hni^^«oxu g holding a monopoly
over "si^ificant others" (in Berger and Luck.ann's tern,s) is
viewed as prejudicing the necessary experience of positive
isolation, that is. of autonomy.^^
Although these conceptions of the fa.ily help ™ake the
case for its authoritarian influence on the socialization pro-
cess, they do not withstand searching criticis^.^S
both the Marxist and Feminist critiques of the family ste.
from What appears to be an erroneous historical view of the
nuclear family as the modem capitalist version of the ™ore
traditional extended family. Evidence indicates, however,
that both the nuclear and extended family forms have persisted
:Mch L-in-it- ?
authoritarian nature S^ toe flmily! " ^ °^
PantheorBooks.°l°9?S): g^P^°th of th. F.mily. (New York.
|rom.e;n\lhL%^L\?^^^^
^»tt.ifAn"fl?bo"rr^I^h'l£Z^^' ^^^''^^'^ ""^^y
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throu^^hout a great deal of history. Apart fro. -.h • • •^^ ' m the criticisms
one
.i.ht ™ake of Parson's functionalist, his attribution of
a key role for the nuclear family in "modern" society is
equally undermined by Lasletfs findings on the persistence of
nuclear and extended family fon^s. Although this is not the
Place to propose a detailed analysis of Cooper's condemnation
Of the family as a poor psychic environment, it appears that
the real enemy of the personal autonomy seen as important by
Cooper is not the family itself hnt "o«,r,+v,ii xx ii ou smother-mother," female-
dominated child-rearing that isolates and pauperi.es the roles
Of father and mother as equal partners in the socialisation
process
.
"^^
However, neither the historical persistence of the
nuclear family nor the future possibilities for its restructur-
ing, mitigate af^ainst the "inherent conservatism"^^ of the
family as an institution or what Berger and Luckmann called the
••confidence trick" played by the family, parents, for better
14
PKov,! o^®^^^ Laslett, The World We Have Lo^t (New York,
frn^^ oth^^'''^'^!^^ 1965). Further supporting evidence
quently!'''''^''^^
studies of Spain will be discussed subse-
n-r +h« M^"^* ^?
interesting that Cooper illustrates his own viewOf the imperialism" of the family almost exclusively withexamples of mother-child and especially mother-son relations.A revolution in Western conceptions of parenthood combined withlemaie liberation may be the answer to the real problems oflamily-caused trauma documented by Laing and Cooper rather thanthe "death" of the family.
''^Elshtain, Women and Politics , p. 218,
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iure
or worse, constitute the significant others who first struct
reality for the child. This acceptance of an arbitrary
arrangement as the only one possible, of a particular social
arranKeraent as the way such arrangements must be, is the first
and possibly the most profound conservative message of a new
human's social life.
However, there is reason to believe that it is the
mttern of this family arrangement and the relationship between
the family and the larger society which has the greatest influ-
ence on the relatively democratic or authoritarian socialization
of the child. For example. Inga Findl, in a review of much of
the theoretical literature on the role of the peer-group and
family in the process of socialization, formulated a model of
the family's authority structure and its influence on personal-
ity structure. she discusses four areas in which the authority
structure of the family can vary and in turn have variable
effects on children's socialization. (1) value-orientations
of the parents—whether values such as obedience are more highly
regarded than those like curiosity; (2) the family's structure
—the locus of power in the family as being exclusively in the
parents and, likewise, unequally distributed between father and
mother, male and female, versus a less rigid distribution;
(3) parents' attitudes toward children--in8trumental versus
17
'Findl, "Family vs. Peer-Group." It is well to keep in
mind Marsh's criticisms of this personality approach to the study
of political socialization. See Chapter I,
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person-re^ardin^ attitudes, and W ..ethods of sanctions-
psychological (permissive) versus power-oriented (punitive)
forms
.
In contrast to the ascriptive and particularistic family
the peer-group in Findl-s review is seen as relatively univer-
salistic and achievement-oriented Tm ^wix g a, in the peer-group,
r>^r.T ^^i^ ^lierarchical family structure is
because th^ ^^--^Principle-egalitarian one,e members are of the same a^^e and
results^'h^?
development stage. FromihS it
authoritarian demands and theirconsequences are less seldom here, (sic)
X"
Principle all members participate
collectively in process of decision-making.
J rnembership in a peer-group is
^?r^k?^''^
changeable /tnd/ this contrastsst ikingly xo the ascriptive membership in
S^J^^Iii^^' relations of the members arebased primarily on mutuality.
The interesting (and highly debatable) aspect of this
model is in the relationship between the family's authority
patterns and the larger society, not surprisingly, middle-class
families are found to fall in the more "democratic" range of
all four areas while lower or working-class families predominate
in the more "authoritarian" range. ^^^^^ ^^^^^ differences
18-, 'J
-Ibid
. . p. 11.
19A central problem throughout this thesis has been thatin presenting a theoretical background of political socializa-tion literature to the case of Franco Spain I am forced to relyupon studies which I find highly suspect on conceptual and
methodological grounds. My point is only to suggest theoretical
views or conceptualizations which seem to capture a dimension
of reality which is applicable to Spain. For example, Findl's
model IS important only to set forth a concern with intra-family
relations and the family-society nexus vital to an understanding
of Spanish political socialization.
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are seen as affectin, or interacting with familiar authority
patterns
.
Another interesting discussion of the child-family-
society interaction is that by James C. Davies in the special
issue Of the Annals cited earlier.^O i would liRe to quote an
extensive passage from the conclusion to his article.
Tribal and feudal societies generally contain
regard^d^Ts/:'^"""^ ^P? "^ich th^ chUd Lgarded les as a potential equal than as a person
in t.hrh^^''"'"K^° ^° ^i^^ onl; slowly
l^L^ t^^''''^^ "«ver expect to live
shiDs wlt.^ o?h'"''^"°'" subordinate' relatioi-n p itn t ers,
=,„+v,^v,J^^'^^^'^^'^f"^ influence of autocratic and
wUhCut ?hf?
Bocial relationships, within and
oWn^^+ family, is usually accompanied by
dnr?n h-''!^?^ endemic physical deprivationu in^r which the ^rowin^^ child must quick] y learnhow to provide physically for himself, ?hen his
no^^l^^' children. Without the
'
potential levelmfr, antihierarchizin^r influence
^L'^M^n;?
integrated and industrialized society,the child is likely to move from authoritariandependency to authoritarian support of those
fnvthinf ^^T: ^^^^^^ 1^^^^ adequatelya ything other than authoritarian ways of actin^r
and reacting and therefore unable to achieve with
any facility the transition from dependency to
autonomy. So he uneasily remains authoritarianWithin the family and in his political relation-
ships
.
As he starts the transition from tribal
or feudal to modern society, he shifts his depend-
ency on parents to a dependency on a new national
movement and new political father figure. There
IS, perhaps, more often than not, some net gain,because the authority influence of the politicalfather cannot, over a prolonged period, be so
strong as the proximal familial influence. In
consequence, when the transition has progressed
somewhat, he is less likely to be as dependent
James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political
Socialization," in Annals , pp. 10-19.
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achieved the be^inniA^a MIn turn, he is likely ?o L i^ autonomy,ian toward his own ^^^^ authoritar-
his father was and ^^^J^^^^^ children than
broad sociaftransi^Ln'' ^^i^^^?^^
transition Of the swL "^-^ internal
The tr«n^?^^ ^ .^^^''^"S individual.
anxiety chJon^c In ?hrr.°? ^^^^^ ^'^^^in the society but «^ in'^^I^'^i^^^ endemic
develops and stabilizes lhp'?i°^":-°^ ^^^^^^family become re-establlc^^.H i^^^^^-^^^ to
and new ties to othl^ ^ ^^^is
includin' oLftfpartv
and the socisl in.,??^ ^ ^^^^ership, nation
pluralL?ic societfIs'?h increasingly
ual social unir th^ f^^n^ universal, resld-
a superior bu^.nn^^-^ ^? ^ subordinate or
whirh tho i'V^. totalitarian functions in
From Davies one could, then, posit a relationship
between fa.ily and society in which the nature of tne fa.iiys
authority structure and. perhaps, its in,portance as a sociali-
zation agent would be related to the "stage'' or "level" of the '
society's relative "modernization." In a more traditional
society, the family would play a major and relatively authori-
tarian role in the political socialization of the child. A
"modernizing" or "transitional" society might find the role of
the family diminished as surogate parents play an increasin;^
part in socialization with a greater possibility of providing
Jbid.
. p. 19.
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"democraticizin^' experiences. In a .ore
...odern- society
the family has a.ain become a dominant a.ent but in the role of
providing the nurturance necessary to fuller human autonomy. ^2
Spanish Political Culture « Normas
Institucionales (Institutional Norms)
This brief review of certain aspects of the socialization
literature has attempted to sketch those theoretical conceptions
Which argue for a child-family-society-state connection. At its
most sophisticated level this literature can only point to
vague associations of different kinds of state and social
systems with more or less democratic or authoritarian family-
child interactions. It does not attempt to establish-as a
theoretical position-the manipulation of the socialization
matrix by the state to promote the development of certain kinds
of citizen attitudes and behavior.
Irregardless of the intrinsic merits of these theoreti-
cal positions, the case of Franco Spain represents a clear
example of the child-family-society-state connections which
these theories seek to define. One of the arguments of this
thesis is that authoritarian-conservative regimes in their
reaction to change come to cultivate certain variations of
traditional social norms as one mechanism of social control.
22The caveat of note 18 is repeated here in regard to
words such as "modern," "traditional," "developed," etc. and
the unilinear, developmental paradigm to which they refer and
about which I have many reservations.
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Chief a.on, these traditional nor.s is the fa.ily which beco.es
a generalized metaphor for political arrangements and attitudes
desired by officials. The Franco regime was marked by a con-
sistent and coherent ideology of which the family formed a key
conceptual element. Our examination of Spain under Franco
suggests that the traditionally
"private" arenas of the family
and particularly the position of women in the family and in
society become highly politicized. This line of argument will
be elaborated and given support in the Chapters that follow.
It begins here, however, with a model of political culture and
political socialization for Spain bacjed on tho r.^^o axii o s a the pioneering work
of Amando de Miguel,
In the beginning of the 1960's a large national survey,
inspired by the Almond and Verba Civic Culture study, was con-
ducted among Spanish youth. De Miguel, a Spanish sociologist
who was one of the leaders of the survey team, reported on the
results in a series of articles in the Revista del Institute de
la Juventud .^3
^ variety of reasons^^ I will not be dealing
P^rt^r^llnTn^^''
Wi^uel. "Estructura Social y Juventud Espanola,a icipacion en la renta y en el consumo," Revista d el Institute
I I ^ ^^y^^^"^ Espanola I Normas institucionales , " RIJ, 1(October 1965), pp. 113-1^8; "Es^tructura SoclalT"JuventudEspanola. El modelo de la cultura politica," RIJ, 3 (February
IZth T "Estructura Social y Juventud EspanolaImpacto Politico e Interes por la Politica," RLJ, 5 (June 1966),
pp. bj''ii^t "Estructura Social y Juventud Espanola « Par-ticipacion Politica," RLJ, 6 (August 1966), pp. 15-38.
The youth survey, being based on the Civic Culture
study, is subject to the problems associated with the earlier
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here with the statistical findings of the survey but rather
with de Miguel's introductory "model" of political culture.
Adopting Parsonian terminology, de Miguel finds Spanish
political culture to be marked by particularism. However, in
contrast to other particularistic countries. Spain seems to be
characterized not by localism or familism but by ami^uismo
("friendism" or a system of friendship relations). De Miguel
bases his rejection of the family as an important institutional
norm (nonmU^stitucional ) for Spain primarily on certain ethno-
graphic studies, particularly that of Pitt-Rivers.^^
work as well a3 some internal problems of its own. For abasic criticism of the C ivic Culture approach, to politica]inquiry see Alasdair Maclntyre, Against the Self-Tn^pgpp nr\y^.Ap (iNew York.^ Schocken Books, 197177 especiaTlT" theT:;^ '
chapter. As with all operational definitions of political
concepts one can never be sure of the relationship between theindicator" measured and the "concept" of political culture or
whatever being studied. On the myth of operationalism seeWilliam Alson, Phjlos ophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.j
Prentice-Hall, 1964), last chapter, Max Black "Reasoning with
Loose Concepts," in his The Margrins of Precision (Ithaca, N.Y.tCornell University Press, 1970), pp. 1-13; George Schlesinrer,
Operationalism." Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol, 5 (I967),
pp. 5^3-5^71 and Friedrich Weismann, "Veriflability , " in Logic
and Language, First Series ed. Anthony Flew (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1951), PP. 115-1-^5.
Even within this quantitative paradigm there are problems,
for at this early stage of quantitative analysis in Spain no
statistical tests such as chi square or margin of error of per-
centage differences were applied.
Finally, as de Miguel himself stresses, the Spanish
survey was conducted only among Spanish youth and therefore has
only questionable application to Spanish society as a whole.
25
-'Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra. 2nd
edition (Chicagoi University of Chicago Press, 1971).
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A curious aspect of these ethnographic studies is that
among the several which have followed Pitt-Rivers only one has
found the extended family to be characteristic of their study
site, and this was in an urban barrio of Madrid. Others,
all in rural areas, found the nuclear family to be the basic
social unit.^^
This is interesting for several reasons. First of all,
it is another finding to support Lasletfs thesis, presented
earlier in the chapter, that the nuclear family is not a by-
product of the modern age. In Andalucia-perhaps the most
"backward" area of Spain-the nuclear family has persisted
through time while the extended family, supposedly character-
istic of traditional society, is found only in modern, urban
Madrid. More importantly, though, the fact that the nuclear
and not the extended family characterizes much of rural Spain
does not logically preclude the importance of the family-
contrary to de Miguel's conclusion:
The lack of mutual rights and obligations
outside of the elemental /nuclear/ family,
the lack as well of occasions on which the
26
Michael Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry. Town and Country in
Castile (Bloomingtoni Indiana University Press, I962).
27Joseph Aceves, Social Chanp:e in a Spanish Village (Cam-
bridge, Mass.j Schenkman, 1971). Substantially the same des-
cription of the nuclear family pattern, first described by Pitt-
Rivers, where marriage is delayed until a new household can be
established, is given by Aceves and the "country" portion of
Kenny. The rural studies were all conducted in different geo-
graphic regions: Aceves, northern Spain near the French border}
Kenny, Old Castile on the central plateau; and Pitt-Rivers,
Andalucia
.
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arily invited ?fa wed°w'^' ^l'
- the
.....L,^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
family constitutes a key social unit.
The major social \ir,^+ , i ,
belongs' is the'nuc5:ear'?a2!;': ^"^"""al
Person^haf othel^'''°^^^* association a
great social meaning has
family squabblec, ar-r„^ ^^oj-ated and intra-
prope?ty\nd inheriLnrr°";.'^P^"^^^y "hen
Howeverf in good
'tl,^:s"nd'bad''\f? ^ *family that the individual must raHyj9
The importance of the family as a unique socialisation
agent in Spanish culture has also been the starting point for
Francisco Murillo Ferrol'c! viou, *.u^ ol s ew of the process of "undersociali-
zation" in Spain.
^ provisional assumption, I would
ar^ ^ela%!ve1v\''"''°" "^^"^^ Country
+ho+ u ^-^y scarce. Therefore, it U not
iorLrbur?ha%"?H' '^'"^'^ culture 'to'inter-'
is delicienf Pv»^tr°K^'" °^ intericrization
instances Of'socSuzation\"r ^'^^^^^^ . fewtou iaxizati at an authentic
de Miguel. Rlj, i, p. 127.
29
^^^^^3' Social gh»npo, pp, 66-67.
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The important empirical question which Murillo's
assumptinn does not xrn -fo, ^go far m answering is whether Spain is
characterized by a neculiar- lo^i, ^y p liar lack of secondary or non-familial
socialization agents. One measure of this contention might be
^'^^ ^-el Of l^^od^^^^i^
associative life) or thedegree to which Spaniards participate in the voluntary associa-
tions both more and less political which are thought to char-
acterize modern liberal society. Although information about
this type Of social participation is hard to come by. some
findings are available tr.d x oi . In the suppressed Chapter 5 of the
1970 Loessa study cited pm-ii.:iv. +uy earlier, the investigative team had
this to sayt
.
f^obably there 1r n o pthpr pI or.^>.-f- ofS£anish_social true-±^7^^^
Francisco Murillo Fpr-roi "To ^„
socializacion." in Centro de ?^?nH^o q^'^'"?-^^ ^ proceso de
espanola (Madrid: Anales de Toral LotT^%' La_familiaI96?), p. i/f8. ^^^'^i-^es a M , Social y Economia, no. 4,
.uan I.inh^d*—rde"Mf^Se\'^S%h'^ e\^?l1 iTS-f
^
Linz and Amando de iv^irm^i jlt ar y 1960's. See Juan J.
(Madrid
.
lLlltuto'df"lstutl§rffftgi? T.LTS,'^ ^ ^ ' ^"
tpalnT" Z'VlT'rr" "^ifferencel^'ndlimpa'rt ons "^hlS^^
ISSiJhe!iLe Of SuanlS^?/"^ f^f" eds. . cLnaging
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only to political life, which is at th«lowest level of an r.f> a - .
historv hnt ?^
ll of Spanish contemporarynj-sxo y, bu to social life 1t<?Pi-r t ~, ^not onlv are nnii + i^^i -^-^-^ ^ . -"-^-self . Indeed,
during so many years, barely exists lh.v»
iSajori?y of fhl^f™'';'?"' Pressures /^h^
Ipiri = 1
legally formed associations
that td '^^^'t'^ i^^^ "'^^'^h indicates to us
sunk tc tt"^ °^ associative spirit has
re2o^^ ''^P*'^^- some
vff^ ? Catalonia, the Basque country andValencia) do associations with great weightin collective life exist and pefhlps in 111
t,^
it is (only) the spor? LsScia-
^Slffc^tlon!!^^^^^^ « Pes^i^^ltic
Of course, as will be seen in later chapters, the con-
cept of "organic democracy upon which the Franco regime was
supposedly constructed intended that "artificial" organizations
such as political parties and other "factional" groups would be
replaced by more "natural" associations such as heads of fam-
ilies, cooperatives, local or civic associations, etc. However,
as the Foessa study comments, except in the realm of sports,
this does not seem to have occurred. 33 Instead, as one Spanish
critic has observed,
Fundacion Foessa, Informe, I970, p. 5.8. The fifth
^.TJ\''\^''H titlid-^a FolriiJa y Asociativa" wasbanned by the Franco government. Multicopied drafts of it are.
ihTrnnAK^'^t^^^^i^ outside Spain and it is from such a copy thatt is quote is taken. Emphasis in the original.
^^Ibid^, p. 5.9.
6?
... (VV)e are seeing occur the
opposite Of what the conqufrors of Uberal
thou^ht'"\^wnf When they
+h^,^^K^"~l ^i^^ ^^^^ correctly wethouf^ht--that on doinp- away with electoralIdeological or party procedures, "na?SrS
"
'
groupings, founded on the concerns of dally
of In"" "^°st profound necessitiesman, would take on a special force of
and on the contrary we note the lowest indexin the vigor (tono), never very high l^^''''^''Spam, of the spirit of association. 3^
Thus, if the lack of voluntary associations can be taken
as some rou^h measure of the strength of secondary agents of
socialization, one would be inclined to agree with Murillo that
the "imperialism" of the family expresses itself in an "under-
socialization" of the child.
Another way of placing the family in perspective relative
to other types of agents is to compare Franco Spain with an
idealized "socialization community . "35 y/ithin this community
one can identify ten clusters of agents with a vested interest
in socialization.
Each of tne following clusters has a program of
socialization, more or less planned, and more
or less formally presented as a program toinfluence the growth and development of informa-
tion, attitudes, values, and behavior of theyounger members of the community.
(1) The formal education system, public and
private.
^(2) The Churches with their programs for
children and youths.
Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en Espana (Buenos Aires
i
Lasada, 1962), p. 132.
35John A. Clausen, ed
.
, Socialization and Society (Bostons
Little, Brown, I968),
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(3) The leisure-time af^encies with their
prS^rams?""^^'
cultural, and character education
c„oh\^^5^ ^''''^^^ control and protection agenciessuch as the police, courts, traffic-safety agents,
(5) The therapeutic, special correction, and
resocialization services such as counselors,
remedial clinics, and programs for the handi-
capped ,
(6) Employment offices and work supervisorsWho hire the young and supervise them on theirpaid iobs.
. J"^^
Political leaders who have an interestm involving the young in political activities
• • •
In addition to these seven personnel clusters
which have more or less articulated programs andprofessionalized socialization agents, there arethe following two additional populations of
agents t
(8) The subculture of parents.
(9) The subculture of like-age and older
peers.
And in addition to these populations of
"direct agents" there is the copulation of a^-ents
who control and distribute the socialization^
interventions of (10) the mass media--the T.V.
programs, the radio programs, newspaper stories,
and newsstand materials. 36
Anyone familiar with Franco Spain will be impressed by
the high degree of State control present to a greater or lesser
extent in all institutions of this "socialization community."
Of the first seven socialization segments nearly all have
significant or total State or State-Church influence. Some
qualifications might be made about (3), (5) and (6), However,
many leisure-time agencies, especially in the case of sports
such as soccer, have been politicized by the regime. And, as
^^IbMx. pp. 33^-335.
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was mentioned in the quotation from the Foessa study, cultural
associations are restricted or supervised by the government
through fear of their possible political development. Clinical,
particularly therapeutic, agencies have their special political
aspect which has been pointed out by the followers of anti-
psychiatry both internationally and within Spain. And in
the field of employment while there is little regulation of
management level employment (perhaps because it is not needed),
the Sindicatos (syndicates) play an important part in the poli-
tical supervision of most workers.
As for the subcultures of parents and peers, the politi-
cization of the first has already been discussed. Although on
more shaky grounds, one could speculate that the institutional
norm of amiguismo
. as expressed in the particularistic patterns
of the political culture, also tends to politicize peer-group
interactions in a way that is supportive of the kind of sta-
bility an authoritarian-conservative regime requires.
Since the elimination of prior censorship in Spain,
the mass media has become more pluralistic in regard to
"official" political socialization. The television and radio
are acknowledged to be completely "government line." Newspapers
have in the past shown some independence although the most
adventurous are quickly silenced as in the case of the evening
-^^Amando de Miguel, "Psiquiatria y Sociedad,';, in Papers .
Traba.jos de Sociolopia (Barcelonai Universidad Autonoma, 1973) i
pp. 11-36.
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dally Madrid which was shut-down for Dol1ti..TI p i cal reasons in I971
The incredibly low circulation of Spanish newspapers (aside
perhaps fro. P^, 3,„,,,,,^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
are. in fact, an elite rather than a mass .nedium.^S
Thus, within this
"socialization community the influence
Of agents outside the fa.ily can he said to he either ™ini,„al.
based on a familial or paternal + ^ 4.^istic pattern, or reinforcing
of such a pattern.
However, it is important to note that arguing for the
special dominance of the Spanish family as a primary socializa-
tion agent does not contradict de Miguel's institutional norm
Of ami^.^. The child's first introduction to social reality
comes through Lhe family and, if we are to follow Murillo,
there are relatively few secondary experiences to modify this
early construction of reality. But de Miguel speaks of later
social interactions (universal relations in Parsons' terms),
such as the adult relationships of professor to student, manager
to employer, bureaucrat to citizen, and argues that these are
marked by patterns of friendship rather than kinship.
Of course, Watergate events in the United States are
only the latest testimony to the fact that the concept of poli-
tical friends (and enemies) is certainly not unique to Spain.
Yet. it is evident from de Miguel's choice of language-insti-
38 ^Jose L. Aranguren, Human Communication , trans, by
VV^Vk\^^2 ^ ^^'^ (^o^doni World University Library, I967),
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i^^ii^ norms-that anii^uT^ is an institutionalized process
not merely a description of quite com.on patterns of human
interaction. Dionisio Ridruejo has put the argument this way.
Our system of living together is reduoPdto private relations, in the end either e^o-
tfin g^^^^^uf* and in order to prove i?It would be sufficient to cite the excessiveimportance which family nepotism, on ?he one
o?hf; T °f friendship and'favo^^ on thet er, have acquired among us. "He whi doesn'thave a god-father isn't baptized." goes arefrain sufficiently old to verify fha? vices
vLes"'?^o^
favoritism are already "anciln?ices am ng us. But now this vice—whichcontaminated to a greater or lesser decree theold systems of personal power-has becomlcustom and even an all-inclusive system !Today everything in Spain-access to empio;m;ntthe concession for a business, the leasing"'
^ installation of a telephone, theresolution of the most common bureaucratic
requirement-is obtained because one has airiend. Of course, the immense major-itv ofpeople don't have those friends who iake careof things, but they can ask to borrow somefrom those who have mountains of them. Withthis a veritable traffic in favors has been
unleashed upon us, a new and curious form of
mendicancy, the mendicancy of influence, whichthrows us back to the most vicious epochs of
courtly miracle-peddling and brings, to those
well endowed with contacts, a large clientele
of hopeful or grateful supplicants . 39
39XbMj., pp. 13^-135. The bureaucratic "interveners"
who expedite administrative details for a fee are familiar toanyone who has spent time in Spain or other Latin countries.
1 cannot resist, however, the tale of the F^adrileno who peddled
iu^^u^:^ technique was to sip a cocktail in the lounges ofthe better restaurants frequented by important government func-tionaries.^ In casual conversation he would always present him-
^^if waiting for a luncheon appointment while he made contactswith these important figures. Shuttling from restaurant to
restaurant during the long Madrid lunch he soon became known
to many officials and made his living by offering his influenceto interested bidders.
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Although concentrating on different aspects of the
socialisation process and hu.an interaction, there is sub-
stantial agreement by de Miguel and Murillo on the nor.s or
values Which prevail i„ the political culture, whether the
patterns of behavior are famfn^ifamilial or amigables they will still
be Characterized by personal rather than impersonal relation-
ships. Loyalty, for example, will be exercised toward people
rather than principles. As the Spanish refrain goes.
hasta 10 .in1u.to
. n l_^nemi^o.nl..io_ju^ the friend even
what is unjust and to the enemy not even what is Just."
Moreover, it is particularly appropriate that de .v.iguel
BPeaks of the institutional norms of Spanish political culture.
Within the institution of the traditional family the child will
be taught values of hierarchy, unquestioning loyalty and obed-
ience to those who represent authority. As the child grows up
he or she will fi„d fe„ associations or organizations outside
Of the family. As has been mentioned, political associations
(except those of an officially-approved sort) are forbidden by
law and few other groups even of a cultural nature are allowed
for fear of their possibilities of developing political taints.
Those organizations or institutions which are legally permitted
(such as Syndicates or professional societies) perpetuate the
values and patterns of behavior described by ami^^ufsmo and the
exclusiveness of the family in two ways. First, within the
structures, leadership and authority are legitimized and
exercised in a traditional manner. Then, the structure or
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or.ani.ation as a who.e „u.t con.o™ to an
..organic., state
erne™ 0. ..natural representation.- Xn t.is reine. poXitioal
theory upon which the Franco regime was foun^ea. the Syndi-
cates, the ra.ily ana the ^ni^ Uoo., governmental unit)
are the "natural organs., of the
-.o,, politic.-, subordinated
to the state authority anrt r-oi=+t.^d elated to one another as a hand is
to an arm and the arm to the human head.'^O
indeed, to both its critics and supporters the Franco5st
state appears as an attempt to govern the country as a large
"family."
^0 P^evan'Sr' authorities continue
Therefore, in order to reconauer thai-order Which the world longs for? ?here uL
iTel- lTllM^t\T ^"4" • • • ^0 thr.i?d°dle
Mlftir»/L^ ^° accepting the social and
f^ i ^ natural orderi to return
^1ap-^---crtirL^LL^j^ ?rj^^:r\°s
doS?ror^ler^L%fr;;t'J:©' '
'
There emerges, then, the following view of the Spanish
socialization process. The Spanish child due to the exolusive-
ness of the family as a socializing agent will be characterized
40
Franooic^t'^nr:!^^""'^'""''^^ ^'"^J'''' °^ "corporatist model', of
treat'm^nJ Kaptervi'^''^^ supplemented by a more complete
41de Miguel, Espana . p. 263.
42,
T .^^^^^^i Carlos Mo^a, "Fainilia e ideolo^fa polrtica."in Las_ideolp^ias en la Espa^a de hov ( Coloquio ) fwad^id,Seminarios y Ediciones, 1972), p. 101. —
vii ariai
7^
by the particularistic and
' ascriptive norms of the family.
Isolated from significant contact with other socializing
experiences, he or she will share common values with others
only to the degree that his or her family is representative of
or similar to the wide variety of subcultures found in Spain.
The socialization process will be heterogeneous in regard to
class, region, etc. and leave the child perplexed before types
of behavior or situations not experienced by the family. q^^.
side of the family, the State will attempt to restrict experi-
ence to those institutions or associations based on the family
and to regulate the relations between these institutions and
the State to conform to a system of "organic," "natural" repre-
sentations. This is the model of Spanish society documented in
the textbooks.
"Official" Political Socialization and
Social Control
The Francoist State intervened in this process of
socialization on several levels. One of these levels was the
blatant restriction of the possibilities for establishing var-
ious types of social, cultural and class groupings or associa-
tions for fear that they might acquire some political signifi-
cance. On another level what organizations did exist conformed
to the Francoist view of "organic democracy," a corporatist
-^Murillo Ferrol, La familia > pp. I6O-I61.
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syste. based on the privacy of what Blondel calls "co^unal
6roups"-such as organisations of heads of families. Church
societies, village associations, etc.-whose co™on bond is
the ties Of tradition, of icinship. birth or religion.'*'* An
authoritarian conservative regime such as Franco Spain, in
attempting to return or preserve traditional values of the
past, must rely on communal institutions like the Family, the
Church and. especially, the Military as the primary basis of
its power.
However. I would like to introduce the argument here
(for subsequent elaboration in later chapters) that this
dependence on communal groups is not just a reliance on already
existing centers of traditional power and authority but that
the regime had to foster the development and/or strengthening
of such groups and thereby promote an ideology which gave an
explanation for and justification of the importance of these
communal groups and the political system built upon them.
It was from this perspective that the Francoist State
proceeded when it "intervened" to restrict certain types of
groupings while permitting and encouraf-ln^ others. It was from
this perspective that a process of socialization was seen as
political and politicized by the regime to form "official"
political socialization.
The activities which I find to be characteristic of this
4^See note 62, Chapter I,
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perspective and whirh in -^0/%+ ^ ^a n c , m fact, r.o toward approximating Franco-
ist ideology were often viewed as curiosities (lo_cur:sl) by
Observers (particularly liberal observers) of Spain. Thus,
Spain's annual cash award to the family head who has sired the
most children, presented by the caudmo himself, is, for me.
a profoundly political event whose symbolism is far from amusing
Nor can the family allowances which begin with the second child
and increase with each successive birth be seen as merely
expressions of magnanimity when one learns that they began on
the anniversary of the "Glorious Uprising" in 1938 when the
first payment was presented by Franco himself. A man and wom.an
can start out married life with a State loan if they are both
practising Catholics and the woman agrees to give up any gain-
ful employment. No interest is charged and the loan can be
repaid at the rate of 1% a month. With the birth of each child
part of the loan is waived and. with the fourth, entirely
cancelled. Apparently, the encouragement of numerous
children tended by full-time mothers was the regime's idea of
"family planning."
This was, then, the final level of intervention by the
State in the socialization process. In a multitude of subtle
and not so subtle ways the State attempted to reinforce the
most traditional and conservative values of the society. And
it did not merely reinforce but in fact created and shaped
^5
-^Kenny, Tapestrv . p. 183
.
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these values. For it was not just any family which was
stressed; it was the father-dominated, authoritarian, tradi-
tional family set out as the ideal family. Within the "sociali-
zation community" this distortion of the family was granted-
in classic corporatist fashion—a veritable monopoly over
socialization. And this "imperial" family was then made the
model of social and political interaction in the paternalistic,
corporatist State. Thus, the particular view of the family
promoted "officially" through formal and informal mechanisms
of socialization became a metaphor for politics under Franco,
As will be seen in the textbooks, direct connections were drawn
between patterns of behavior and interaction in the authori-
tarian family ideal and the patterns of participation (and non-
participation) to be encouraged and enforced in the political
sphere.
The analysis of how this strategy of social control
worked and its implications is best left for Chapter VI after
the official images of the textbooks is presented. For now this
"intervention" of the State to fashion a process of "official"
political socialization should be taken as a tentative view of
the vast complexity of factors and forces which go to make (or
unmake) the Spaniard as political person.
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CHAPTER III
IMAGES OF THE STATE
The materials in this chapter and those which follow
constitute the primary original contribution of this thesis.
In these chapters we will be looking at the messages or images
of reality which "official" Spain wished to convey to its
emerging citizens. These images may be divided, albeit some-
what arbitrarily, into three main parts j the Image of the
State, the Image of the Individual, and the Image of the Citi-
zen. The distinctions are based primarily on degrees of
emphasis rather than any sharp demarcations drawn by the
Spaniards themselves or anyone else. In fact, the historical,
philosophical, theological and ideological traditions of Spain
argue against such tidy categorizations. The distinctions are
intended, however, to provide a basis for analyzing and com-
paring that concentration or collection of political power
called the state with the view of human nature implicit in the
textbooks (and the political and social system they promote)
and, finally, to view the interaction of state and individual
when human nature is in a sense politicized to form the poli-
tical actor or citizen,*
*Before beginning with the textbooks themselves a few
words might be added as to how access was gained to them. They
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Organic Corpora ti sm
corporatism as an approach to the governing and study
Of political syste,„s is becoming a growing concern in political
in^bott n^°v7:^d Tel'lol]£Z''^'.'\i:t -f^f be purchasedbe permitted to use an ext^n^f;;; however, I was fortunate tohad been compiled by Amando de m \^^?''\°':' °^ textbooks which
search offices. The collection ^^Pk^ ^? ^-A. re-
represented books from the Ia?e 19fMT\^" ^''^ '?""''reds andwith the heaviest emphasis on the pI""^ presentperuse this collection over Franco years, I was able to
well as a hup-e card ?ile i ° ""''^ ?^ several months asby associates ofPro?eslo? dH?^;i:? ''H^'' '^^'^ ^°'"Pil«dof over 130 "ideolo-ill" L |h"eriA ^^''^'^ 5^?" ^^^^ consisted
with excerpts or passlLs 111^^?^+? textbooks
the researchers had^elected thJnf'"f, "ideology" whichthe textbooks in the coUec?ion f v,^"' reaSln. of nearly all
rather random way sleMn^ a "^ek" for"?he"^ research in athe texts and their virietv ult general nature of
aXrfnX--d-ffL^~
content^ ?^ --""Plioftionf^r^^^ t'd^^o'"^ ^
?extboJks cove?in?mi°? orif^lT''^'' ^'^^^^ °^ ^'^^"^ ^"^i'
^ore^recent text^Sfoks^^fL^^^S^h-a^^efLl ^^^^
books is"nor^s"cie^^tui^!^^ Tte^^^fs^"^^*?: ^t^^
tfo^?ro^?^^'"*?"^ °^ collection or Of m; '™ selec-
5^ r Tu^*: '"^ ^^'^'t judgment based on a year's stav in Snain
section of%hoL"'°?^?.^ "j^Y^ "^^^^ represLt a ro^ c^osS
"
For tb2 1 ^ r 1" the political formation courses,
f^?. J'*''* decade or so a publication of the Klnister of
is aroff?c5afn'b^-^'^?: I-ibros y l-laterial de K..%'.JL °L-...
i ^
pu lication of those textbooks approved for usein elementary and secondary schools, was available and confirmedthe general representativeness of my selections.
o i a
shout +:;*'^°?'^4.*''i? ^^^'^^ less chance that I can speak
appear in ?he ^fviK^^^^'^r^'^^ passages I^^quotet textbooks, A more rigorous content analysis was
^nft r J°"fidered and ultimately rejected. What impressedme mos about the textbooks was the consistency of theirPhilosophy, the meaning conveyed by their tone, the illustrative
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scienoe.l While one may debate the prediction that this
century will be the "century of corporatism" fo'r the Western
world it has certainly been an accurate prediction for Spain.
The Franco regime was quite self-conscious about its corporatism
and. for a one-time suitor of the Axis powers, not overly em-
barassed about it. It touted its "organic democracy" as an
alternative to "outdated- Liberalism which plagued the "so-
called" Western democracies and also to atheistic Communism
Which in its predictably cynical (and Godless) way had mistaken
the possibility of class warfare in modem society as a necessity
to be exploited. In opposition to these two great "isms"?
Snts' TdifLr'''".""!"^ "^^^^^ the table of
wnnirt i
-lid not read them as an unbiased observer nor
^»viS i investigators necessarily see the same things in the
"^^5 ""^ interpret them the same way or dra^ thesame conclusions from the interpretations. I believe I have
e degree that I have suc-
contPnt ?ho ^
^^^"^ presentation of the textbooks'
-^f following pages, then, should be viewed as an
t^«rih! r logical construction, I will be building an argumenthat the images of the textbooks form the outlines Sf a Spanishideology and that this ideology will help to explain and critiquethe ongoing Spanish political system,
^See Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The New
corporatism (Notre Damei University of Notre Dame Press. 1974).
especially the article by Philippe Schmitter, "Still the CenturyOf Corporatism," for extensive bibliography on the topic,
/r, .
Mihail Manoilesco, Le Siecle" du Corporatisme . rev, ed.(Paris, 1936),
3Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Development! The
Portuguese Experience (Amherst 1 University of Massachusetts
Press, 1977).
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Franco Spain purported to offer peace, harmony, cohesion and
continuity. Let us begin our discussion of Spanish corpora-
tism with the ^'official- images of the State.
Patria. Nacion and Estado
Much has been made of the contrasting political and
philosophical histories of the Anglo-Saxon-American-Common
Law-tradition as opposed to the Med iterranean-Lat in-Roman Law-
tradition.^ This difference is made very clear by a comparison
of the three-tiered conception of the Motherland. Nation and
State of the Spanish textbooks, with the nation-state concept
of the Anglo-American tradition.
La Patria (the Motherland!. La Patria is the highest
level of the three-tiered structure of Spanish political
philosophy both in the sense that it subsumes the other two
divisions and also that it is the purest, ideal form of Spain.
We know that patria as applied to the whole of a national
territory is a relatively recent development in European poli-
tical thought. -5 Indeed, Spain still retains the earliest
meaning of patria as the local community of one's birth in the
expression, patria chica
. or "little motherland." However,
within the current regime, the Motherland has a very specific
Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of
Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Traditioni The Corporative
Model," World Politics
. XXV (January 1973), pp. 206-235.
^Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori in Medieval
Political Thought," American Historical Review
.
LVI. 3 (1951)
»
pp. 472-493.
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meaning ta.en primarily fro. the words of Falangist founder
Jose Antonio Pri.o de Rivera,
•Miaumid^d^_De^y3o_^
IMversal" ("A unit of Destiny in the Universal").
Early versions of political education textbooks con-
tained a notion of ]a nn+yio ,.,u-! ula^tria which was closer to the medieval
meaning of patria as the roofcj nf +h« t„ t, on ts o the local community in the
land t
wh.-.K Motherland is the country in
parents' ^h^ ^^^^ °f our
wMcf^he n^rnfrfi ancestors, the laborui-cn xne living- realize continuin;^ thp xxi or>
first^??:h?:6^^^ - Which w^la^'^hf
Yet the words of Jose" Antonio (poet-revolutionary that
he considered himself) seemed to have a lofty and more abstract
meanin- which latter textbooks emphasized:
thP y/;^''''^^''T^^* "^^""^ ^^^^ believed thate Motnerland was "the land in which we havebeen born, where our parents were born andwhere our ancestors repose." This concep-
l I'lJ^^^^'l,^^?:'^
Spaniards had an attachment,
a great attachment to the land; this is, tothe place where we were born, and that Span-iards believed service to the Nation would
consist of defending the tombs of our grand-parents and of intoning emotional canticlesto that land where they reposed, which isthe national territory. All this is very
well {but It is necessary to elevate one'sthought and see that the motherland is some-thing more than territory and superior to
the men who have peopled it or will live onit
.
What is the Motherland?
. . . /The/
characteristic of Spain and that which
6
T ^ "'"Sf®
mina Cortiles, Enciclopedia c^m <( ]^^r^rai nr^c.
,
Imprenta Elzeviriana y Libreria Cami; 194l), p. 266.
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distinfcuishes it from other Motherlandshas not been the possession of a terrUorvor a population. The essence of Spain isIts havm^x fulfilled and continuing to ful-fill an undertaking or mission which, pro-
videntially, God has bestowed upon it inthe world
.
(
In fact, the significance of la patria for the Spaniard,
and that which marks it as distinct from the Anglo-Saxon
"nation." is to be found in this undertaking, or mission, with
which all Spain is bestowed. Part of the origin of this
"mission" can be seen in the "spiritual" view of humanity
expressed in the textbooks.
Man needs to live in an order higher than
the natural.
It is sufficient to look with attention
at the human person in his complete reality
to realize the insufficiency of the natural
ways m which people live together, ivian, in
fact, isn't satisfied with the exploitation
of natural resources and the food, clothing,
housing and comfort which they provide him....
Man needs for the full development of his
personality, to attain to projects that are
much more wide and ambitious.
^
Corporatism, in its reified metaphor of the State as
an organic individual, takes this view of the human person as
the basis for the distinct "mission" which Spain must pursue in
order to reach its full development. The Spanish "mission"
while similar to that of other nations in its role as a
1 /JDelegacion Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Formacion
del Espiritu Nacional (I'V^adridi Ediciones del Frente de Juven-
tudes, 19^7), p. 135.
^ ^Seccion Femonina. Formacion Politico-Social (Madrid
i
Seccion Femenina, 1964), p. 4l,
8^
transcendent unifvinp- forrp ic, y^r^^^+u^^ ,^xyxiiir^ i ce IS, nonetheless, uniquely Spanish i
Nations, like individuals, act in life.
.
^""^'.^"^ History, in accordance with
J tV""' ^^''^ ^« s^^y "that the indi-vidual has a true vocation to be a warrior, ora musician or a military, when these are hisinclinations, also we can say of nations thatthey have a commercial vocation, like England;
or a military one, like Germany; or artistic,like Italy. '
Spain has its own vocation which is that ofdefending its spiritual values,
9
For anyone familiar with Spanish history it should come
as no surprise that the meaning of these "spiritual values" is
concretized in the dogma of the Roman Catholic faith. In many
ways Spain became a nation in the modern sense for the first
time during the reconriiji.sta of the Koors under the banner of
Catholicism. But what may be surprising is the stridency and
absoluteness of the identity between patria and Catholicism
made in the following passage, particularly in books meant for
children. For here as elsewhere throughout these next chapters
it is not important that "official" Spain selects carefully
from its historical past but rather the pattern of selection
and the persistence of that pattern throughout the textbooks.
Each people justify their presence in the
world through a mission which it carries out.
History tells us that Spain not only has such
a mission but that it is the most noble, by
being spiritual, and that she has fulfilled it
amply, because she has been the defender and
propagator of Catholicism, has exercised the
spiritual imperialism among other peoples, has
^Formacion del Espiritu Nacional (194?), p. 123
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her f^L ^h^^ai^h and nothinfr has swayedrom carrying to the world her culturp
un^.Tth'' ^^'^^ ^^^^"^-^^ without equal!'til the point of exhaustion, her religionher^language,
^>^er^laws^a^.g eustoo.. her^S^^'
The importance of this Catholic mission is "proven" by
the past and the requirements necessary to maintain it are not
ignored by the textbooks.
fnT-pn?'"''
Motherland was chosen by God toulfill one of the most decisive destinies
ctrLlL^ly.'^^ ^^^^"^^ propagation of
This destiny is manifested in the deedsof every group: religious, cultural, poli-
It^'^l
and military. In its fulfillment Spainreached the most glorious days of her history
and only when she turns her back on her voca-tion aoes she loose her pre-eminent positionm the concert of nations.
H
Here you have the objective of our policy,m agreement with our vocation, to defend
religion through all the means at our dis-
posal, in councils when heresy attacks dogma,by arms when it might be necessary, against
the enemies of Christianity on our land orm Europe, where a danger to the faith pre-
sents itself there wili be a Spaniard to
defend it. For this mission, interior
spiritual unity is absolutely necessary,
conversion of invading peoples, missions or
expulsion of religious minorities like the
Jew, etcetera.-'-'^
The Catholic interpretation of life
is, in the first place, the true one, and
•^^
Ibid.
. p. 98.
^^Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
Pormacion del Espiritu Nacional (Madrid. Delegacion Nacional
del Frente de Juventudes, 1955), p. 6.
•^^
Ibid.
. p. 10.
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besides, historically, the Spanish one. ItIS a noble pride to continually make thisaffirmation with words and, above an w?thworks, since all the acts of your lik haveto be consistent with your ideas^lS
The good works which the patria is required to perform
are not, of course, limited to the national territory. Spain
views its mission as Catholic in the wider sense as well, that
is. a universal mission with a message that must be brought to
a waiting world.
5n °^ 2pain consistsm civilizing peoples who still remain in
error, m carrying European culture to allthe corners of the world and in maintaining
a spiritual unity with all the peoples thatshe discovered and colonized. This is, that
which is known by the name of Pan-Hispanism.l^
But what exactly is the nature of the spiritual em.pire
which Spain pursues as her mission? Some insight can be gained
about the paternalistic realities of such an arrangement frc
the following anecdote
t
Countries Dependent on Others
Perhaps you don't have well in mind
the characteristics of and differences there
are among dominions, protectorates, colonies,
mandates and empires; you will understand
better with this example:
You have an older brother, already
married, who lives from his profession in his
own house, with his wife and children. He
lives independently of his parents up to a
certain point but there is a tie of affection,
fondness and even economic dependency which
:'0m
pManuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
formacion del Espiritu Naclonal (Madridi Editorial Nos, 1955).
p. 39.
•^
^Ibid.
. p. 23.
8?
keeps him united and with a certain subordin-ation to the judfrment of his parents. This
J?^.?" ^""^^^ Po"^inion with respect tothe Mother Nation.
^
You have also a unmarried sister whofinished her training, has her employment
and salary, and can live fairly independently.But she lives m your parents house, she obeysthem, is directed, protected and helped bythems this is an image of a Protectorate .
You and your little sister depend com-pletely on your parents and are subject tothem m everything, they order you and indi-
cate everything that you have to do. They
watch out for you and you don't have tobother yourself about anything. Your situa-
tion is similar to that of the Colonies.
Your parents also have as boarder in
a private high school a child who they re-
ceived when he was left alone by the death
of his parents, and who they are educating
and instructing until they make of him a
useful man v/ho can provide for himself and
open up a road in life. That boy represents
a country under Mandate (Fideicomiso )
.
And finally, your paternal grandfather,
with all your uncles and cousins, are owners
of important factories and businesses with a
great number of employees and workers. All
these have relations among themselves and
work under the supreme direction of the ^^rand-
fatherj such is the image of an Empire. ^3
The designation of Spain's mission as a spiritual one
has implications for the relations that obtain between herself
and those nations who "still remain in error." For just as
corporatism reifies the relations between the individual and
the State, so too are relations between states seen in
strangely religious and personal terms.
Perhaps the most curious manifestation of this reification
-^Antonio Maria Zubia, Geof:rafia Universal (Madrid
i
Editorial S.M., 1964), p. I25.
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Of interstate relations which corporatism entails is Spain's
view of herself as the "World's Priest. As ^the above quo-
tations have shown. Spain is seen in the textbooks as playing
an "imperial" role in the world, but this "imperialism" is
"spiritual" in nature. It consists in propagating the "eternal
values" (in Jose Antonio's phrase) of anti-materialism, Cath-
olicism, etc. of which Spain is privileged possessor. If one
were to diagram this relationship it would probably look some-
thing like the following
»
Diagram A
spiritual mission
/ / r I \ \
WORLD
Spain as a nation, then, sees herself presented with
the ethical dilemma familiar to Catholics and Catholic priests
in particular I how does a person (or nation) who is "right"
Labor Escolart Junior (Madrid i Dalmau Carles, Pla,
1955), p. 587.
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deal egalitarianly with another who is in "error"; how does
one who is "saved" deal with one v/ho is not? The solution
for Spain (as for the priest) is to try to act as if one were
not superior even when one knows this to be the case . The
following passage illustrates this point as well as sounding
several of the themes set forth in this section:
Patriotic Orthodoxy
Patriotism should be maintained in
the strictest orthodoxy, as close as possible
to the true Doctrine, and vices should be
discarded that could get one to decline into
jingoism. These vices are, besides egotistic
rationalism . . racism and materialism.
Racism would have us believe in a
superiority of our race, which would be opposed
to the equality of men before God which our
Holy Religion recognizes. Besides, we Span-
iards, who to so many people have given our
religion, language and culture, know that we
have always considered all men as brothers
and equals and have united our blood with all;
the ideal of a people who have a universal
mission is not to consider oneself superior ,
but to work in order to elevate everyone to
its level .
Materialism shouldn't influence patriotism
either, since we have repeatedly indicated
that it is of a spiritual order. Material
motivations aren't despicable but they can
never play a role in influencing the great
universal task of the salvation of the country,
which is the foundation of patriotism.-"-'
La Nacion (The Nation) . We need not spend too much time
on the Spanish concept of nation as it does not differ substan-
tially from that of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and can be thought
of in the terms of this tradition without significant ethnocentric
•^"^
Ibid.
. p. 587. Emphasis added.
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distortion.. One of the More straightforward definitions is
that contained in the quotation below,
is oompoled^of^tte"^?^?"' ^f^"^^*^ "=^tio„
other definitions, however, inject a .ore metaphysical
note such as that seen earlier in the definitions of 1,.^^
f^mU^L'^^'^'^u ^^"si^t^^ Of a plurality ofa ilies, with a common origin, territorvand possesses a certain cultural a^fl^itv
wL'of'n?^A ' ""'^^ produces'fspeiialay life /more precisely, form of bein-7.19
On
which ^^n u-l^''''
an historical formation
definitivP^L^''^r''^ f'^'^''' appeared in itstive form about the 15th century, andwhich means fundamentally the gathering o?diverse human communities in an historic
undertaking of superior category. ^0
The definitions seem to agree, in general, on the cul-
tu2zal nature of the concept of nation and its link with a
living, breathing people. It stands in contrast to the abstract
ideal of la_j2atri^ and the juridical formality of el estado
(the State).
El Estado (the State)
. This discussion of the Spanish
concept of the State begins with the distinctions drawn between
18
/M ^
Alfredo GosSlbez Celdran, Educaciol'i civico-socipl(Madrid
« Doncel, 1970), p. 130.
—
' —
.
^^Alfonso Ferrer Guillen, Formacio^n Politico-Soci.n1 v
CiV-T-ca (Madrid: Almena, I968), p. 30.
~
c>eccion Femenma, Formacion PoliTtico-Socin l (MadridiSeccion Femenina, 1964), p.T^8^
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sm
l^naoion and el_esta1o by .the textbooks. In typical cateohi
fashion a textbook asks. What relation exists between the State
and the Nation?
K l^^ ^^^^ constitutesthe base and foundation of the State. Thenation is an unorganized society, which needsthe organization which the State confers on
,
-Xu- T^^^^^ ^^^^^ lesser societies.withm the State, are articulated functionallyin a species of social organism, with differ-
entiation of organs and functions, with airuitful division of labor and with a better
arrangement and utilization of the efforts
of Its people.
State by means of the Law or poli-tical Power, grants and confers unity to thepeople and directs the will of all towardsthe common good,"--*-
But, although the State seems so important for the
Nation, the two are not that vitally linked. For the State may
change while leaving the Nation intact:
... The Nation is an element anterior
to the State. It arrives, like a living social
current, through time, and the State represents
a mere canalization of this current in order
that it may circulate better and that its energybe more useful. The State can end, giving way"
to another form of social organization, or to
another State of different political content,
and, nevertheless, the Nation continues being
the same. The Nation is the living element
of the State, that gives it feeling and trans-
cendency. It is the people, with their forms
of life, their customs and idiosyncrasies, v/ho
through a necessity for order look for the
instrumental help of the State to structure
themselves according to norms and general laws.^^
^^Ferrer Guillen, Forma c ion , p. 30.
2?
Ibid.
. p. 30.
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This provisional nature of the State may seem at first
glance out of character with a dictatorship of the Spanish
variety where things would hardly be expected to be provisional
or temporary. 23 This view of the State is, however, one of
the main justifications or rationalizations of the regime.
For in the three-tiered conceptual framework of Spanish cor-
poratism, the first two tiers of la mtria and la nacion are
immutable and probably infallible. Thus, if Spain has ••problems"
they stem from the "inappropriateness" of the existing estado
for the "real" Spain as defined by the concepts of patria and
nacion
.
El estado, the juridical form that organizes and
coordinates la nacion and la patria . must have a proper "fit"
with these two higher and anterior concepts. In I936 it was
Franco's and the Falange's task to demonstrate that republican-
ism-~the existing form of estado—was not appropriate to the
"true" Spain of la patria and la nacion
. After their victory
in the Civil War they had, in turn, the task of proving the
appropriateness of their own version of el estado
. In this
effort Franco had new tools to work with: defensively, the
power of coercion in the form of dictatorship; offensively,
the ideology of falan?ismo which proved pliable enough to have
23There was, of course, the legal provisionality of
Spain's being a monarchy without a kin^. In the late 1940 's
the regime had reasons for presenting itself as an interrep:num »
after forty years of interrer^num this whole cloth had worn
quite thin. The regime's true perception of itself is found
in the fact that Juan Carlos when he became king swore fidelity
to the principles of the Movement (that is, of Franco) like
other political underlings and functionaries.
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been retained in one form or another for nearly forty years.
Chapter VI will discuss in detail the use made of these tools;
here, let us continue with the definitions of el estado con-
tained in the textbooks.
The Spanish definition of el es tado has two essential
elements: corporatism and the special Spanish version or
expression of corporatism, national syndicalism. Here, we need
not enter into a long discussion of Spanish corporatism, which
has been treated systematically elsewhere. Rather, let us
get a feel for the content of the textbooks and learn what the
Spanish child learns about el estado .
Corporatism unlike Liberalism has a social view of
humanity. Each individual fits into and is defined by an
ascending hierarchy of social organizations.
Man doesn't live alone. He plays, studies,
works with other men.
He is united to woman and creates the
family.
Families are joined together, they elect
a single territory to live and construct a town.
The towns situated on neighboring lands,
with similar customs and geography, the same
language, etc., are joined together also and
form a region.
And the regions, joined by cultural, his-
toric, geographical ties, but, above all, by an
undertaking, by a common task, form, united,
that great union of men and lands that we call
nation, and which, in our case is Spain, our
Motherland. -^3
2kSee footnote //I,
"-^Joaquin Navarro, Todos Juntos (Madrid i Doncel, 1965)^
p. '5.
9^
This apparently simple hierarchy is basic to all Spanish
corporate philosophy and is constantly repeated. It is the
basis along which almost all the textbooks are organized and,
most importantly, the philosophical justification for nearly
every kind of human relationship imaginable, public or private.
Man (and it is the male of the species being referred to) is
a social being who has no meaning outside of a social situation
and, hence, has no individual rights but only those social
rights granted by society. Man comes first, woman second. She
is subservient to him and is joined to him for a social purpose,
the procreation, of children. The family, then, is the basic
unit of society and just as individuals are joined together
under the authority of the father, so too families are joined
together under the authority of the municipio
. nunicipios ur;der
the province, provinces under a region and I'egions under t/ie
authority of the father of all Spaniards, the Head of State.
The hierarchy is paternalistic and authoritarian; rights flow
from the top down, obligation and obedience from the bottom up.
And beyond all this, the hierarchy is more than the sum
of its parts, it is a living organism:
Society is composed of alD the living,
of all the dead and of those even yet to be
born. Each one has his place. The position
of the individual in the community doesn't
depend, then, on a contract, but on the fact
of birth.
Individuals differ in sex, in age, in
health, in physiological and mental aptitudes
• • . All form, together, an association of
heterogeneous but complementary elements.
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Thus, such an organization is similar tothat of the organs in living organisms. ItIS called organization or organismic p-roup.Its most simple form is that of the com-
munity formed
^
by the father, the mother andthe children m agricultural exploitation.
Or by the inhabitants of an isolated vi]lap;e.
There also exist associations of homo-geneous but not complementary elements. They
.
can be compared to associations of similar
organs. For example: of brains, of stomachs
or of hands. These are called organic asso-
ciations or groups. This type is representedby a class of children, a medical or law
society, by a workers syndicate. Organic
groups are beneficial only when they cooperate
with all the other organic groups to form aharmonious organism. Every organic group
that egoistically develops for'itself plays
the same role in society that cancer playsm the human body.
The inequality of individual aptitudes
and of social functions shouldn't cause a
class inequality. The stomach and the rectum
are as indispensable as the brain to the eyes.
Every organ depends on the heart, and the
heart depends on it. The boss is at the
service of the worker as the worker is at the
service of the boss. In an organismic com-
munity, the most modest work is not less than
the most elevated.
. . .
Society should lock up or cut out
those who sow discord or hate. 26
This quotation like many other similar ones occurring
throughout the textbooks makes a subtle shift from description
to prescription. What begins as a description of how society
originates and is organized soon becomes a prescription for
the way society should be seen. What is supposed to be natural,
self-evident and organic is apparently not so for all members
26 . ^Ferrer Guillen, Formacion^ pp. 11-12,
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Of society. Por as the shift fro. description to prescription
occurs the reader can see the exhortations of the author to
believe and accept what is, in fact, .erely one_theor^ of
society. The reader is warned that (for so.e
-inor^an.' c"
reason) there will always be those who sow discord Ind hate
Who fail to see what is (that is, should be) self-evident,
.ot
surprisingly, the institution chosen to do the "locking up"
and "cutting out" is el_estado:
con^.+h^r"*"
''^^""^ definitely constitutes
s mething permanent is thpt. c^nn^.i i
f^^- i-resently, the State ord^Frj^Ti:~tical society and permits it, through thisorganization, to be able to iarry oSt itsessential ends of well-being, security, 'eace,public order and physical and moral perfectioAof persons. l t^Lx n
We could compare the State with anenormous organism, endowed with a series oforgans perfectly disposed in a vital unity.
^Ll \tT^ form that our body possesses ^rms,eyes, stomachs, lungs, etc., and all these
1 W^^S n'-''^ "-^u^" orderly way, permit us tolive, so also, the State, is made of a
number of ordered organs, of hierarchicalfunctions, of coordinated activities, etcetera,
which are directed toward the com.mon good ofthe society.
On the temporal plane, the State is aperfect society. By this we mean that it
contains all the ends that are proper and
that, besides, it has available all the means
necessary to carry them out.^?
This notion of the "perfection" of the State was a phrase
often repeated by "official" Spain. The promulgation of any
new law or measure seen as important by the authorities was
Jbid.,
, p. 36. Emphasis in original.
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usually proclaimed as on. .ore way in which the Spanish state
was perfecting itself. Obviously the phrase was a kind of
solace to the adherents of the regime. But, as we can see from
the quotation above, it was also a warning to any potential
opposition, the State already is directed toward all the Broper
ends and has available all means necessary to pursue them, any
"social cancer" which pursues "improper" ends will find the
State possessed of all necessary means to "lock them up" or
"cut them out,"
The Spanish definition of the State, we have said, con-
tains elements of corporatism and National
-S ynd icalism. The
following quotation makes clear how the two are related in
"official" thought I
The New National-Syndicalist State
In adopting the doctrine of the
FalMi£:e_JLspanola Tradicion»lista v de_Ji^
-J 1 0
.
N
.
. S^ we arrive at the politics not of
thejTiost, as until now, but of the best: we
arrive at the direction of the country by the
most capable and not by the most numerous.
Hierarchy, mission, work as an honor, justice
as a norm
. . . National-Syndicalism gives to
the ^Spaniards bread, peace and work; a digni-
fied life, without economic preoccupations,
prosperity and love.
Falangism, an idea suited to present
times, is not a product imported in this newhour to the old Spain. Corporatism was alreadyimplanted some hundreds of years ago, when
Spaniards grouped themselves by offices, having
their neighborhood, their street, their saintly
patron, their standard, their seal and their
statutes. Spanish Falangism was prevailing in
the Middle Ages, when all of Europe was clutched
between the claws of feudalism. /Notet Spain
is not considered a part of Europe herejj
National-Syndicalism, which does not
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The new Spanish Stale U.Lns^^r.l'f ?f^^^i^^'
ina?es''
'^^^ the'^orc^^^^^o^LnS^^
'
Mo?herSnd!' '"^^ ''''
^-P -
Falan^e protects the P-lorious leprnrv
trad???on\h'r'^'''"' '""^'^^ into'thff
hour^2j ^^^g^^^ies of the present
National-Syndicalism is defined as well by the attempt
to set itself apart from the other "-isms" it sees as the
greatest threat to its conception of the State, Liberalism
and collectivism. Again in catechism fashion, a textbook asks:
^
How^does the Falan^^e conceive of the
otate It is creatin/y?
^
As a totalitarian instrument at theservice of the Destiny of the motherland.
How will the Falann;e have arrived atthe construction of this new State?
By means of political revolution.
^
Of what will the political revolution
consist?
Of the substitution for the liberalState servant of the doctrines of Rousseaulor a National-Syndicalist state, servant ofpermanent truths,-^"
On
^
There remains a third political point
of view between these two extremes /anarchism
or the^ complete freedom of the individual and
a statism that considers society as the only
entity/: the State at the service of the
common p-ood
. The common ^^ood demands an
intervention of the State^ in order to plan,
coordinate, prepare for the future, guarantee
^^
Ibid.
. p. ^13.
Seccion Femenma, Forma c ion Politica (Fjadridj Seccion
Femenina Zl95V}. p. 111.
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pnr.^^r.+ 4^:. - I.^^^f^l problems as the Lih^r^c,!
The following long quotation illustrates again this
attempt by National-Syndicalism to distinguish itself not so
-Oh by What it is for as by what it is against,
.y Spanish
colleagues at DATA, S.A. suitably called this the "ideology of
rejection"
:
Political parties. The realitv o-r ^r^^ir^IS one reality alone, and our lult^de towardsit as clear as that of the child towards hif
n^^^?^;-""^"^'^"^"^^' liberal\ta?e waspermitting every Spaniard a different and mis-
Pa^hs ?hat"ft''r f %--^^--land and'ff thep t t i ought to follow: some were of
shinT'^ro? ^^^."^ "P^'^ ^^^^ ^^^^^-r wor-p to God; others, that the national territory
^L^''^ ^-.^f '^^^ ^^^"^^^ (separatists); Ss^that capital
^ and even the motherland wiuld dis-
hTfdif^e^rt''^'-^^^'^^^ Spaniards
Those who on?^-?^^''^'^^ ^^^'^V^ all these matters.coincided m opinion formed a poli-tical party. There were elections. Votes werewere cast for some or for others. The manygained to the disadvantage of the few. Theliberal State was the cold spectator of thisbattel of slips of paper, without keepin;- Spainin^mmd. Those who won took advantage of theirtriumph to secure more votes in new elections.
In this activity the energies of the governin/?
were wasted. While all this was going on, Spain
collapsed victim of this liberal politics.
Class Struggle. The battle of parties
caused one of classes. In order to win votes
politicians fomented hate among Spaniards.
30r> « 1 1 1 . ^Ferrer Guillen, Formacion
. p. 55. Emphasis in original.
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Social classes were united in order to destroyeach other, political discord fr^oinp so far asto bring rum even in the very bosom of thefamily. The ground of the cities and villages
was bloodied with this fraticidal battle.
^jocial injustice. Political parties
exploited^ the masses to grow rich on their dis-content, Dut they did not bother with their
social or economic betterment. This class felt
• iu i oppressed and without aid from anyone;therefore it cannot be surprising that they
sought a quick recovery of class alon^- thetortuous paths of Marxism. 31
Corporatism and its Spanish expression in National-
Syndicalism compose the Spanish definition of el Estado . Yet
there still remains one twist to National-Syndicalism that should
not be overlooked: what my Spanish colleagues have referred to
la alouimia nolitina
. political alchemy.
more^than a concrete regime, Spain is
today, politically, an open form, an^ ongoing
process. Each one of the fundamental laws is
a milestone in the unfoldin^^ of History. Its
essence is not a Constitution in the rationalist
and ^ all-predicting fashion of Liberalism; but
it is an architectural framework of a unanimous
spirit
Some have seen the ideas contained in the quotation
above as an expression of Spanish pragmatism, of the non-
ideological character of the Franco regime. Rather, it is more
like alchemy I the trial and error search for the touchstone
that will transform a common and base dictatorship into some
glittering edifice worthy of poet-revolutionaries. It is only
the rulers who know what they seek to produce; and only they who
are entitled to experiment.
-^•^Formacion del Espiritu Nacional (19^7), p. 86,
32 /Jose Antonio Ma, de Villarreal, Encilopedia (Madrid
»
iviagisterio Espanol /l95^)t P- 5^5*
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CHAPTER IV
IMAGES OF THE INDIVIDUAL
chairs or othfr easL v ! ^v'?'' ^"""^ the
order that tho\,, i,^ ""^^"^ objects in
can'be'sle'n'^h'erefh'a^tln'?'
'^l^'^'the ground and deUvef^ft^thfL^e'rfr"
This quotation summarizes and symbolizes the main teach-ing Of the textbooks about the individual: a lac. of confid
xn the goodwill, trustworthiness or integrity of the human
being. Whether in the area of "soo-i^i • •cire i c al pessimism," from which
this quotation was taken, or sex or sey mi ocx roles or comportment or
other topics covered in the textbooks, the dominant message
communicated to the child is ne,ative. The child is tau.ht to
be distrustful of others and also of himself, of his body, his
mind and his nature.
In this chapter, then, we will be locking at several
message areas in the textbooks which are important for an
understanding of the "official- view of the individual. Among
these areas are the definitions of male and female social roles
(particularly in the context of the family), the general area
Of sexuality and comportment, authoritarianism and paternalism,
KspanolafWslh^prsJ-Sl.'^^^^'
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and the area of social pessimism.
La Mujer Espanola (The Spanish Woman)
The role of women in Spanish society is fundamental to
an understanding of the
-official" view of the individual. As
elsewhere women make up about half of the individuals in Spain.
But aside from this biolo.;.ical fact the position of the women
in Spanish society is. I believe, a key concept for an under-
standing of this society as a whole. 1 will be outlining the
arguments to support this contention in Chapter VI. For now.
I would like to turn to the textbooks themselves while keepin.^
in mind that these passa.^es on sex rolec^ and the family will be
looked at later in the wider context of a strater^y for social
control
.
La mu
.
ieri pi erna quebrada. en ca^n (The woman: in the
house with a broken lerj is a famous Spanish dicho. or sayin/r,
which usually brin^rs a smile to the lips of more emancipated
Westerners. It is. however, one sayinp; which is practised as
well as preached, for despite the impact of "modern" influences
on Spain during; the late 1950 's and 1960's, the ideal woman for
most Spanish men is one who is literally immobilized by her
home and her familyj
Thus is the Spanish woman. Refuge of her
husband, teacher of her children,' comforter
of the poor. Pious in her devotions, active
inher labors, long-suf ferinx^ in adversities.
How many thinrs a Spanish woman knows how to
do. She knits for her family, and if there
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is time for the' poor. She washes and irons
banS and ^Mi'h
^^^^^^^^ ^l^^^^ing o? her hus-
are
J
Glean like the smile of her soul. Shemends with careful attention, cooks wi^hlaborious art and understands how to make
holid^vf ^•a'*'^^^ brighten the table on familyidays. And how good a rosauilla (type ofpastry) tastes made by mother's hands.
2
Spain is a country in which ever larger numbers of women
are entering the work force and, undoubtedly, this in itself is
having and will have an effect on society's and women's self-
determination. But look at what children of the late 1950's and
early 1960's-the "take-off" point for women's employment-
learned about women in the workplace:
But even if work in itself is always a P-ood,
a merit, a laudable fact, also it is a pun-ishment for Zoriginal/ sin. And if woman
already
_ received her own punishment for herfirst sin, why throw upon her shoulders another
additional punishment? Precisely that which
seems to be the special punishment of men?
I ^ believe that we only ouf^ht to accept this
situation of the professional training- of the
woman with certain reservations, making it
understood that it is necessary that the woman
does not denv her collaboration /with her hus-
t>and/ and is capable of contributinr- to it .
Keep in mind that the best part of a journey
is ^ always the return trip. And the return
trip in this specific case to which we are
aluding is precisely the return from whateverjourney to the home; to the hearth . r/:aternitv
.
the governing of the house, decoration, the
education of children, friendship and intellec-
tual companionship with the husband, etc.
This is for the woman the glorious return
from her trip through the field of professional
9 ^"
El Libro de Espana (Madrid: Bruno, 19^3), p. 81.
10k
pSsfuofiii?? ronouncinp this
ou^'paradisf3'^' ''"^""^^ have lost
Another, perhaps more mundane, view of the woman's
place is given in the following passage where she is compared
to a brood-henj
?h^:L^^?^^?
time there was a hen who had
cMoL children. Only three littlehicks. This IS not much for a mama-hen.
But the three little chicks were "terrors."They were never quiet. Therefore they pavemore work to their mother than if she^ad
nad a dozen,
^
The qualities which a Spanish woman ought to possess in
order to fulfill her divine mission as mother and wife were
certainly not likely to promote protest against her assigned
role.
The Spanish woman has to be generous, sub-
missive and happy at every moment.^
Her required "contentment" is not, however, designed to
prevent displeasure with her role as much as to help fulfill it.
<i iov.
Carmen Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social (Formacion F.grn-jUJ^^x y boc3Rl ) (iviadrid: Seccion Femenina, 195b). pp. l60-lbl-emphasis in original. The class nature of this passage is obvl-
?o o.^f^'^^i-^^^" reference to professional work for'women. ItIs. evident throughout the textbooks that they are aimed at theypper class and especially the clase media . The poor are referred
f -11
^^^ally 1^ an exhortation to be kind to them or, as we
fil!?!!
'^^ point out the proper way to distribute alms to them,
unx.ii very recently the authors were, however, quite correct in
supposing that only the "hi^rher" classes would be reading suchi;ext books. Spanish education, particularly on the secondaryj.<>vei remains very elitist. See Foessa, Informe Sociold^ico
.
v.h * 1^
»
Lecturas. Cuentos (Madrid: S.M., I969), p. 50.
^Escuela Espanola,
f'Adelante !
, p. I98.
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For she is to be the moral and social pillar upon which the
family is to rest:
Tranquility is a virtue without which woman
IS not that which she has to be: the soothin/?,
comfortable, serene element of the home.
It is she who produces the resultin/^ "hearth."
Somethmf^ always fixed, immutable, solid, that
is at the center of the family as a bond of
union, as security.^
Of course, the woman is compensated for the rather con
fining role she must play in a manner that is certainly not
unique to Spanish sexism. While she may not do man's work,
entertain man's ideas or have man's freedom, she is still
superior to him in a most important v/ayi virtue.
The wom.an is by nature better than the man,
and constitutes many times the true virtue
in the marriage,
7
And, besides, she receives that special reverence from
men which is due her:
Respecting Women
You also, young boy, ought to accustom your-
self from now on to see in every woman an
image of the most excellent woman, ^:ary.
Treat your sisters with delicacy, being
obsequious and agreeable with them, correct
and educated,
8
Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social , p. 159,
7 . .
^ 'Seccion Femenma, Forma c ion Familiar v Social (Madrid
'Seccion Femenina, 19^9) i p. 254.
^Antonio Herrero Antolin, Lecturas educativas (Madrid:
Hernando, 1959), p. 32.
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indeed, the devotion paid to the woman as mother is
boundless-as witness this
.odel oration of a daughter.
To rny Mother
Loving mother, let me love youlBeloved mother, let me kiss youiPermit me, holy mother, to express my
Caressinf; your hands I Kissing your facel
TosoJlMlV?"'' • l-e"i<5l/°n you^Liernalbosom that invites ray lovel
Source of songs and tenderness.
And quench this thirst of affection that suffocate^ine m your sweet and pure waters!
^nd i"^nh%^° ^""5^^ affection that you offer me
T?at T o.^^-?^'^?"'' '^^^^ ^^^^^ ^'-^^ t)ind me.h I cry with happiness when you kiss meAnd groan with enthusiasm wher. you embrace me.
9
La Familip (The Family)
While the Spanish woman is supposed to be possessed of
certain qualities by nature, one cannot really define woman
outside of her "proper" context-the family. I have spoken
earlier (Chapter II) of the special role the family plays in
Spanish society and in the "official" Spanish ideology. In the
textbooks one can view the essentially authoritarian nature of
the ideal Spanish family and the hierarchical roles assigned
husband, wife and children.
One must begin to discuss the family in proper corporate
9 • /
',r.^^^
Edelvives, Qramatica (Zaragoza: Editorial Luis Vives,
1963), p. 59.
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fashion by demonstrating its organic origins.
nol toll^; alone -""^-^ of mankind
with otherbeIn"s for^ui.^^l together
most simple anri =+ L assistance. The
for. ofTi^an^gatherlng ITV.T "^T^
:^fkiti^n!-i-tXi J > F
JJa^LLl.JS^ ^"""^-^ K2t\^i^or:^ fif-
Ihe textbook family is an incredibly happy place where
all work and live and keep their place in harmony,
I saw first light in a simple home, wherethe peace and love of God reif^ned! Thomewhere each morning I would see in my parentsthe noble eagerness to undertake the dailvtask under the blessing of the Lord! ^
My father honorably earned a wa^^e hour afterhour to take care of the family'l necessUies
o?^K^ T'""'''' dili^^nt, self-denying? soJi
'
a touch o^'le'f""^'^ children provided
oiiT K?-" tenderness so great, that, though inall humbleness, a sensation of tranquil well-
at the end of the day agreeable and happy. 11
This model family is close-knit and the special affection
which prevails there is not meant for everyone.
Being agreeable with visitors, with friends.
13 all very wells but our affection, our mostcourteous manners, our attention ought to befor our own.l^
10_ , . -
u ^
Delegacion Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Forrraci^ndel Espirjtu Nanon^l (Madrid. Frente de Juventudes? 194?)? P?'l38.
11 ~Escuela Espanola,
iAdelante l . p. 49,
12 /
Formacion (19^9), p. 11,
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As I have already mentioned, roles within the family
are carefully defined:
o\^"for^civi^^%'.'^5 ^^^^1^ --^ooli and for civilization/ comes the importance
ILI tuTr'^^l organization of the family and
autho^i?v ^5'^'' represents in it the si^n of
lo^e sac^i?^.^''^'^^- ' ^°ther,
.
children, respect, obedience and subordination.
The man is the head, but the woman is the heart
he isTollll -nd she, sentW,
tion!l5 ' adornment and consola-
These roles are not only decreed by God, Nature and the
rest but by law as wellt
The husband has the obli/ration to protect,defend and represent his wife. The woman isobliged to obey her husband and to follow him
wherever he establishes residence, except whenhe goes to another country.
The goods that the husband brings to the
marriage find themselves in an entirely free
situation. Those of the wife find themselves
subject to certain restrictions, because thehusband is the head of the family.
.
. .
The father is the head of the family.
All the individuals which form it are subject
to his authority.
The power and authority that the father has
over his children, which has been recognized
by the laws of Spain, is called patria
potestad .1^
•^Ibid.
. pp. 191, 192.
14 ^ . /Jose Udma Cortiles. Enciclopedia Cami (Barcelona:
Imprenta Elzeviriana y Libreria Cami, 19^1), pp. 202-283. The
exception noted in the first paragraph—that a wife need not
follow her husband outside the country— is interesting given
the fact that several hundred thousand Spanish workers are
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In the family's chain of command the father supposedly
wields supreme authority with the mother and children subserv-
ient to him. The female child is, then, the last run^ on this
hierarchical ladder:
1. What is the best quality that can adorn alittle ^irl:
Docility and obedience.
2. To whom do we owe obedience and respect?
To all those who are our superior in a^e,
or dignity or in the office that they hold.
3. Whom do we most particularly have to obey?
Our parents and teachers, because it is a
very sacred obligation corresponding to their
rights
.
4. Why is the obligation sacred?
Because it is ordered by the Fourth Command-
ment of the law of God, v/hich says « 'Honor thy
father and mother*.
5. What must one think of a little girl who is
ungovernable and disobedient?
That if she doesn't work to correct such a
serious defect, she will be a very bad Christian
and very disgraced during all her life, as
experience proves. -^5
Although the female child is placed at a special dis-
advantage, strict obedience is set forth as a norm for children
in general. They are admonished that when dealing with parents
employed in other West European countries and that the money
they return to their families in Spain is a very important con-
tribution to Spain's balance of payments. See Chapter VII.
''^Edelvives , Cantilla moderna de Urbanidad (Zaragozat
Editorial Luis Vives, 195^). P.
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•Nover dispute the., nor answer back, nor lie to the., nor
raise your voice.-l^
^^.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ .^^ ^^^^^^^^^
are limited
»
Never respond with a simple
-yes' or 'no'
'Yes^ r>L:^^
according tS the^'situa^ion?
'
s, papa'
I 'no, mamma'. 'As you wishmama ' 'Order me, mama,' 'as you desir^
Si' re?r^^' P-Pa.' 'as^y-wlsh.
Also very nice is the reverential title which
tradiuSn ^^^^-i^^ the SpaniS'
^
T ditio : 'Yes, sir' or 'No, sir'. 'Yesmadam' or 'No, madam'. All these firms ol'
D^^^^^fji^^^r ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
i?'- 'nPv^^J'l
""^""^
J"^' ^
^°"'t ^^^1 like
chiid S? ^^"^^ ^^^^ a well-born
The following story from one of the Spanish readers gives
some insight into Spanish child-rearing practices. We are told
under the heading, "The punishment of children," that a mother
loves her child too much and when he comes home one day from
school crying she goes to see his teacher. He tells her:
"Madam," said the teacher with dignity and
rectitude, /'your son failed to give me respect
on occasions, and I have punished him as his
reward and a warning to the rest? if you don't
want him to be punished, take hirn home, spoilhim, pamper him, that he may laugh and be amused;but understand that the more he laughs now as a
child, the more he will have to cryas a man."
The questions for discussion which follow this story
^^Emi]5D Alonso Burgos, Cortesia Juvenil (Madrid: Don
Bosco Z1962/), p. 30.
•'•'
^Ibid.
. p. 31.
Ill
illustrate the connections the authorities want to make between
a relatively harmless anecdote of authoritarian child-rearing
and the exercising of state authority a^rainst "bad" men.
Why had the teacher punished the child? Are
our parents bad because they punish us? The
authorities punish transgressors of the laws.What would happen if vicious men were notpunished?io
Here the analof^ies implied by corporatism are more obvi-
ously in evidence than in other of the passages in this section;
but of course the State is vitally interested in the way that
the concept of the family is developed and in the definitions
of the male and female roles within the family. The importance
of this should be as clear to students of Spain as it was to
Jose Antonio;
Jose Antonio, in his longinp; to give unity
to our nation, sees in the family the
cornerstone upon which to place national
unity, and therefore our doctrine respects,
supports and assists the family, and
therefore he cannot be a Falangist who does
not love his parents and brothers and sisters
Or»
as he ought.lv
This eagerness for the emancipation of youth
that kills the life of the family, is the
cause of many of the maladies of present
times. Those of us who are comrades, have
to remember the enthusiasm of our National
Delegation for the rebirth of family life,/
He has said in one of his discourses: Jose
^^zequiel Solana, Lecturas de Pro (Madridt Editorial
Escuela Espanbla, I966), p. 101.
•^^Formacion (19^7), p. 139.
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Antonio saysj ' "One must place man's feet
on the frround: for the woman the frround isthe family . "'^^
X^o humcino, lo moral, lo Rpynpl (Humanity, Morality,
Sexuality)
In this section I would like to examine some of the con-
trasts between the "official" views of human nature and of moral
and sexual propriety. From a highly spiritual and mystical
view of man, the texts descend to a concentration on a Puritan-
ical sexual ethic and a Victorian concern for appearances that
convey a profoundly negative impression of human potential.
A discussion of the "official" concept of human nature
beg:ins with the definition of man as the bearer of eternal
values ( portador de valores eternos ){
Spain, defender of the spiritual values
which enclosed the Middle Apes, in the midst
of the iViodern Age wished to order human co-
habitation ( convivencia ) according- to the
Catholic understanding of man, in opposition
to Protestantism. Our defeat in this engage-
ment was the triumph of a despiritualized
humanism, which, in our days, has led to
modern materialism; and in the economic field
has bred the division of men into classes and
the Liberal and Marxist social organizations;
the former founded on the following equality
i
one man = one vote
and the latter, in which man is the essential
factor of production. Such absurd ideas came
to seize the Spanish people, hastening our
national decline towards catastrophe. Against
them the Falange raised its human assertion--
man is the bearer of eternal values
—
, which
we already know is not new, but is extraordin-
arily revolutionary. It is a Catholic
^ ^^Seccion Femenina, Formacion Familiar v Social (Madrid
>
Seccion Femenina, 19^9) i pp. 142-1^3. Emphasis in original.
113
postulate upon which we seek to mount a
Tn?or>:r%^^"i ^P^^i^^ motherland^ Ui ioimis all of our ro-irr>T ^ ^oij-j. uj. u revolutionary Droceq<?i
etcet^rl: institutions /r?,htir
*
ofIna?^ ''i^^ "^^^ affirmation
pvp ?ho\ ^^^^^y universal destiny,are t e two p-reat pillars upon which the
.
Falanrist doctrine is firmly planted. 2?
Another textbook makes it clear that the definition of
the individual follows from the definition of the Patria:
Why do we say that man is the bearer ofeternal values?
Because after defining the Motherland asDestiny m the Universal, we have to valuethe man who has to fulfill this destiny.
Perhaps the most striking contra^-t with the elegant
picture of man painted in the abstract is the discussion of
sexuality. Messages about the taboos of sexuality are conveyed
in many ways-from the definition of the human body as dirty by
nature (hence the need for good hygiene) to the unspoken dangers
of coeducation. Anyone who has the least familiarity with Spain
would expect to see passages such as the following:
What undignified fashions, so injurious to
modesty! Legs bare to the muscle, arms
uncovered until near the armpit, low neck-
lines on the chest and the back, dresses
fitted to the body in a shameless manner.
It is almost worse than being nudel^-^
21 /Formacion (19^7), p. l4l.
22 / y /Seccion Femenina, Formacion Politica (Madrid: Seccion
Femenina Zl95i7) . p. 92.
23Angel Ayala, S.J., Conse.ios a las .iovenes (Madrid:
Ilk
It is not only the hu.an body which io so offensive topublic
.o-ality but certain activities in which thi« boay
engages
i
One condemns the attitude
"th^Lles^'^^n,^- -
°"
they be ln^a^ed) iLf^P"^?*'^''^^ ^''^^ though
live gestures? "'"'^ ^"^
armfon^iL"^.*,^! the throwing of
OP s ? f---
--a? e^xS^.
Neither parents, nor relatives, nor authoritiesought to permit the contamination af toe
circulftiorduriA/mryear inlp^in!'^' " commercial
Today they leave out the collar, the cuffs
^e?^n^^'$!'^ thousand details thatr fi ement demands, and therefore men andwomen present themselves in any form whatso-ever showing all parts of the body, which
1 '^nL?? ^^PVSnant thing one can imagine.A sport' neckline or no neckline at all.showing the arms up to the armpit, with allthe hairiness so disagreeable to the senseOf smell, and this in formal gatherings.And it IS when there is no virtue, that the
man-savage with all his instincts appears.
—from Daniel Vega, CM., El anti-Cristo a laXis^ (Madrid, 1972), p. 32, quoted in Amandode Miguel, "Los estudiantes cambian de valores."
Informacionecj, March 1?, I973.
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The concern with giving ocandal and with public and
especially neighborhood opinion i^ «P Is a common phenomenon in thetestbooKs and, from my experience, in contemporary Spain as
and embracing is the outward impression th..o-iiipre sion ey create. Appear-
ances are important to Spaniards and itx a is assumed that public
intimacy is just the tip of the iceberg.
wUh^othr^'/^?^'^ ^^"^^ grades do not mix
evenin^^r ^^V"- (customary
to Ce ?he end^; '^'^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^as
ohl?L+^ ^ ^ Paseo; such can only be an
Mtv^^ ^as to ..0 ?o the
^he^Uza'^a ?h ^"^^"^ cathedral,
bv^^rad^^ etc., one must also ^o
lL^+S groups and even in file accord-ing to the custom of each Center, but alwav^
dLeanor'ff f^""^; --^^ Sr!^caeinean IS tne least to be expected, since
yours2lTtrV^^ourself from the group, or enter anyplace
?hin'r'H-f^"'^"^'^' ^^^^i^g persons or'
fi^ht wT^h^'/°^^ continues ahead, or
plfce
companions or change your
A concern for appearance leads Spaniards to place a
heavy emphasis on manners, comportment and courtesy. One author
in the preface to his book makes clear the origins of this con-
cern and the great value placed upon '•proper" conduct. He begins
the preface with a Spanish refrain-C^uien a^rada. m.nd. (He who
Emilio Alonso Burgos. Cortesia
. pp. 6^-66.
IMlx, p. 7O1 emphasis added.
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pleases, commands)—and goes on to add:
Each day I am more convinced that the major
part of the lacks of comprehension, of the
displeasures and sufferinp;s that we mortals
bear, and even a great part of the offenses
that are committed against our God are
through a LacI^ of Education and Excess of
Discourtesy .'^
~~
The maintenance of appearances often seems to involve
the negation of spontaneity in the child, of what most adults
would probably see as the natural energy of childhood:
Every pupil in his juvenile age has to live
always with a happy face and play with opti-
mism in the patios and recreation areas. He
has to prefer the games that put the entire
person into motion.
Your games have to be elegant and proper,
avoiding games from the lov/er class neighbor-
hoods and of children "of the street," which
consisting in striking one another, grabbing
hold of each other and rolling on the ground.
Avoid, then, putting your hands on others,
feeling anyone and the throwing of your com-
panions on the ground, 2?
Following is a "good self-analysis of general character"
presented in a reader for thirteen-year olds:
1. In order that I might fulfill my obligations,
do I possess perfect health?
2. When I work, do I do so with a fixed purpose?
3. Do I make myself a daily plan, without resort-
ing t) raanentary improvisations?
^, In my studies, do I devote maximum attention?
Ibid
,
. p. I J emphasis in original.
Ibid,
. p. 48.
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^
"^^^^ advantap^e of time? Do I waste iton unnecessary things? x
DiltShp/^'^'^^w V^ll-dressed, clean, with shoespo is ed and hair combed? ^^nueb
LpertinLcer^' grossness or
• ?reatment of^'th'e?!
r^^''^ ^^"^^^^^^ ^
cha^acte??""^
impression of seriousness of
10 Do I know how to control myself when whatothers say disgusts me?
11. Do I reject sugpjestions that can incline mvspirit alpn/T the bad path?
etcetera.
These preoccupations with appear^.nces
,
manners and urban
ity are not, however, mere quirks of Spanish character nor are
they anachronistic vestiges of traditional Spain. These con-
cerns flow from a social theory and they are just one of many
mechanisms of social control
i
Keep in mind that an agreeable presentation
of your person predisposes you to be always
esteemed, treated civilly and considerately
by others. A good presentation will make us
pleasing one to the other, an essential con-
dition that God has established among men in
order that they live in society. It makes
happy living together among the different
social classes, not scorning anyone.
A presentation full of courtesy and elegance
maintains in its place the necessary hierarchy
among all the elements that form society,
without friction or violence. ^9
Emilio Ortiga, Estimulos ( Barcelona » Pedagogia Activa,
1959). p. 19.
29 . . /
'^Emilio Alonso Burgos, Cortes la . p. 23.
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Lest see be
.oved to dispute this interpretation of
socal life, there are regulations that prohibit certain activi-
t.es such as pla.in, cards, throwing stones and speaKin, about
politics t
tp:a\°?;/^fliii??,P^^J!"e for .oney and
Social Pessimism
This Chapter on the Images of the Individual be^an with
instructions on how to retrieve fallen
.onoy while avoiding the
suspicion that the retriever would pocket so^e of the coins
himself. This presumption of the worst about others is a
fairly constant theme of the texts and
, I will try to argue
later, an important component in the "myth of incapacity" per-
petuated by "Official" Spain. I would like to conclude the
chapter, then, with the theme of mistrust of others or social
pessimism.
Early on in my perusal of the texts I came across a story
in a reader that gave me pause. The reader was in use in the
middle sixties and was designed as a practice text for 8 to 10
year olds. The story concerns two Moslem boys who supposedly
practice Mohammedanism " en secreto " in Malaga, a resort city
30
Ibid.
.
p. 49.
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on Spain's southern coast, m the story these two Moslem boys
verbally abuse and then physically beat a Christian boy for
practising his faith. Although the Moslems are painted as
despicable characters, the story ends happily with their con-
version-by the angelic example of their victim-to Catholicism
and their baptism. ^-^
The reader may wonder as I did about how many "secret-
Moslems there still are in Spain after the Reconquest. cen-
turies of inquisition and religious persecution and the present
forms of discrimination against religions other than Catholi-
cism. One might also wonder about the wisdom of practicioners
of such an unfavored sect who practice in secret but beat up
in public.
Of course, it is just a story but it only seems to make
sense not as reality but as allegory. If one were to substitute
"Communist," or foreigner (or foreign idea) or non-Catholic,
for "Moslem" the story would make more sense. But it makes
sense also in a more generalized way: the fundamental division
of Spanish society into an "us— them" dichotomy. "We" well-
born, right-thinking, obedient, reverent Spaniards are always
threatened by "them"i the atheist, the subverter, the "anti-
Spain." It could perhaps be argued that Spain has a history
which gives some support to such a view. Spain seems to have
Solana, Lecturas de Pro , pp. 92-93
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always been characterized by the division of its people into
"water-ti,ht compartments "-in Ortega's phrase. The Romans
found Spain one of their most difficult conquests because each
small city-state would defend itself to the death. There were
no alliances, no regional chiefs and so the Romans had to pro-
ceed literally mile by mile in their conquest. This lack of
cooperation among the cities meant that the Romans would take
decades to subdue the country but it also meant that no matter
how long it took they would ultimately succeed. That such
domestic isolationism has persisted is evidenced by the "inven-
tion" of guerrilla warfare in Spain and the anarchist tradition
that lives on to this day in some areas.
But it is not so significant that the textbooks refer
to the past but that they refer so selectively. I cannot say
whether it was true in the past but for Franco Spain this
"domestic isolationism" of which social pessimism is one part
served the needs of the status quo. If Franco Spain we^s not a
totalitarian dictatorship in that it did not maintain total
'
control of all aspects of political, social and economic life
but allowed a "limited pluralism"— in Linz's phrase—to exist,
it did not need to be totalitarian; for this "limited pluralism,
in an atmosphere of "domestic isolationism" and social pessi-
mism, can insure that no broad-based, organized threat to the
status quo can be mounted. Thus, the Spanish opposition-
embroiled in its sectarian feuds— could barely unite to
effectively oppose Franco. It was in "official" Spain's
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interest, then, to promo'tp iriooo • ,mo e ideas of social pessimism,
"domestic
isolationism" and a general "myth of incapacity."
A good example of how such a climate of ideas was main-
tained on the individual level -p^t tIS the following passage
»
Living is like trading
Life is like a great market. We are allbuyers and sellers in the bazaar ^existence
nn/? ""l^^^^^ry. then, that we be alwayfa^e^^
nMS .^^^ operations that we see ourselves
'
Obliged to brin^ about in order to ^ive letus carry on with the necessary precautions
IIT.V' ^'""It ^"^^ unLrupSloLpeople, even though many times they appearhonorable, who live at the expense of ?hosewho are overly careless. 32 ^ ^^^""^^
A reference has already been made in an earlier section
to the emphasis on appearances, on outward forms. In the area
of social pessimism the reverse side of this coin is exposed:
now appearances are used to hide the base instincts that are
supposed to characterize humans.
The proper person hides his animal life(his fear, his cold, his heat), hides hisintimate concerns (his excessive happiness,his excessive sorrow) for the benefit ofthe general well-being, and he hides, as well,his preferences and antipathies. He is theperson who in all things has equilibriujr
,
discretion and serenity, joined with a proper,tranquil and affable appearance . 33
A more cynical version of this same message and one
which seems to me to correspond to the real social ethic is
Ortiga, Estimulos
. p. II3.
33 /
Eorjnacion (19^9). p. 9.
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round in another texti
And''he^!hfh.'^
life are judged by appearances.a fte who as cunning need never want. 3^
The negative presumption about others begins with child-
hood temptations- but extends to adult life and the workplace
in this curious definition of independence:
Remember what satisfaction you felt wheninstead of accepting the invitation of thatboy who wanted to bring you to pick fruityou said no and went on to school?
Thus you should always do when someone
wishes to prompt you to commit undesirable
acts: knowing how to affirm with prideyour personality before the suggestion ofthose who would incite you to evil.
Yest-;rday it was that young thief who wanted
xo^ trick you; tomorrow it will be an evilfriend who will wish to teach you how to do
something disgusting; later it will be a com-panion from work who will propose that yoube as wicked as he. 35
One aspect of social pessimism is the way in which
social ills are explained. As might be expected all kinds of
misfortune are seen as the result of personal failure on the
part of the individual involved or, as in this definition of
responsibility, on the part of the unfortunate parents:
Perhaps sometime you have seen deformed
children who can not go to School or play
v/ith others, or have the normal life that
you have. Well then: almost always these
children are paying for the faults or vices
of their parents, who were drunkards, or
3Z4. ^Ortiga, Estimulos
. p. 3^.
'^-'Herrero Antolin, Lecturas . p. 15.
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the necessary charartfr?^ ? 1 ^^^^^
nnoo^i-P Z "^"-^ ^n acter to know how to frpponeself fro™ unhealthy, foreign inflSencel!36
A similar message is conveyed in the following anecdote
about two kinds of alms-giving.
Actually, there will alwav<; h<- +h» „„
What an admirable thingi The wise man
lZTni,l° "''^'''t ^ ai^flcuirbis'iness,and a vil age priest would have seen it solvpd
savs Jiffn^"-, poverty!"charit1l"y h s formula,,,. '
Of course, there is charity and then there is charity.
In the big city house, for example, all the charity cases line
up on the street outside the house and
They begin to whisper-
-which is a blessinp-
—about everyone; but especially of the family
and the servants who take care of them. Theygrumble, discuss, dispute, get excited,
quarrel, insult each other and make an in-fernal racket at times, hurling improprieties
at one or the other,
A servant of the house emerges to distribute a coin to
each. Some, according to the author, go around the block to
try to get a second coin and most of the rest waste their money
on vices such as cigarettes, wine, aguardiente, sweets and
chocolate
,
^^Ibid. . p. 21.
12^
On the other hanri ^v, +uxn nd, in the country the mistress of thehouse comes out with loaves n-r hr>^ ^ . .Of bread and gives them out herself
asking after the sick and ^ivini. r^i ^ ^ •
^„
g ing eligious instruction where
appropriate,-^'^
social pessimism is. in fact, based on individual
T>essi.is.-on the deprecation of self and hu.an nature in
general,
.he textbooks urge each individual to wrestle his
base instincts into submission while assuming that few if any
others will be successful. And the atte.pt to gain control of
oneself is indeed a strugg-le.
limifof^^^" ""^^^ A
a SifJ'r- ^" economic limit (money),
.abandoning oneself to diversions
lack o^ edP'?? ^" ^^^'^ is a
oon?r.nf because it is a lack ofc trol over our nature and our appetiteswhich are entirely savage (when not tamed). 38
No better summary of the general thrust of the Images
of the Individual presented in the texts could be found than
the following:
Be resolved
I!^^r ^""""l^ powers nor in theprotection of men but only in God. 39
Vives, im) Z i8V '^I'i^^^^ Editorial Luis
comes from a 'book ^iJ^^^S^ passage itself actually
selection in ^h?i T ^J^^ ^^""^^ ^^^^'^ ^^^d as aj-ecti m t is textbook published in 1948.
38.,Werner Bolin. Convivencia, p. 12?. Emphasis in original.
39
r?r. 1
Agustin Serrano de Haro, Cada Vez Meiore c, (Madrid
«
Escuela Espanola, 196?), p. 14.
vicLorui
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Certainly this is nothing more than any Catholic child
learns who is taught the central teachinf^s of Roman Catholi-
cism. But the quote must be taken in context, in Franco Spain.
God was literally "official" business f it was "official" Spain
which decided what God is and what God wants. In the case of
Franco Spain, then, the quote might just as well be, "Wever
trust in yourself or your fellow humans but only in the State."
To the degree this admonition was accepted there could be no
democracy in Spain nor even an effective opposition; to the
degree it was rejected, the dictatorship itself was rejected.
However, let us leave further speculation on the implica-
tions of the Images of the State and the Images of the Individua
for Spanish politics for a subsequent chapter and proceed now
to an examination of the nexus of the State and the Individual,
the Images of the Citizen.
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CHAPTER V
IMAGES OF THE CITIZEN
In this chapter we turn to what are probably the most
important images conveyed by the textbooks, the images of the
citizen. In it we will be looking at passages which deal with
the rights and duties of the Spaniard, the means for partici-
pation in the governmental system set out by "official" Spain,
the special definition of participation in terms of obedience
and discipline, the connections drawn between the family and the
state and, finally, the concept of patriotism.
Although there is some overlap with earlier selections,
the passages chosen for this Chapter emphasize more than others
the connections between the views of the individual and the
state presented earlier. Here seemingly abstract discussions
of the nature of humanity and the ends and purposes of the state
are operationalized
, as it were, in the expectations of
"official" Spain about how the Spanish citizen should and will
behave
,
V/e begin, with the most fundamental aspect of citizen-
ship, the notion of rights and duties.
Derechos v Deberes (Rights and Duties)
It v/ill come as no surprise to students of Spain or
dictatorship that in the texts much more of an emphasis is put
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3S
on duties than on richts.- th^c- +^ vxxgnxs. i is IS to be partly explained by
the corporatist nature of Franco Spain. In such a corporatist
system with its so-called "organic" view of the person, rights
are not seen in the abstract, individualist, absolutist way
which is more common to a liberal, Anglo-Saxon tradition. We
have already seen that the individual is made subservient or
secondary to the needs of society as a whole, that-as one of
the textbooks argued-man does not exist outside of society.
From this philosophical tradition, individual rights (derechj
in Spanish) are seen as relatively unimportant or as luxuries
that may be easily dispensed with for the "good of society" as
a whole. For example, in the case of Spain, group rights or
fueros such as those extended to the Church and military of
their own schools or separate legal systems have a tradition
that stretches from feudal through colonial to present times.
Individual rights (derechos) have a far shorter and weaker
tradition being really a nineteenth and twentieth century
appendix and which existed in Franco Spain—some would argue-
only to placate international opinion and the human rights
amendment to the United Nations charter.
Yet while there is this lack of a philosophical tradition
in Spain to support individual rights it should not be forgotten
that the de-emphasis of individual rights served the needs of
the dictatorship and is an important message of the textbooks.
One passage discusses the relation between rights and duties
in this wayt
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Duties
As soon as wa ay-c.
surrounded by obli^«?Tn ourselves
have to fulfiirif tions that we
men and useful to Knm! ^® honorable
have the duty to obev n^^* children we
teachers. As J '''' Parents and our
orders of our superior^ ^^^P^^^ ^he
tion Of creatinga fam!iv of""^"'
the obliga-
of fulfilling ourselve^ thv.^ supporting it,
of respecting m?ive tL.n?-''^^ ^^^ydefending thf ^l^l traditions, the duty of
born? ^ ^hi^h we have been
And in smaller type:
Rights
ptr P,,+ ^ respected by other personse c. But one must earn ri/rht=? tk^ i 'for example, has a perfect H^ht worker,
individuals cannot speak of ri^ht<^ ntl
or as another text more succinctly put it. "The quality
and right of the Spanish citizen is called citizenship and it
Obliges us to the fulfillment of many duties and to the exercise
of some rights
.
There is as well a philosophical and religious argument
19'tO), 5^395!'° Enclclopedia ^ctiv. (fedrid Hernando,
2 y
Jose Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia Camf rRaroplImprenta Elzeviriana y Libreria Cam 1^941 77^/272?
ona
»
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for the priority of duties
i
If rights and duties are considered in
relation with the universal order, we canprove that the ripht is anterior to the duty
.... God, Creator and Legislator, does not
nave any duty, and does have every right.
The Divine Right is the fundamental law, from
which issue all human duties. But, consider-ing duty and right in the relative order, itis easily understood that, within each indi-
vidual conscience, the duty is anterior to the
right, because man, destined, for an end by
God, has to complete the obligations which areimposed on him with an obligatory character,
although for the completion of this end he
is given some rights, like free-will, the
exercise of reason and others.
3
But perhaps the best argument for the priority of duties
and one which comes closest to the real reason for the emphasis
on obligations is pragmatict
The last duty, the most sacred of all,
is to defend the Motherland against its enemies.
Who are the enemies of the Motherland? There
are interior and exterior ones.
The interior enemies are our countrymen
who, with negligence and cov/ardice, consent to
the name of Spain being denigrated. They are
those who are not sorry for their disgraces,
those who don't contribute to impeding them and
those who don't make haste to correct them.
They are those who, in the name of a false human
solidarity, try to detract from the permanent
essences of religion, race and language. And
they are those who, to conclude, conspire to
tear /ppain/ apart, which is the same as tearing
out a piece of her entails. Exterior enemies
are those who, secretly, or with arms in hand
attack our national independence,^
-^Torres, Enciclopedia Activa
, p. 398. Emphasis in
original
,
Vntonio J. Onieva, Heroes (Burgos: Hi jos de Santiago
Rodriguez, 1951) » p. 11.
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A pragmatic approach to the definition of duties and
ri^^hts is followed as well in the case of the ri^ht of liberty
AS can be seen below a rather ™ild philosophical discussion of
the nature of liberty in the Catholic tradition is followed
imnediately in the textbook by an exhortation to the child to
leave such niceties as rights to those in authority and concen
trate on duties
i
It has been said many times that libertv
wL'h.r' r'T^^f ^^^^ P^^^^^ doinrwhat he""ishes. Liberty consists in the faculty thatwe have for electing among all the possible
means that which we consider most effectiveto advance an end.
In this election, man is free, becausehe rejects those means which he does not see
as conducive to said end, and even among those
which are, he employs the most adequate.
^
Child: Don't be bothered about your
rights, which the State already has in mindjlearn the chapter of your duties and fulfillthem without avoiding effort.
The chapter of your duties is the
followingt
a) Love God above all things and, in his
name, all your peers.
b) Honor your parents showing in each
moment that you are a good child.
c) Obey your superiors and especially
your teacher, who only desires your perfection.
d) Serve your motherland in what it demands
of you and make for it, if it be necessary, the
sacrifice of your life.
Within these duties your liberty must move.
Outside of them don't support any tyranny.
3
^Ibid
. . pp. 10/1-106.
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Participation
When Carrero Blanco was appointed Presidente HpT r.ny.'..^^.
by Franco m the Spring of 1973 there was a great deal of dis-
cussion in the foreign press about an expected liberalization
of the regime. With the assassination of Carrero Blanco and
his replacement by former security chief Arias Kavarro there
were again press reports about the impending apertura or opening
of the regime.^ Part of this speculation was based on the
rhetoric of both new Presidents and of Franco himself which
emphasized that new and better participation of Spaniards in
the work of government would be a goal of the regime.
No such "liberalization" did, in fact, take place under
Arias Navarro and, for reasons to be explored in the next
chapter, increased repression came to be characteristic of the
last Franco government. This would not have been so surprising
to the foreign correspondents if they had taken the time to read
a child's textbook to see the way in which "official" Spain
conceives of participation.
The formal means of participation in Spain's "organic"
system are set out fairly clearlyi
We all have, then, a right to participate
.
in^ the construction of the law, contributing our
points of view, our opinions about the most just.
But, as it would be impossible that before
making a law one v/ould have to consult the opinion
^See especially the reporting of Henry Giniger, New York
Times correspondent in Spain.
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tions that are the obieo? o?
°^
community, through thi ^^"^ • ^he
municipalities? fJecte ^^"'ilies,in order that! amonr?hI ^^""^ capable persons
agreement on^neft'^^S'mJ^r^us^f
^or^n!^
thrcueh'lL\P:r°a"?tlS^at^
I^l^h':""*^^ ' .^"^ •of the law.?
i-J-tipate in the construction
On
representation^'^"^'-"^"" possible forms of
eli;^fL?efrep;eseS?lor?hro"K""''^
parties Poll+f^fi through political
ished lA the coin?ry''^''^hr'-"'~'-'.'''^^"^
^tr^:^ -thri^Saf"unlts^'^^r"^^-
with a''Sur??ft"'^ f"" "f^^? '"^^ ^" or-anismpl <ility of societies in which the
fa'ilv "?h/^ ^ed, such as'?hetne municipality and the syndicate
In'^olTer llT "^^^ these'^channeL
force of ^ho !° ^^"'^^ directions andl t e society. Therefore representa-tion adopts the "organic- formj "^^P"^^-^^^^^
What is most important to consider, however, are not the
mere forms of participation but the quality or content of it.
From previous sections on the Individual and the State, for
example, we already know the hierarchical, authoritarian rela-
tionship which exists among "channels" such as the family, the
PP
31-32^^^^^^ Navarro, Todos Juntoc, (Madrid: Doncel, I965),
g
Ferrer Guillen, Formacion Pol^'tico-Soo^ p 1
gJVJ^ca, (Madrid » Almena, I968), p. 52.
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municipality and the State. The next section on Obeaience will
contribute further to an understanding of the context in which
these "Channels" of participation exist. But the textbooks
also provide so.e direct examples of the approved
.anner of
participation. For instance, the syndicate,
it is to ?of?=h^;''^^ ^? *° contribute something,collaborate with other producers and
weU-be[nrof'?he°"'"^- ^° -"trfbute to%he''tjij. oemg of the community,
pates lIuhT ^^^P^f^i^ipate? One partici-
cases:
^yndical spirit in the following
affairs^o?^hf ^^^'^ influencing theiiairs oi the syndicate.
best perlonf elections to the
are held^^'^^^"^
functions and meetings that
Going to syndicate residences, lodgings,
excursions, or to cultural or sports events.
Following the directions of the syndicate.
Taking advantage of the trainin/^ andimprovement courses.
9
Or, in the school
i
Participation
A+
school center, the director organizesits life J the professors put themselves out toteach the best possible and the students withtheir work and study learn their lessons. All
participate in the work of the centen somedirecting and teaching, others obeying and
studying.
^
Alfredo Gosalbez Celdran, Educacion civic o-sor.ial(Madrid! Doncel, 1970), pp. 90-91";
~
ener-
13^
To participate is to contribute withone's personal effort to the task t)i^t th^community is realizing.
^^r^.r^J^^
authorities are charged withdirecting civic life, but all the rest of ushave to participate in it by carrying outtheir orders and discharging our du?v withan elevated spirit of servile. 10 ^
We begin to see here the "organic" form of participati
society is a unity, a whole whose different parts fit together
in a pre-determined order. Naturally, there are those who
command, direct and order and there must exist a counterpart
Who follow and obey. To participate "organically is to know
one's position in the hierarchy of life and fulfill it as
getically as possible. That "participation" in the Spanish
sense is something other than democracy is made clear by the
following anecdote:
Social Reform
Two men were discussing the manner of
arranging society. A general aspiration ofloafersl
Both agreed that the world is very bad;that one must correct abuses and reform cus-
toms} that, finally, if remedy is not taken
soon, this path will lead us to a dreadful
cataclysm.
But they did not agree on the means of
carrying out the reform; each one upheld his
own opinion, without conceding one point to
the other; they were carried away by passion,
reached no conclusion and finished up insult-
ing one another without any consideration.
on
Ibid
.
. p. 20.
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directing:Lh'severi?f '° ^""''^ ^^outs,be ity these words at therai
first
'^lr^nTinP'Ul°stl^llr without
religion, you see JeS ^hl "''V "°rality.to reform societv h! ? remedy, in order
you are individuals!^ " ^ reforming yourselves,
the reforms?
"each^one^rLf'^J''?'"^"* *° decree
evils of the
.iTa :mre%lJlTs',lil,r
we discuss at a later time the consequences of the Cath-oUc sentiment expressed in this passage that social
.etter.ent
oomes only through individual improvement, here it is important
to note the way in which discussion (and argument) of issues-
surely a prerequisite of meaningful particinati nn ip o
—is presented
as the Obviously fruitless occupation of loafers.
Participar es nhoH^^^P
(To participate is to obey)
If every student of Spain kept this three word definition
Of participation in mind when reading speeches or declarations
Of Franco or other government officials, they would have met
'
with fewer surprises and written less sanguinely about an
impending liberalization of the regime. For as we have already
indicated, when "official" Spain spoke of participation it had
in mind a series of concepts intimately linked to this idea,
concepts such as obedience, discipline and order. It is when
Espa?iola^f;^6)fp!°M?^' ("^""d, Escuela
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discussing these concepts that the "organic" view of partici-
pation becomes more clean
'^^ every organized society there existsome men who command and others who obey^theformer are the authorities, and the latterthe subordinatpc? ait ^-p iu J-^ui-e ,
anri o+h^v.^ t!? ^-^-^ them, some commandinfr
fection p ^^^i''^' contribute to social per-^
f^n^i? % ^i?^ ^^"'"^^ ^^^^ functions are
'."^^^ is "i"ch more so; since
or in wMch^f -'^ authority is not r^cognUed
anarchy!!
""^^^ ^"^"^ degenerates into
thp+ 10^+^"^^^^
of discipline engenders chaos,at is to say, disorder. Only discipline makes
fulffn^^^^'^^i??- ^ P^^P^^ which everyoneills his obligation is an ideal people.How does one fulfill his duty? Respecting theorders of one's superiors and meekly carrying
thera out. *' &
For this it is necessary to subordinate
oneself to authority. If everyone dedicated
obly^l^"^^^
ordering, there would be none to
The following illustrations from one of the textbooks
present this variety of personal, social and legal relationships
graphically 8 -"-^
Common
Good
12Onieva, Heroes
. p. 39.
13Evelio Yusta, Lecciones Preparadas ( Burgos i Hijos de
Santiago Rodriguez, I96I), pp. 821, 823.
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The model relationships upon which the relation between
the authorities and the subordinates is based are, not surpris-
ingly, those of the individual with God and the individual with
the family. And the obedience required by such relationships
is—again, not surprisingly—blind and absolutet
Obligations of the subjects. Obliga-
tions of the governors.
--Every man has a
Motherland, which as its name indicates, is
the land of his parents. From the Motherlandhe has received his language, and many otherbenefits. Without Motherland there is neither
school, nor civilization.
God has wished it so. The rulers of a
Motherland represent God, within their charge.
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his rJllt^f"^^' ?"bjeot owes to the rulers
^.ivj.c collaboration. He who speaks badlv n-pthe country, who grumbles aboufthe governmentetc., does not fulfill this obligation! '
rood, seekw'''no?''fI;^-'°
^'^^^
b,,t Ih! 1?^^ ^^^^^ personal advantage.
^^11-being of their subjects and the
^1 cry and prestige of the Motherland
, prescribeoust laws, which respect the sacred rights of
^fn^LS^ ^'^^^^^J^^^ ^>^e armed defense of the
As I have said the philosophical basis of the relation-
ship between ruler and subject requires a strict kind of
obedience:
«r>n.
^^^^ ^^^^ "^^^"s absolute obedi-ence to the tasks of the collectivity, of thefamily and of the individual. Obedience to theaction of those who direct.
What do we Spaniards have to do with
regard to the action of the rulers? Purely and
simply, to help. Each one in his place, helping;
even though we may think in some instance thatthings are not going well, help. Here is thepractical consequence of discipline. That no
one be ambitious for command and all obey.
That each one apply himself to his job and his
work and leave the government a clear road
without obstacles. That we speak of our ownbusiness and little of politics, 15
14Juan Forquets, La doctrina de Jesucristo (Barcelona!
Lumen, 1939), p. 93.
^
^^Emilio Ortiga (revised and augmented by Alberto Montana),
Egtimulos (Barcelona! Pedagogia Activa, 1959), p. 66.
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Tho dinciplino though otrict will be moot effective if
the oubjects accept their subordinate position, m the follow.
In^ two pa.sa^oo. tho text, outline in rou..h tonnn the oociali-
zation Btratery to be employed
i
r^n.i WM^"^^^-'-^"*^ neceaaary quality forroaHzinr: every undortnkinr worthy of men
?o^.o "f^^'^^^" ^^^^^^^^ "^'^ imponed by
i? h^' ^^S^^^ ^-or it to be eflectlve^
i^ r ^^^ ^^\^V^^«d «n ^-nith in the commaAd.n the rnen who direct tho de^tinieB of theMotherland or of the captains who direct thearmieo. Only when the nubordlnate rccornizesthe nuperiority of ho who commando him andthe ^;uperior does not become ootentatioua
^t, does true affection arise, whichincline.'! the firnt to the f^reatent obedience
and Bubminrjion and the oecond to the mostheroic oacrificGQ for their own. 16
* 4.U ^"^,f"t i« exactly thin which we intendin the political formation of youth. ToInculcate in them all thooo ethical and civicprinciples, from whose exercise arine the best
norinn of living tor;ether ( convivenc 1 n ) and of
well-beinp;. And one is not simply trying toteach them a doctrine, but to create certainhabits which make them live under this ideal.
It flowH from this that In our activities, in
our tcachin^rs, in our orders, wo always seek
the way^to Fjtimulato virtues that favor unity
and living to<»;o thnr ( convivrencia)
. and to
reduce or eliminate those vices that are
opposed to it or make it difficult. ^
7
In this effort "official- Spain can rely on help of
institutions which have been important influences on the youn^
16
,
Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio do Orte Martfnez,
£l>ri!i.Qclon._d el ICnplritu Nacionn l (Madrid i Fronto de Juventudes,
1? " "
Dolef:aci()n Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, For-m- iclor)
dl'lJiai>:U:jJaL.J^iiLC..L^^ (Waclridi Fronto del Juventudes, Iv^r/)
,
p. VI. Tho LJpanish word conv ivonei
a
— translated here an "llvinf^
to^iether" and elsewhere an "cohabita tion"—has no En^tlinh
oquivalent.
1^0
such as religion, the school and the family.
Thus, you have to consider your Dro-
vlrlnU f^^"""-^^ between Him and your
mtur^f'.n ^"""^"^ "^^^^ requirement, as a
^°I^?e^^ence. the respect , love, andwhich you have t^ih^thi^^s ?hedelegates of your parents.
God is not accustomed to command us
ttlT.X'''' ^^-^^^^^^ he delegates Ms author-i y to those who command by his order andconsequently, you have to Low that ^ha?which your professors order is that which
was ordered by God. 18
"""^^^ ^^^^^
The analogy drawn so many times between the family and
the state is used again to lend legitimacy to the need for
obedience
i
^
^^^^ ^^^"t all the members
fL^^! family collaborate with their personaleffort in order to bring about the greater
well-being of the community, so too the Mother-land requires that each one of us collaborate
with his work to gain national well-being.
It is, then, a fundamental duty this
concern with serving the Motherland in the best
way possible, in whatever moment and with thegreatest enthusiasm. How does one demonstrate
throughout life this concern with service to
the Motherland? In diverse ways, according to
the moment:
—During youth i By study and learning.
.
—-During adolescence: By work and military
seirvice.
—Always i By obedience to authority and the
law. By the desire of collaborating effectively
with its greatness in every moment.
18
Fl nino bien educado (Madrid: Ediciones Bruno, 1953),
79. Emphasis in original.
1^1
mObedience' to authority is centered
S^atnrhl'^'f constituted as Held of
w:^ras^L^^Lre^^^a?^s^^'^^^^'^^°^^' -
The family analogy is also a way to promote "voluntary'
acceptance of the need for discipline and obedience.
In any activity of life, in order to
•
know how to command well one must previouslyhave learned how to obey.
i-«vxu bj.
hoc
cannot justly give an order if onehas not previously come to experience thedisposition m which those who have to obeyfind themselves, and what tone and manner ofcommanding will be able to facilitate thelulfillment of orders.
In the convents, brothers m.ake a volun-tary promise of obedience in the altars of an
elevated love, since no great love exists
without the renunciation of somethino- of ourbeing. ^
You also have an institution for culti-
vating your obedience: the family.
With the help of your parents you will
observe that obedience makes you each time
more ^ free. Thus, learning now to obey with
happiness, you will know some day how to
command properly, since you will be able to
put yourself in the place of those who ought
to obey and you will know how to command
with gentleness, without wounding anyone or
establishing hateful divisions or frustrating
anyone's personality.
He who does not know how to obey, is not
worth much as a leader. ^0
'
.
''"^Alfredo Gosalbez Celdran, Educacion civico-soc ial(Madrid t Doncel, I968), pp. I57-158T
Antonio Herrero Antolin, Lecturas educatlvas (Madrid
»
Hernando, 1959), p. 4?.
~"
1^2
At times it seems 'as though obedience is the key to
happiness t
In fart'f'' h«^^v.^^ ^^^^ proverb.
^^"^ ""^^^^ ^^j^ys himself in giv-
faot?nn of superior, and this satil-
Mm n pleasing another is a way of likingnim, of loving him. -^'^-i-iig
who nh^L''^
easier to obey than to command. Heobeys, makes no mistakes; he who commands,
i??'fn?^n?'' ^r-^ think whetherIts fulfillm.ent is possible; on the other hand,he who obeys is free of such a preoccupation?2l
Of course, after learning what a loving, liberating
experience obedience can be we come to the real point of it all
--order
1
Obedience is the indispensable base of
our very liberty and of all social life. Whydo we have to obey? Because we are not inde-pendent. And on v/hom do we depend? First andprincipally, on God; then, on our Motherland
and our parents.
* ^ Hr
And do not think that this blind obedience to
the Motherland is an exclusive obligation of
soldiers
,
We should never comment on or censure
another's acts; if the person who does them
is subordinate to us, a sincere and opportune
admonition issues, and if the person is not,
silence; never a commentary. It is not for us
to judge our superiors. Let us respect the Law
of God without possible discussion, and he is
ignorant who makes efforts to arrive with his
knowledge at unraveling the divine mysteries.
In like manner should we treat the will of
Onieva, Heroes « p. 3?.
1^3
our parents, without a right to believe our-
selves to be like them or to discuss their
orders,
Notice in the following discussion of public order the
way in which authority-enforced order is expanded from common
sense notions such as preventing disturbance of the peace to
wider and wider areas of belief and political and social life.
Public order is the most important,
because it refers to the totality of theinhabitants of a State. All persons, be they
nationals or foreig-ners, ought to respect thn
Public Order. Therefore, the laws and dispo-
sitions of the authorities that refer to the
Public Order, ought to be obeyed by all those
who inhabit a State, and not only by nationals
of the country.
If a person, or a group, begins to sing
late at night, when all are resting with the'
object of being able to work or study on the
following day, the Public Order is-: disturbed.
When a person goes onto the street with an
immoral dress, which scandalizes people, she
is attacking the Public Order. The laws and
the authorities punish these acts v/hich offend
or molest everyone. Also, when activities are
carried out such as unauthorized public demon-
strations, secret meetings, etc., that might
wish to attack the order of the State,
Public Order if- that which shows itself
to be indispensable for making possible the
total proper functioning: of the society . It
expresses the most important conditions of the
community's life which refer to its general
organization.
Every political society establishes a
series of norms of special interest, based on
beliefs, traditions, moral convictions, neces-
sities, etc., which, as a whole, constitute
/ Seccion Femenina, Formacion Familiar v Social (Madrid.
Seccion Femenina, 194^), pp. 1 67-169.
'
1^^
the Public Order. The State acts as defender
01 these norms, punishing persons who do not
respect them.
The effects which Public Order producesin a community are. tranquility, security and
social health. Therefore, it ou^ht to be
accepted by all. since its benefits redound
to all persons.^
J
As in many other areas of the textbooks which v/e have
already covered, simple, common-sense models or examples of
the need for order are expanded as paradigir.s for broader areas
of social relations. For example, the following passage con-
cerns the need for order in the school. The true message con-
veyed, however, is to be found in the structure and sequence
of the chapters which move from family norms, to the school,
province, nation, world, etc, building concepts such as order,
loyalty and obedience. Keep in mind, then, when reading the
following passage that the need for order in the school is
meant to prove the need for such order in other areas of social
lif'e which are not always or necessarily analogous t
What would happen if there was no order
in school?
Order helps to make things go well between
teachers and pupils.
Order, in the school, is called organization.
Organization serves to allow all to be able
to learn without bothering each other.
We have hours for coming and going, a place
in class, in games, in recreation.
•^Ferrer Guillen, Forma c ion , pp. 57~58» Emphasis in
original.
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We cannot all learn at one time,
gradesr^"^"''" ^""^ °^dered in
year yll Ur^nltVoXl h^^h^^^Si^^: "^^^
life ofl?! ent!re°schoo\"!^'°" ^"^^
have cS^Lirj;^ l^ojrp-^aSlifSf- ^
useful'?rott:r^! ^''^ '° '° ^ "^^^ -"'l be
Observe wellj
—Who has the best arranged books?
—Who has the cleanest notebook?
—Who has the most neatly covered books?^^
Perhaps the following passage will serve to convince the
reader that too sinister an interpretation is not being read
into the texts
i
Info, from
Childhood get used to ordering your
anf^tJongf' ^'^^ ^^-^'^^
From the social point of view, prepareyourself to be a person of order, since/as
such. Spam has to be in need of you. For
l^il Purpose you ought to respect the schoolnorms established by your teacher. Any dis-turbance you produce is a disorder, with whichyou will have prejudiced all your school work.
24
T -.'^ ^
Gabinete de Educacion Politico-Social y cfvica del
1^6
o=„,^
"""^ s,treet always proceed in the
^? Oxygen of society, without itsociety perishes, 25 ^ xun x ,
There is one final aspect to the discussion of order
Which n^ust be mentioned, the celebrated liberty-licence
(l^hertM^U^^rt^ debate. I say "celebrated" for. as any-
one Who spent time in Franco Spain knows, the words were the
terms of discourse for the discussion of where the limits of
social and political acceptability will be drawn. The debate
was almost always a right-left one in which action seen as the
exercise of liberty by the left was seen as the abuse of liberty
or licence by the ri,jht. As we shall see, the debate was also
the material for typically Spanish political humor.
But, let us begin by setting out the debate-as con-
tained in the textbooks-from the point of view of "official"
Spaini
Thus, then, having proved that, in the
extremes, an excess of liberty leads tolicence and anarchy, and an excess of social
pov/er destroys the person, "massifying" anddenying his highest values, we have to considerthat the .iust disposition of libertv and nf
^.ociety represents the effective solution.Society and liberty are complementary terms,
though they are in tension and care should be
taken, in every moment, that their equilibrium
never fails 1 neither social order at the cost
of the sacrifice of individual liberty, nor
^^Onieva, Heroes , p. II6.
liberty which is wild and without feeling
which destroys itself in destroying the order
necessary for its existence. 25
Of course, the problem with such a formulation is who
decides what is the "just disposition" of liberty and licence;
under Franco the question had usually been decided in favor of
the right.
An illustration of the debate and "just distribution"
is provided in a cartoon by the Spanish humorist, Mingote,
which appeared in the press during my year in Spain (I972-1973).
In it two Spaniards are contemplating a road which stretches
off into the distance and leads, significantly, to Europe, ^"^
The road is crossed by two lines, that closest to the men bears
the signpcst, "Liberty"; and but a few short feet beyond, the
second crossing is marked by the signpost, "Licence." One
Spaniard comments to the other, "Don't you think they've drawn
the lines awfully close together?"
The significance of the cartoon is that in the real
world of the Franco regime the need for order always took pre-
cedence over the exercise of liberty. What I have called the
26 ^Ferrer Guillen, Formacion
. p. ^0. Emphasis in original,
27
'Humor is perhaps the most ethnocentric form of language
and not easily accessible to the outsider. My belaboring of the
meaning of the cartoon will hopefully be excused by those
familiar v/ith Spain.
The reference to Europe is to the eventual joining of
Spain to the Common ivlarket. For Spain, this implies social and
political modernization especially since the original Treaty of
Rome establishing the Market specified that Spain would have to
be a "democracy" before being admitted.
1^8
liberty-licence debate was, in fact nn+ +>,.h- ^^o x l , ot that but rather a
device by which "official" Smin k^ni- +^pai ept its opponents engaged in
a wearying pseudo-debate over whether the exercising of what
were once called inalienable rights such as freedom of speech
assembly, etc. was liberty or licence. The outside observer
'
can see that the exercising of rights in a way which threatens
the dictatorship would always be examples of licence and that
the exercising of rights which serve no purpose other than to
salve the liberal consciences of intellectuals would probably
be examples of the "proper use" of liberty. We will have .ore
to say about such devices in the next chapter. For now let us
turn again to the Images of the Citizen as expressed in the
State-Family analogy.
The Family and the State
The use of the family as a metaphor for the State has
been seen many times throughout these chapters on the textbooks.
Forming as it does the key way in which "official" Spain attempts
to conceive of a variety of social and political relations it
has appeared in all three sections on the Images of the State,
the Individual and the Citizen. For this section I have tried
to choose passages which illustrate "official" Spain's view of
State authority as being directly derived from the father's
authority in the family. In this view the authority of the
father (and, hence, of the State and its leader) is conferred
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by God and exercised in thp foii «
..t».. •
following, ways, l) n
-- here is no higher authority and h»..
.
""^y hence, no appeal of itsdecisions, 2) It is paternalistic-it 3, »iiST^ic It IS always intended toserve the "best interests" of the citi,»
it
zens even though at tiraesmay "maure" them or be in error.
"e begin with so.e examples of the State-Fa.iiy analogy.
mands anfa?? the^rest^Sbe?; ''^^
the children obey toeir Profe^?.'" f^^°°^village, the provincI Ld ?hf so also thetheir authorities.2§ nation have
What is the school?
the
.rl^'rt/^^^^^^^^^ and
anl-brothers and ^J^^^l ^""^ ^^^^ mx_,earents
eats, lllyl'l^^^^^^^^^^ wor.s.
is the'ci?yUeT: Sfl\:e'.3'?^' ^-^^^ ^^^-'^
As we have seen already the Spanish State views itself
as corporatist or organic and it is from thi.to ciiiu x i s conception that
the importance of the family flows:
hau^tlh?! the family, an inex-
familv L ^T^^ subject, because they is like the sun. the water and so many
.^o\Tes^^sf^tf.^-es\-d%-.^lu's^r^f|^offt-i^O-----
28,
Textos Es(
p. 48. 'ESis^rffFlffe/"^"'^'^^''^ ^""--^ Bruno, i960).
p. 37.
^"^^"^^"^"t^^ ^e la Juventud, Educacion crvico-socl.l .
31
-Ibid.
. p. 48.
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stop to think how great is their utility and
p^oduce!^''^''
'"^^^ '^'^^ disappearance ^oSd
No one can doubt the necessity of societvbecause this is a function of man's nature So'also, m order for societv to pvic.+ ?
composed of the father:%'L'mother';nd' hllSr^'
^nsable^ indissoluble ties, is indls-'
who livp%n''^^H^ collection of individuals
hoa^, /?u^ 5''''^®' ^"^^^ authority of itse d; and the forefathers, descendents, relativesor in-laws of a line. And better stili: the
?n''^h''^^^^•^^^^i^^ elevated by the Church
o?P ^^^"-^^ a Sacrament, sacrificing forIts offspring. It IS the anchor of morality,the safeguard of women's honor, the check on
unbrialed corruption, the home-port of the
rf"' "^^^ beacom which will illuminate theirpath through the stormy sea of life. It is thedomestic hearth, the first and most important
school of character. There is where every humanbeing receives his best, or his worst, moral
education because there is where he is instilled
with the principles of conduct which guide him
and which cease only with his life.
From this origin be it pure or impure comethe principles that govern society. The Law
Itself is not more than the reflexion of the
family, given that the ideas poured into childrenm the private life of the home display them-
selves in the world and are converted into public
opinion. Therefore Pilar tells us, in her dis-
course at Granada, that "our obligation, instead
of being in an office behind a desk, consists in
instilling in the hearts ( meter a nuestros hi.ios
hasta la entrana ) this Falange v/hich fills our
32Seccion Femenina, Forma c ion , pp. I9O-I91.
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Because or its importance tne State
.ado protection anaperpetuation of the "approved" f=.„ii , .
, ,
^''"'^'^ (authoritarian, patriarchal,
etc.) a key part of its ideology. The followin.
examples of the way in whioh +h« +m W c the textbooks link the family
the State I
5 passages give
and
parents'and*tt» ^^"4 • °f the
base of society root i^""
cril;rio"4hich is tte^:"°-''"'^'^" ^"'^ "^^^
eaudillo and 0? t^: new State™.ff'^K °'
yoirlffe^^?'^^ °^
ins It^tlJ^s ^^i^^ ^ ^^o ^u life from your birth, and contribute to
inlt!?:;??r!f Of t^^^^^^^i!^
from tpi/^^?jfp---
^rei^Llg-?-el^^-
triviS%uHH-"^'f ^^^^ ^o the most'rivial j ridical norms, recognize the family
dltiL^^or^ocI^iy?^?^
natural, ^authentic'^oui^:
1n<, + ^+?;+?
^^"^^^y is considered as a moral
thf^ 1^ endowed with an inalienable right;
«nf .-^'^ ^^^'.^ha^ no one can suppress itfand it IS superior to all positive law. Prin-ciple
y of the Fundamental Law of May i?. 1958
Po1nt:'oJ$%h^i"?h'^'^%^' Nation^llive^^nt)
?^ »^ ^^^^ national community isfounded
-on man ... and on the familv h...
^-^^^Alf^^' .Equally, PrinciilFvflffiSfthat
.the fam ily is a natural entity, h^<^^ n-p
the national community 3-^ — '
As in earlier sections on the Images of the State it
•
^Ibid.
. p. 192.
original.
Guillen, formacion.,. p. 10?. Emphasis in
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is important for us to keep in mind what '.official" Spain hopes
other Spaniards do not. adherence to a '.natural,"
..organic-
State is Obtained by the same means employed in other less
"natural" systems, persuasion, manipulation, socialization and
--in the case of Franco Spain-a good measure of repression.
This is why we can speak of a Spanish ideology, why the dis-
cussions Of such widely varying topics as covered in these
chapters on the textbooks seem to fit together so well. One
of the textbooks in a note on methodology intended for the
instructor makes this point clearlyj
There is continued in this third year ofsecondary school (Mchillerato ) a method ofprogram and text similar to previous courses:
an inductive and experimental method. It pro-
ceeds by ascending through the units of livingtogether (conviyencia) that integrate the reality
ol Spam. Passing from the surroundinp-s of theimmediate, of the society of most natural orip-in.the provincial community, based on an adminis-
trative apparatus, appears. The ideas regarding
the province which ought to be ^iven to the
student, have to be, In the first place, general,
and after, concretized in the proper province.
The organic value of the province has to stand
out; the relations of service between the capital '
and the villages and the benefits which the
latter bring to the city; the relationships and
the personal and collective mission with respect
to the elevation of the social life of the vill-
ages, etc.
In the explanation of the region, after
establishing its physical-natural character, a
key^ concept is the transition from this unit of
living together ( convivencia ) to the unit of
historic living together ( convivencia ) v/hich is
the motherland. One must explain this transi-
tion from the history of the Spanish regions
and its initiation in the reality of Spain as
a unit of historic destiny.
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text of^?hp''^i'^f "^^^ program and in the
because in th^o^''^ Diocese is justifiedo o e order of religious livinp-together (conxivencia it is^similar ^S^heProvince, as the Parish is to the familv
-inrt
U is'nr;"'''^"''^^' above alirbecause
value S? hn^r^-' r ^^"^"S ourselves on the
on ^
^^^^g^i^yr not to lose in poli-tical-social formation the order of the reli-
th«f . ^""^ '"^-^^ the student aware
^he un!t?
social being he also lives united ?ot i s of religious living together(convivencia)35 x
By way of conclusion and summation of this section I
would like to ask the reader to follow along with this next
lengthy passage. Its unity of style and thought requires that
it be translated in its entirety and I could devise no better
integration of the themes considered until this point
i
Society and its classes. Man lives in
union and cohabitation ( convivenoi a ) with othersFrom this state ^ of union are derived obligations
or^duties. Society is the moral and permanent
union of various individuals who tend in their
acts toward some common, honest end.
Society is of three classes: the domestic
or family, the civil and the religious.
The family is the primary form of society
and its essential condition. V/ithin it the
authority of the father is recognized as the
participation of divine authority and among its
members mutual obligations exist.
^The civil society. From the union of
families civil society arises. Its conditions
i
to live in a single territory, under the regime
of a single authority, with the same laws, in
order to procure the common good. This is the
unity of territory, authority and ends.
^
-^Seccion Femenina, Formacion Politico-Social (Madrid
»
Seccion Femenina, 196^), pp. 9-10,
15^
^
Its origin and end. The origin of civilsociety was necessity and defense.^ ?t was pre-cisely an organization to protect them. It
'hfpa^h'tfthe?' ^^^^ ^^^^ one -can find
nels!
temporal and eternal happi-
Necessity of a supreme authority. Inorder that society may exist it is necessarythat command or authority is bestowed upon oneindividual. This will give unity and life to
end.
^^^^^ ^^^^ '•^ ""^"^ ""^^^^ ^"^s
^
^^^.^fyfj^e origin of this authority. Godis the primitive and absolute individual ofpower; God does not exercise this power directly
and immediately, but it is exercised by elements
or supreme Governments. These are the deposi-tories of the power of God.
^
The right of command. Authority is based
on rights. A human right is absurd, as is force?therefore, m.an cannot find in him.self the right
of commanding or directing another m.anj he willhave It as soon as he finds him.self invested withthe majesty of the right that em.anates from God
or as depository of his sovereignty. The right
of command ought to emanate from absolute reason
and justice, which are God himself. (Conversation
and comments with reference to our providential
Caudillp, Chief of State and Chief of the
Falange,;
Hierarchy, With command residing in the
supreme Chief or Government, these delegate the
exercising of it to persons of lesser grade or
power in a descending scale. (Discuss the hier-
archy of the military or ecclesiastical order.)
All these people constitute grades of authority
whose power is augmented to a greater or lesser
degree until arriving at the top.
Therefore hierarchy is the order or grading
of persons. This concept can be extended to the
order of human values; thus, referring ourselves
to man, there also exists in him a hierarchy of
values, with spiritual values having preference
over those of the flesh, and among spiritual
values those which refer to Religion or the
Motherland are superior to those which are
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purely intellectual. (Make a firm stand onthis assessment, which is fundamental to thedoctrine of the Falange.)
.
Hierarchy engenders a duty, and it isdiscipline, without which one cannot conceive
of hierarchy. This duty is translated into
obedience, congruity ( correspond encia ) and
submission of the acts of the inferior to
superior.
This means that the commands and orders
of the superior are fulfilled by the inferior.
This is the duty of obedience. 3©
Madre Espana (Mother Spain)
Perhaps the most important aspect of citizenship is
patriotism—that tie which binds the individual to the poli-
tical organization we call the nation-state. In this section
we will be looking at the textbook definitions of patriotism
and the special "love" relationship between the individual and
the State embodied in the phrase, Madre Espana .
The following passages were taken from a section titled,
"History of Patriotism"!
Patriotism is the sentiment which moves
us to love the Motherland. Patriotism, there-
fore, is always love? love for one's neighbor,
for those born on our common land, those who
live according to our customs, submitted to
common laws, with a single ideal.
It is our duty to feel a true patriotism
i
to love the Motherland without mental reserva-
tions
.
Frente de Juventudes, ;Formacion
. pp. 1^5~1^6,
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heart, ^whc4her'?^:1.f 1°^'' "'^^
ous abject^ coLulL ^"^^ °^ P^osper-
loye our 'otTLl^TVor^Z. t^^.T/fiU^'irheing our mother. oxnr;±e lact of
* * *
and mor/L^ iu "^^^"^ elevated more
^h^t 1^
villa^^e, the region and its sisterst a IS not pure, is not love for the Llotherland
.
The fact o?'h^?^''J' ^^"^ ^^^i^ birth.
lovP thf^Y J "^""i"^ ^"^ deeply, with the samee at we have for our parents. The landm which^we were born is our mother, ^hiscommand is raised to those of us who have beenborn in Spam: "Love your Motherland Si?h anyour heart and all your unders tandin.-
, and vouwill love, also, all that is 3panishV"37
^
The intensity of the patriotic love to which Spanish
children are exhorted by the textbooks is revealed in the follow-
ing "Decalogue of Love to Spain":
1. I love Spain with all my heart, with
all my soul and with all m.y intellect; I love
my neighbor as myself and in a special way ifhe, as I, has been born on Spanish soil.
2, I will never take the name of Spainin vain, nor will I speak badly of her, and I
will exert myself as much as possible that alllove and respect her as she deserves.
3.1 will remember all the days of my
life the sacred flag of my Motherland, in whose
37Udina Cortiles, Enciclonedia Cam.f. pp. 267'-268,
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folds beats the soniknew how to bear thp^^ ""'^ ancestors whothe land. ^^^""^ ^P^^^t throughout
I was bir^/^^iolJe'r^oJ^Lrof^?^
soil, the province or ^n? £ national
and the ^roupin^of Iiff^'^H-^ '^^^"^ ^ ^^^^^^or regions, whifh con^ti^u?o^iK?^'^i'^ Province!land, for me the most^ ov^i '^^'-^ beautifulis my mother Splin? '''' ^^^ich
fellow^ci^i^ens ?he f.^'i -^^ "^^^^^ myfalling in i^ve with o?h^^!^ i^^" ^P^in,
will avoid as much L ? ^^i^J^^^^^s, and I
nwortny of calling myself a Spaniard.
that ihulht'll Selioalfto^tt,^°^military service; neUhlr wi?! ?^' "^V^d
">ent Of the taxes o? i^lr^es of thf^if^ P^^"which I ought to pay. ^
f»oi '"^^^ lie about love T do rot
^^overn Snain t "^^^ "^^^^ ^ho
buir?o'?he^'w^lL°J|r'lulL' rnyself to contri-
be worth.
^"^^^ver little my assistance may
u,«v, -^.u*
^^-^^ never desire to live as i f twere the son of another land; I will live as
^ ^^11 contribute to correclw
M^oth^^L^d^!
^^^'^^"^
^^^^-^ ^r'^^^
cultug-oJ S\=3^^^^S^L
Tand irfhTh'^r'^ ^^S^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ beautifull m which I was born is, so beloved so
like mvs^ef^ ^T' ' "^^^ take'clre ' that
.
the iS^nfi?' themselves to make of
Creates? ^^^T' 5 ^^^^^^ ^P^^"'g t, the most beautiful, the best of thp
countries of the world. 38
38
-Ibid
.
.
pp. 268-269.
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V/e have already seen in c-nmo n-r +v,^J ^^^ m some of the passa^^es quoted the
use Of the Phrase, "..other Spain." The conceptual origin of
this Phrase is the already familiar family analogy seen so
inany times throughout these chapters on the textbooks. And it
is this authoritarian family analogy which explains the intensity
or stridency of the
-official" view of patriotism. We have
already seen the attempt to link notions of authority and
Obedience as exercised in the model, authoritarian family to
analogous concepts of State power. Kow the final loop in the
chain is closed as nationality, the condition of oeing Spanish,
is tied to support for the regime. With this final conceptionll
definition, opposition to Franco was seen in the "official" view
and, as we shall see in the next chapter, even in the opposi-
tions view of itself as: anti-God, anti-family, anti-re
and, ultimately, anti-Spain.
Let us turn, then, to the exposition of the family
analogy as applied to patriotism:
All men are born members of a family
which they ought to respect and honor; whichthey ought to love with all their mightbecause all that they are is due to it. Welljust as man has a family formed by his parents
and brothers and sisters, he has another greatfamily m which all Spaniards take part; one
must respect this great family just as that
other smaller one. That great family formedby all Spaniards is that which we call Spain.
Spain is the Mother of this great family.
Spain is our Mother and we owe respect, help
and veneration to her just as to the mother of
each one of us.^"
39Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
Formacjon del Espiritu Nacional (Madrid: Editorial Nos, 1955),
pp. 11-12.
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The connection between patriotism and the family analogy
IS made clear in the following passage.
familv?%f^^^r^^"^ ... is the enlarged
^om^^t^{he^:;it?^r:i^i^^^^
a moral person who has eSucatedr?ed and pro-tected us and whom, therefore, ^e love likPa mother; public things arp 1 kl
patrimony.
^am e Ix e the national
hn+ ^^^^^^^^.^^'^erstands that Datriotism isthe extension and amplification of familvaffections and that indeed one can sav that
^
self fnd t'L^t'^'^r^"' ^^^^^^ love'f^r'one-±i a hat which one has for his chUdrenparents, relatives and friends. ^0
Not surprisingly, the family analogy is used to define
the kind of loyalty which Spaniards owe to the motherland.
V/hich of us would tolerate anyone insult-ing our mother, damaging our house or ou^
things.'' am sure that no one would be capableof allowing It; well then, if Spain is ourMotner we cannot tolerate anyone insulting her,lacking in respect for those who represent heror damaging capriciously things which are hers.-^l
The notion of respecting the representatives of Mother
Spain is, of course, the key issue to be kept in mind. For it
must be remembered that in the "official" view all that is
Spain was represented by Francoist political authority and even
personified in Franco himself. This Chapter concludes, then,
with the patriotic words of and about an important part of
"official" Spain, the Falange.
Ibid.
. p. 15.
^1 .
Ibid.
. p. 13.
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received a^honor tn fo^ ^"^^^ ^^^^^
cadets...! The voiL^? ^^^^ ^^^'^^^^ of
ought to be a modern? ^^^nt
duct. ConstantlC th? i?""^^^^ '"'"^ private con-
deeds wilTS^L'^J^^^^^^^^^^ S?h\'/^'"%^^^vice to the Motherland and ?hl v f greater ser-tion of the Natiom? Lf. 5^ Falange, incarna-
the Youth Front wni t^^^^^"!^^- . The militant of
by his spirK Of sibor.nn ^i^^i^guish himself
the fulfillment ol^riT^^^^^ happiness in
to him. NevefwUl\%lSnrtha?'?h"' ^"^^^^^are his friends and rL^^^ commanders
ested in makin' him fSfi??';.?''''"^^^^^^ i^^^^^"but that thev are ?hp oraers and regulations.
Caudillo with rlt^l.L J^''''^^ charged by the
the fulfillmpnr^?^ J:^""" "'^^ ""^^^ necessary for
Movement In L^^^ ^ Postulates of the Glorious
;^XTV? + i moment the conduct of the
but in^a'soeof ? ^°^^\Front will be exempS?y;
folm ^.rl^ i""^ ^^^^ '^'^^^ is dressed in uni-l r . Every Spaniard is obli^-ed to proceed inan exemplary way with a spirit of self-denial in
??ooD. of""' the^ effort reliLed by the
^h^Y^ ? i;rancoj but if besides he belongs to
^^hi ^^"" Front, ^his conduct ought to be insup-erable, sacrificial and if necessary he?oic!^?
^ Our Lord and our God,Jose Antonio is with you;
we wish to gain here
the difficult and erect Spain
which he aspired.
The Caudillo guides us.Lord
,
protect his life
and inspire our efforts,
until we fulfill
this supreme watchword
t
Through the Empire to You. ^3
Why do we want to be useful men? Whatgoal does our life have, Spaniards? For whatpurpose the vigilance of the rulers? For whatpurpose the Youth Front? In order to lift upbpam. All this is contained in our cry.
p. 782.
^3
42
Enciclopedia Escolar (iMadrid: Afrodisio Aguado, l^),
Frente de Juventudes, Formac ion , p. II,
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every 'In^PrpS"? ^^^'^^^ ""^^ °°<5
'
cIudillS!55 ' ^""^ ^^"^^y -"S" the
We end this Chapter on the Images of the Citizen with
the call Of "Official" Spain to support for the Caudillo. Hop
fully it is apparent by now that this call was not just emo-
tional exuberance but part of a strategy to obtain, or coerce,
the loyalty of the Spanish citizen. In these Chapters we have
looked at "official" Spain and seen an "official" view of
reality. Now we turn to the everyday reality of Franco Spain
and the pattern of social control with which it was interwoven
and of which the Images of the State, the Individual and the
Citizen form one part.
e
Ibid, , p. 32.
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CHAPTER VI
A STRATEGY OF SOCIAL CONTKOL
This chapter sets forth the nature of the elaborate
ana effective app.ratu. of social control evolved Prancolst
•political authority to maintain dictatorial rule. Fro„ a^ong
".any areas or topics that could have been discussed, those
have been selected for discussion here which relate directly
to the i^a^^es Of the textbooks or follow logically fro™ the
analysis of the texts. The role of political socialization
In this apparatus of control can be seen in two general areas,
one. the .ore formal, is that which we have looked at empiric-
ally in the last three chapters, the "official" images of the
State, the Individual and the Citizen conveyed in children's
textbooi^s. The other is the informal area of the everyday on-
going life Of Spaniards and the subtle but effective influence
"official" Spain had on it.
These two areas were not really separate but interwoven
so that ,,hat
-Official- Spain wanted or approved of in the
texts was enforced or encouraged in everyday life. This is not
to say that Spanish reality exactly mirrored the ideal images
of the texts—Spain was not such a depressing place. But in
aiecuBsinc an apparatus of social control one is talking about
Ideology in practice, about an attempt to make one version of
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reality the dominant one with wH^.k
^ .
^^^^
'""St compete andcontend. For bf»t+or» ^«e ter or „or.e. the ideology
^xi.psea in thetextbooks and which 1, . &
u n
ne .or Spa.n. xt
.as not necessarily the version or realityin Which all or even a
..ority o. Spaniards Relieved hut Uwas the one which pervaded their political culture and sur-
rounded their everyday life For ony r . all those who had a choice
and chose to remain in Spain, this \^.nir. .
^
^
'
^^^^ ideology is the one withWhich all analysis or criticism must begin.^
Mechanisms of Social Control
The raochanismg for maintm'ni r,rr +u-ujT ai ng the apparatus of social
control may be divided into four sections m . ,i>ecT;ion , In each section
will be found examples of
-official" ^^.o^v.!uii i Spain's carrot-stick
approach to social control, ideas, theories, laws, practices
and customs are used to elicit compliance while coercion always
re,nains in the background to enforce it if necessary,
gelgotive Hlstoriral A^-i-rirr
A point made several times in the chapters on the text-
books was that "official" Spain relied heavily on history as
-proof" Of the validity and appropriateness of the current
the dominant^ideolSrL^'Jhe on^' H^^ tautological situation.
Of the soSety must^Lpin blcaSse"it ifthe dTl °°"?^?r^'^°"For -rPTcinna T.>xi. ^ «u ..i-t^^Z J-i^ IS ominant ideoloe-v.
lpairL'rbeen"airi"succlssful"1„'?oJcln
^Jh^^**^?'
""^"'^i"'"
onnrlCl^ + ^/^« -1-^
j.ax/.x,y buocessiui In jorcinxr t e above-^rround
16^
-.i.e.
.Ms historical' analysis Is
.elective. cHoosln, t.ose
elements or Spanish Mstor. „.lch support the regime's claLa
and ignoring or rejecting counter-trends.
This is perhaps »ost clearly seen in the texts' treatment
Of the concepts of^ ^ ^^^.^^
.^^^^^^^
the concept of £^ ^3 .isslon-the universal role which Spainhas been destined to play i„ the world. This mission is not a
-torial but a spiritual one. for Spain is to carry the eternal
values Of Roman Catholicism to the world.
It would be difficult, of courso i-f. -rt ^ui ae, to find any interpre-
tation Of Spanish history which did not assign importance to
Catholicism and the imperial era. But what "official' Spain
has done is to make these elements the essence of the Mother-
land and to designate adherence to them as the measure of
patriotism. Thus, if one is not a Catholic or. indeed, an
anti-catholic, one is out of step with what is held to be a
basic value of the nation. Those who fail to hold the textbooks'
definition of patriotism are in the "official" view true her-'
etios who have rejected an article of faith in the religion of
being Spanish.
The designation of dissent as a kind of heresy is an
important step for political authority to take in justifying
repression—in Spain or elsewhere. In the Spanish case this
can be seen in the use of the phrase
-well-born Spaniard" which
the student of Spain encounters in numerous speeches by poli-
tical authority and even in the vocabulary of the ordinary
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Spaniard. It usually appears as the last word on what is
really a debatable point. Thus the latest "organic law- of
the government will be proclaimed as the best possible solution
to the nation's problems with which any
-well-born Spaniard-
would agree. There are those, of course, who do not agree but
they are not
-well-born.- not real Spaniards, not the Keepers
Of the faith.
Perhaps the non-Spaniard can see the importance of
this "official" monopoly of the concept of patriotism by refer-
ence to recent history of the United States. It was during my
year in Spain (1972-73) that then Vice-President Spiro Agnew
^
delivered a series of speeches in which he tried to establish
support for the Vietnam War and especially the policy of Viet-
namization as the criterion of patriotism. Those who could not
support Washington's conduct of the war were no longer merely
dissenters from a government policy but unpatriotic. unAmerican.
If Agnew 's campaign for unity (that is. conformity) had been
more successful, it would have formed the intellectual and
emotional basis for the "weeding out of bad apples" and "the
cutting off of dead wood," which is a common feature of the
Spanish dictatorship.
What the textbooks depict as the ideal is very often
the common practice of everyday life in Spain. A Spanish
mission that requires conformity, that can not tolerate heret-
ical dissent, has had its effect on Spanish life. We can see
in the following passage how strongly the notion of conformity
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imbues the culture in w»vfli.ur m ays that are not usually seen as
political. *
coll f-^'^ays lived, for thousands of vears
have an especially well-developed se^se of
in Don Juan, or Lazarillo or La CelestinaTthat I am given to scientific investigation
?S donhr^H^'^'.^^^"^ ^ ^^^^ ^^is leads me
XL V^ll that there exists a Spanish hMn^ of
I^d
fj;"?^"sually described, now and forevir.
« foif^^^ ^ ^^^^ consider myselfa foreigner in my own country. 2 ^
It can be seen from this passage that the notion of a
counter-culture exists in Spain as in the United States but
that it is at once more difficult to uphold and more political.
This is because the line between "any well-born Spaniard- and
"those others" has been drawn more rigidly and narrowly than
is generally true in the liberal democracies.
-Being different"
in Franco Spain was not. then, a simple matter of alternative
life-styles. It was a profoundly political act and, there-
fore, at times, a very dangerous act as well.
Once "official" Spain had demonstrated—to its satis-
faction-that its definition of la patria was the only true one,
it had to move on to show how the Franco regime, the Estado .
2 r\/de Miguel, Espana. p. I5. emphasis in original.
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was the appropriate expression of this definition. I„ its atte.pt
to ™ake the new Franco state see. appropriate, the regime had
two basic tools l COe^rrlnr^ ov.^coe cion and the corporatist ideology of Xal^
Although the use or force in Franco Spain was a developed
and sophisticated tool, the basic outlines of its nature are fan,-inar to „,ost Citizens of the twentieth century and need not be
examined carefully here. We should, however, looic at those
elegants of falan.is. which are desired to prove its appropri-
ateness to the
-official" version of Spanish history.
As we saw in the textbook passafres, one claim of
falansism is that its organic, corporatist
.odel of the State
is "natural- because it is the expression of the basic and tra-
ditional elements of Spanish society, the family, the munici^io
and the syndicate or guild. Because it is supposedly based on
such eternal verities it is a wholly Spanish approach to govern-
ance which has not been contaminated by foreign (and hence evil
or unworkable) ideas.
Another aspect of falangism which makes it appropriate
is its emphasis on harmony. Falangism acknowledges the potential
for but not the inevitability of class conflict in capitalist
society and seeks to mitigate it. Rather than one class gaining
victory over others, all classes are to function as part of a
harmonious whole, each in its place. The benefits of such
harmony to Spain's mission are obvious.
Falangism is itself an ideology of rejection? rejection
'Of the foreign, evil "-isms" such as liberalism, socialism or
anarchism which had invaded Spain to her detriment. Thus,
falangism and the Francoist regime were by definition appro-
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Priate to the true Spain's true needs because it had heen born
as a native, natural, organic response to the plague of
inappropriate foreign-based politics which had been visited
upon Spain in her recent past.
One of the strongest supports of falangism to the
claims of appropriateness by the regi.e was what was referred
to earlier as political alchemy. The regime contained within
itself the mechanism for constantly assuring its appropriate-
ness because it was not a government of mere laws and consti-
tutions but the ever-evolving expression of a "unanimous
spirit." It was a regime constantly perfecting itself, making
itself more and more one with the noblest goals of every
-well-born" Spaniard. Its political alchemy would surely-
sooner or later-turn even its basest elements into gold.
These aspects of falangism seem to have been of great
service to the Franco regime in supporting its claims to appro-
priateness. In later sections, falangist "contributions" to
the stability of the regime will be examined. Next we turn from
interpretations of Spanish history to an interpretation of the
effects of Spanish history on the contemporary Spaniard* the
myth of incapacity.
The "Mvth of IncapacitY **
A "myth of incapacity"—the notion the Spaniards are for
some reason unable to function as responsible, active partici-
pants in the political process—has been referred to at earlier
points. This section begins with an example of the "myth of
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incapacity" in action.
Salvador Panikeri What is the Spanish form
of experiencing (vivir) democracy?
Alberto Ullastrest A North American who spentsome time amon,^ us, once said to me» "In NorthAmerica we feel as if we belong to a great Stateibut we are not sure if we form a nation. You
opaniards do not feel yourselves to be a State;
nor a nation. You are like a Big Family."
That seemed to me a wise observation. We deal
^4":? ;things m the same spirit as a family deals
with them.
S.P.: Spain conceived as a family leads to
paternalism,
A.U.J No.
S.P.J It leads to the authoritarianism of the
Pater Familias .
A.U.: No, I am not saying that we Spaniards
live politics in a paternalistic or family
sense. I am saying that our social order, the
way we understand ourselves pertains more to a
family experience ( vivencia de familia ) than
to a state of law governed by pure rational
ideas. We Spaniards are v,'hat I call a poster-
iori democrats t we value political power more
in order to throw out a ruler who governs badly
than to name a new one.
S.P.t Are you sure?
A.U.i We Spaniards do not feel (sentir) the
law, we do not feel ideas » we feel man, we feel
life. If we want to establish our own democracy
with possibilities of surviving we ought to do
it upon real bases, one hundred per cent Spanish.
To desire now to pull 10 political parties out of
the hat, without any ties, seems to me filled
with problems.
3
^Salvador Paniker, Conversaciones en Madrid ( Barcelona 1
Kalros, 1969)» pp. 30-31, Paniker is one of Spain's young, lib-
eral, "roving intellectuals"; Alberto Ullastres was Spain's repre
sentative to the Common Market at the time of the interview and
considered among the more liberal Ministers with a modern, Euro-
pean outlook.
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This rather long quotation points out several important
realities of Spanish political life and serves as a good
transition. Paniker, whose politics might be described as of
the moderate opposition, tries to pin down Ullastres. a member
of •'official" Spain, to a quite remarkable definition of
"democracy.- As seen in the texts, Ullastres is talking about
"organic democracy'' which most certainly is paternalistic and
authoritarian (whatever other "redeeming virtues" it may have)
as Paniker observes. However, Paniker's objections succeed
only in getting Ullastres to deny the interviewer's interpre-
tation of his remarks and then to expand in even more authori-
tarian terms on his original point. All Paniker can do is
express an incredulous—but respectful— "Are you sure?"^
The passage quoted serves as transition because it is
a prime example of another mechanism of social control which
I call the "myth of incapacity." Fortunately for the human
race, no socialization process yet devised has been perfectly
able to transmit the "official" values of a society. In Spain
as well, there have always existed those who "break faith"
with established values and promote "non-organic" politics.
To combat this tendency it was in the regime's interest to
This denial and subsequent confirmation is but one
example of the public style of many of Spain's officials. The
deceptions and "misstatements" of the Nixon-Zeigler era in the
U.S. are far surpassed by everyday Spanish practice. This
"yes-but" approach extends to laws and documents as well. For
example, article 12 of the Fuero de los Espanbles (Bill of
Rights) provides that "Every Spaniard may express his ideas
freely provided they do not attack the fundamental principles
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maintain a climate of opinion that Spaniards were incapable of
functioning in "non-organic" democracy, particularly the Liberal
democracy of the West.
As with other mechanisms of social control, the "inca-
pacity myth" operated on several levels, the intellectual and
pragmatic, the moral and psychological. It served the regime
as a rationalization for repression of "non~organic, " unSpanish
dissidents or. to the degree that the
-myth" was accepted by
the opposition themselves, it narrowed the alternatives to the
regime which can be imagined by and offered to the Spanish
people.
One unsvspected and perhaps unwitting ally of the
"incapacity myth" was the perennial debate in Spain over the
substance of the Spanish "character." Books such as Diaz-
IjOS-Esj^anoles v los siete nen^r^os capit.-^lPf. ( The Smninh
and the Seven Deadly Sin^ )^ have gone through many editions;
Triunfo, a weekly magazine of Spain's "divine left," devotes
a special issue to national character and "Los Espanoles"?^ and
one of the most important intellectual works of recent years
of the State." School teachers in Spain may use any textbookfor their classes that they wish
, . , provided it is on the
approved list of texts.
Fernando Diaz-Plaja, El Espanol v los siete pec^do.7
^?apij;B_lei^, (Madrid 1 Alianza, 1972, fifteenth printing).
^"Los Espanoles," Triunfo . 532 (December 9, 1972),
extra edition.
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has been La^n Entral.o
.,^.,£^1,.,,,^^^^
^ ^^^^^^^
then,e of these worKs-of which I have mentioned onl, a few n„the „ew3-
.urin, ,ea. i„ Spain^-is the supposed aecadence
or Spain and/or Spaniards. The critioia. is biting and sar-
castic, at ti.es tinged with hu^or and apparently very ineffec-
tive because what was said of Spaniards nearly two hundred years
ago could be and is repeated by today's critics.? u .ay be
that Spaniards have not been sufficiently jolted by their i.age
Of themselves to change or. ™ore likely, it is that this
eternal la.ent is not an adequate approach to a people's
history. ^
Espasa-telpe? igjj)^"*''^^^"' A-Q.ue Ll8,m.,nos Fnp.n^ (Madrid.
into two'cltegorles^'^'o^e character" can be divided
eludes historf and ^hlinL^:^, criticism which in-
year 1898 an7the reasons fo? t^f f^f'"-}^^" primarily around the
category one raSht mtn?ion ?aJv»+V ^'"P^5=- I" ^his
y Galset's KsMnrTnv?;tXS^= ? '^-^^^^^^^ Ortega
or Sanche.-AiSi^fggif^:^["°
Lsifo? TrluSio aireldv ? the book by Diaz-Plaja and the
?rrih%\§f&ff^r^,-t^^?e%Lti^^
9
+h« ^^^^^ ^^^^ concentrate their criticism on
^now botter^^'whi^^r''
classes
--who are presumed to be ab^e ?o
Spaniard!
"coday's criticism is of the "average-
it may be that there is a relationship between qoriflichange and social criticism but not the desired onef ?he mo?e
?S?nhe'critl'.lf''' '""'l'"' '''' vi?ui:nt"(an5'in:?lec-
^vni^i! L fi^^'^'^'^S- contemporary United States may be anexample of this. For an analysis of the "historical sterility"
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None of these writers of course knowingly contributed
to a policy of repression by the government or to perpetuating
a "myth of incapacity." Their intention was probably the
opposite. But. nevertheless, they appeared (to this outside
observer) to help maintain a
-gap- that has long existed in
Spain between the ruling and/or intellectual elite and the
masses of the people. The "gap" is one of social distance
between rulers and ruled that has been bridged in Spain only
by authoritarian and paternalistic politics. It is a gap ex-
pressed in Ullastres' conception of "family democracy" at the
beginning of this section i it is embodied in the notion of
"revolution from above," the only theory of "revolution" that
was "officially" endorsed in Franco Spain? '"^ it is revealed in
the pseudo-reformist ideas of Ortega y Gasset whose belief in
the role of an elite—any elite—in regenerating the nation led
from support for the Second Spanish Republic to opposition and
(by 1933) calls for vague parties-above-parties.
I cannot prove that the "incapacity myth" is just thatt
a myth. Ideologies are not susceptible to proof. But, as with
of Spanish self-criticism see P.E. Russell, "The Nessus Shirt
of Spanish History." Bulletin of Hispanic Studies XXXVI (I969)
.
pp.219-
225.
Among the fundamental doctrines published by a meeting
of the association of professors of Political Science were
"organic democracy" and "social revolution from above." In-
formacione^
.
February 27, 1973.
12
Woolf, ed,, European Fascism , pp. 286-287.
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any ideology, one can subject it to two
-tests", whose inter-
ests are served by the ideology? and what are the implications
of accepting a particular ideology as true?
By way of "evidence" for the first
-test" let me para-
phrase an anecdote by Jose Maria de Areilza.^^ A French
doctor when questioned about his progress in a new position as
a village physician replied that things were going very well
since he was not so interested in curing people but in creating
a "strong medical conscience" among them, that is, convincing
the villagers that there were desperate diseases lying in wait
all around them and that they must depend solely on him to ward
off these dangers. Similarly, the "incapacity myth" can be
seen as an attempt by Spain's "political doctors" to persuade
people that they are "politically ill" and make them content to
receive the small doses of "curative drugs" administered by the
regime. Thus, the perpetuation of a belief that Spaniards are
not possessed of the capacities for self-rule could only
strengthen the rationalization of the dictatorship as "rule
by the best, not the many."
For the second "test" there exists as "evidence" the
influence of the "incapacity myth" on social science research
in Spain, specifically the relatively new field of survey re-
search pioneered in Spain lyAmando de Miguel and his associates.
13 ^ / yJose Maria de Areilza, Cien Articulos (Madrid » Revista
de Occidente, 1971), pp. 168-172"; Areilza is one of Spain's
outstanding political leaders.
1?5
As has been its custom for several years, Infor^ani op.<^
(a Madrid afternoon paper) published on February 19, I973 part
Of the results of the latest ICSA-Gallup poll on politics. The
most striking thing about the results was not the responses to
questions about defense and armament, censorship and public
information but rather the lack of response. The percentages
of those who have "no opinion* ranged from 32f. of the upper
class to 1-5% of that of the lower class interviewed. Informa-
clones summarized that "almost two-thirds of the Spanish popu-
lation are on the margin of the public domain as regards
politics. The degree of depoliticization affects in greater
measure women, those over thirty-five and the lowest socio-
economic strata,"
In fact, the "apathy" of Spaniards as reflected by
opinion suri'-eys has a rather consistent history over the years
that survey research has been done. For our purposes, one of
the most interesting surveys v/as the first attempt at voting
return projections made by DATA, S.A. for the I966 municipal
elections in Madrid and which were reported in the since pro-
scribed evening paper, Madrid (November 25, I966). A survey
done by the DATA team before the election predicted a turn-out
of about IQiio while the actual number of those who voted turned
14
out to be closer to 30^, An important finding of the survey
Amando de Miguel, "Los sondeos de opinion," Universitas
V, i>k (December 28, 1972), p. 68.
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was the large percentage of those who professed nn intention
to vote and yet had no candidate in n,ind at the ti„,e of the
interview compared with a smaller number of those who had a
particular candidate and intended to vote. The percentage of
this latter group (those who had a candidate) corresponded
much more closely to the actual turn-out and Amando de Miguel,
head Of the DATA research team, has interpreted this result as
indicating that the lack of information provided to the Spanish
people in general and especially in regard to this election
conditioned the turn-out. 15
An interesting objection to this interpretation was
offered by Jose Vidal Beneyto.^^ Vidal Beneyto offers two
Objections to the DATA interpretation. The first deals with
the climate in which public opinion functioned in Spaini
The public behavior of the Spaniard in
general, but above all of lower-middle andlower socio-economic positions, is marked
(es-t^ vertebr^do) by an inhibition conditionedby Ignorance, by mistrust, and also in some
measure, by fear. From this comes the tendency,
almost mechanical, not to direct falsification
as such, but to a partial concealment? to a
truth that is disguised so that it is known but
not completely exposed. Thirty years of asser-
tions in monochord and in a permanent strident
tone, with dissidence possible only from the
imiriunity of anonymity, have accustomed the
Spaniard to deal with public issues in an
extremely subtle language, in which what is
^%t)id.. p. 68.
"^^Jose Vidal Beneyto, Eleccionea Municipales v Referendum(Madrid* Cuadernos de Ciencia Social. 196^).
177
most important is not what one savs but
is'^expreLed!!^' °^ "hat
The second objection is to the interpretation of the
response of those voters who professed an intention to vote
without having any candidate at all in mind,
eJlctC^i?e^t°",f,*^^ category of the
and h?^^! " ^" ^f'^Se part an ambiguous
tS vo^P °^ *heir decifion not
I? """^ °^ alternatives offered.
toow'wL°%rvni? for! ?f? ^^^f."" ^IS^
allv th^t L rather specific-
f-nty ? ?
l?e knows very well who not to vntoilor, and wishes to make it clear that hilrenunciation^of the vote does not indicate
thrS^;S:!t\:f8^^^^- -^^airs hut exl^??^
1?
reticence^Sftven'eliie oub?lf?i ''^'"^^i^ ''^^ the
Following are IwS of toe^responfefSLr^d''^''^ °Pi"i°"^-trative officials and P?ocurado?e' in IJe s^-nT^^'r"', ^"^""i"^"-
^^S^sLr!^"'"^
^'^"'^ oiinSir^e'?dS! qSaulSeri?t '° '
^ politician and would findit difficult to give some responses
asked X or in the survey, realizing thatin order to do so, it is necessary tobe not only interested, but reallvinvolved in politics.
Because of my position as Procuradorin the Corte^., completely free and notbeing subjected to any of the many
groups which, unfortunately, make them-
selves felt nowadays in the country,
and maintaining exactly this liberty of
opinion for the future, I can not in anyform, make knowTi that which you request
• • • •
18
-de Miguel, Espana . p. 2^5.
Ibi^jL.* p. 24, Emphasis in the original.
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It is not necessary here to explore the arguments
Offered by Vidal Beneyto to support his contentions nor to come
to any conclusion about which interpretation (de Miguel's or
Beneyto's) was more correct. The point to be made is that
these differing views really represent two value positions.
The first admits that apathy and ignorance is widespread while
hoping for its eventual diminution through open public debate
and adequate dissemination of voter information. The second
takes a much more positive view of the "political health" of
the Spaniard in maintaining that, dentro de lo oue c^bP . there
existed a public consciousness which was expressed . -"-^ Thus,
the "myth of incapacity" and the ideology of paternalism of
which it is a part, can have a great influence on social
scientists' interpretations of their data.
Although it is not necessary to come to a conclusion
about the validity of the "incapacity myth" it is important to
realize that at least some Spaniards do not confirm the image
contained in the "myth of incapacity," Despite the fact that
the Spaniard is socialized from his or her earliest days to
believe him- or herself incapable of responsible action and
that researchers find this Spaniard to be, in general, ignorant
19It might be mentioned that the contrast between these
two interpretations is not unlike that between American radicals
and pluralists in the field of Political Science over the
existence and/or significance of apathy in the U.S. electorate.
Vidal Beneyto 's argument obviously poses important objections
to the reliability of any attitudinal surveys in Spain,
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and apathetic, outbreaks, of protest, resistance and organiza-
tion do occur. One of the more recent and, perhaps, significant
of these attempts at organized protest is the "Workers' Com-
missions." As described by Jon Amsden, the "Commissions" were
outgrowths of the brief "liberalization" period in Spain that
extended to the State of Exception and cabinet shuffle of 1969."^
Encouraged by apparent "liberal" trends in political life,
Spanish workers, including some leaders of the official Syndi-
cates, attempted to organize autonomous representation for
workers outside the government controlled Syndicates. Amsden
has described the political workings of the Commissions this
way I
By all reports, internal activities at
each level of the workers' commissions
organizations were characterized by the
strict observance of democratic forms.
Problems were debated and votes taken
despite the difficulties involved (i.e.,
those associated with the problem of
assembling more than about five people in
one place). Of all the criticisms tha t
have ^ since been made of the workers' com-
miss ions none include censure of their
internal political quality . Even the
Opus Dei magazine fvlundo ( World ) made the
following grudging observations "The
most curious feature of these workers'
movements is that they appear to be born
headless as it were. From their beginning
the Commissions have involved collective
organization v/hich, when it comes to vot-
ing or pronouncing an opinion, each person
counts
. This apparent lack of orp:anization
.
nevertheless, disappears at the moment of
20Jon Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict
in Spajn (London: London School of Economics and Political
Science, 1972),
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actioni but the directives behind th»action can be ascribed to nobody!.
It might be that this cadre of committed militants is
an exception to a
.yth that holds true for the "averase"
worker,
.et when A.sden, instead of surveying workers, list-
ened to and Observed the. in their dealings with
.anage.ent
in Spain-s informal equivalent to collective bargaining (the
^lii^Mo^EffiEresa), he ca.e away with the following view of
the "incapacity myth^i
The worker^' delegates on the whole
lobs althoL'^-i^^^' \° -i^^ ^^eir
aneousiv ?hf5 -fL"^" obviously not instant-ly t at they acquired the skills
TrllT'^V: interpretation of the con-
wf??h remarkable, however, thatithma reasonably brief period they had
JnT. ^^ili^' especially
mosfn.r^^rr^ middle-aged men who for the
tion ^ tI
^^ceived little formal educa-
rn^nl^-ho^^
'^^^^"'^ ^^^^^ performance
oH^nv negated the often heard remark
5^^^^^".^^^ employers and even syndi-cate officials to the effect that Spanish
workmen are unequipped to represent thom-
?^^K^^S''"^^°^^"^^^i^ " PPca fo rm.acion"
^Slight education) and " poca cultura":"^^
This quotation, while significant, could easily be
followed by quotes from other anthropological and sociological
works on Spain which would lead to different conclusions about
the validity of the "incapacity myth." My own experience in
Spain and with "objective" social science has led me to conclude
21
IMdj., p. 100. Note that participatory democracy is
seen as a lack of organization by Opus Dei opinion.
22
Ibid. . p. 12?.
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that social science is not now equipped with the tools to
answer such important questions about morality, politics and
hu^an nature. What this discussion of the "^yth of incapacity-
has tried to show is that there exists •evidence" for a rejec-
tion Of and a belief in the ".yth." Given this dilemma, it
seems to rae that "npnti-ai o«' 4.ueutr ls or those who support progressive
forces in Spain must suspend judgment about the "myth" or
i:'eject it. For to accept the "myth of incapacity" is to
support a powerful mechanism of social control, one which puts
the very minds of Spaniards in a political prison.
Social Pessimism
It was mentioned earlier, in the Chapter on the Images
of the Individual, that social pessimism (distrust of others)
is a powerful inhibitor of organized threats to the status quo.
Functioning in this way it is part of the "incapacity myth."
"Official" Spain hoped that Spaniards, or at least those who
sought to lead them in opposition to the Franco regime, would
despair of the capacity of Spaniards to take control of their
lives into their own hands. Social pessimism reinforced this
despair by supposing that the politics of social change was a
pure Hobbesian world where each individual could only be con-
cerned with his own safety and where any social interaction was
a true zero-sura game. As Samuel P. Huntington has commented,
-Mutual distrust and truncated loyalties mean little organiza-
tion."^^
23Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chanprinpr Soci -
eties (New Haveni Yale University Press, I968), p. 3I.
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A„ ex-Falan,ist.
„o„ powerful critic of the re.i^e. nas
observea the effects of official!, encourage, divisions on
Spanish societyi
civil war conf?^^?* ^u? ^""luered of the
aild its p^elg Sve d^?,r'"''' ^'^^ Government
Z in 7 wM^h twi , 'y encouragement and
as th{ Serge^c^ of'fh^'f/^-p '^^"ic:! gtjnce 01 the dreadful repronni nrr
obdu?a?rin ^"^-'^ '"^'^ ^"^^ have^been
^
T • • ''««Pi"(r account of the horrorq
:r.\V:^^ha^5ln?e!?^^^ 3u.3e2tiv^:^^t\L\us
thefrLaLntL'f ^h'\" ^^^^^^ies. but behind
fact tha? ?n ?hn ^^^^eavy and indissolvable
in^J^ 2? ^ ^^^y interior of the passivelv
wen Is ^h'
effectively opposed groSps? Isll a in t e heart of the groups that have a
sondarUv^Irf'; co^peraUofInd'
Ind ?? t!^ t Ji'^^ alarming weakness today.A It IS certain that only that which is pos-sible can be made to happen and the putUnfinto action of the communitarian conscience in
It'can'nnt'T I''' ^^"^^^ ^^^^'^ meaning when
^Ln^o+ i-^^ referred to concrete action anddemonstration. And whether we speak of anintellectual group, of a guild of workers orol a municipal community, feeling oneself
united means feeling united for somethinr under
conditions of autonomy and activity and neverm conditions of passivity and mediation. 24
The foundation of social pessimism in the Catholic view
of human nature tends to discourage collective action as well.
As we saw in the anecdote of the old man and the idlers (Ch. V,
13^-35)
»
the Catholic view of social reform has often been
personal. That is, social evils are seen as the product of
Ridru^o, Escrito en Espana . p. 138.
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Ls View
evil
.en ana t.e resuXt of e.U Hu^an nature. T.e rectineatiOf societrs faults lies i„ the salvation of each inaiviaual
Better »en ™a.e a better society-not the reverse. Thi v
Of social Change has served the Church well i„ allowing it
to coexist with a variety of political regi.es without (in its
view)
.oral contraaictions, since the social syste. is of little
importance in the Church's wor. of inaiviaual salvation, the
Church neea be little concerned with changes in that social
syste. (unless they threaten the well-being or existence of the
Church, of course). However, the concentration of the Church on
the individual has tendea to blina it to the importance of
larger social structures such as class. Thus, when the Church
has become involved in organisational efforts, such as Catholic
labor unions, their organizations have been ineffectual and/or
dominated by traditional sources of political power.^S r^e
Church then while having some positive views of humankind,
particularly in the concept of free will, contributes overall
to a strengthening of social pessimism in its description of
human nature as concupiscent and its notion that social improve-
ment can come only through individual betterment.
Sex and Social Conl^ i-n-|
The chapter on the Images of the Individual demonstrated
that the textbooks have very strong opinions on the subjects of
25
1.^0 D ^1?
examination of this process see Howard J. Wiarda,Ihe Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement (Amherst, Mass.i LaborRelations and Research Center, I969),
human nature, sex and momn+xr t:' o.a rality. Extreme notions of urbanity
and strict codes of Ror>i«ia a i s c al and personal conduct were examples
Of ways in which the natural vitality and activeness of the
Child were discouraged. The connections between these images
Of the individual and politics can be seen by reference to two
aspects Of Spanish society which are intimately linked to the
apparatus of social control, the interrelated concepts of
honor and shame and the political culture of machismo.
Mnor^n±^hsMe. The concepts of honor and shame have
for some time been recognised as important and distinctive
features of Mediterranean societies. Most authors have
explained the preoccupation with individual and family honor
as features of "small scale, exclusive societies where face-to-
face personal as opposed to anonymous relations are of paramount
importance. "^^Recently, these approaches to the concepts of honor
and shame have been criticized for their failure to fully
acknowledge the way in which the concepts differentially
interact with social classes and groups, thus reinforcing
their importance as mechanisms of social control. "I would
then suggest that the distinctive characteristic of these com-
munities /marked by concepts of honor and shame/ is not their
size or the lack of anonymity of interpersonal relations.
What appears to be important is the manner of status determin-
ation directly linked to the nature of the social structure."^''
26
J.G. Peris tiany, Honour and Shame 1 The Values of Medi -
terrane^p SocletY (Chicagoi University of Chicago Press, 1966)^.11,
27 /Verena Martinez-Alier, Marriage. Class and Colour in 19th
CgPti^ry Cviba (London» Cambridge University Press, 19?-^^), p. 123
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For example, in nineteenth-century Cuba.
-The explanation for
the system of stratification obtaining Must be 'sought in its
economic base characterized by a highly unequal distribution
Of the means of production. This unequal distribution of
resources was preserved by an emphasis on heredity, with regard
both to property as well as to status, coupled with a class
endogamous marriage pattern, "^^
These elements of honor and shame linked to status
determination and social structure can be seen as operating in
Franco Fpain as well. The maintenance of honor and the avoid-
ance of shame and of being designated as sin ver^upn.. (without
shame) act as powerful restraints upon the behavior of Spaniards.
As the American anthropologist, Aceves. has observed (speaking
only on the village level)
i
The major agency of social control is notthe law, but that seemingly omnipresentgroup known as "they," In Spain, it is
phrased as que diran?—
-What will they
say?" While many people say that they do
not concern themselves with what the public
will say or think, nevertheless they do
because a dishonored person cannot expect
to live a good life in the village. 29
Of course, the Franco regime did not invent the concepts
of honor and shame. It is rather, as in its selective histori-
cal analysis, that tn? rggj-me used a preexisting phenomenon for
ov^ purpogeg. As Aceves again comments, "Both honor and
^
^Ibid.. p. 123.
29 Joseph Aceves, Social Change in a Spanish Village(Cambridge, Mass.i Schenkman, 1971), p. 65.
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are
as
shame are intimately link^^ w-^u .
n , .
^'^^ ^^^^^ morality whichlegitimized by both sacred (i e ch.
to ^-v,
° U.e., C urch) and secular norms nthe nature of propriety in behavior. "30
values Which constit.tmen u e proper behavior are all tho..
*i i^hose seen In
.3.
^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
s
o^xolal" an. thus
.aae support
.0.
..o^x^r iaentical „Un
.support for the regime on a national level To the .
it
-levei. degree thatI was able to establish the validity of t.h(= i- , ." this link between it-
self and a certain version of morality the regime had available
t e traditional
„echanis™ of social control described by
.oeves.Given the encouragement of the state and its control over local
leadership-the priest, the
.ayor. the teachers, the ever-
P-sent m^^rdia^-spaniards could in a very real sense be
the instruments of their own repression. Public opinion and
social pressure would be the major enforcers of conformity and
the status <iuo while state authority and more blatant instru-
ments Of repression remained for those who were sin^vergi^.
aa^^ESlltical^lture Of Waohi-^mo. Elsewhere 1 have
tried to give an account of Spanish machismo as seen by males
and females at different positions in the social hierarchy and
Of my own involvement with and reaction to a machist.^ culture. 31
TWO of the individuals described in that piece can serve to
illustrate the nature of Spanish machismo as well as giving
30
-Ibid.
. p. 65,
31Richard Nuccio, "On Being Male in Spaini The PoliticalCulture of A-achisino . " (raimeo). ^ m i^oiixi
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one example of the possible class dif^
t^n.o ^
differentiated manifesta-ions of a machisia ethic.
Pepe was a waiter in a local
...^ (combinationbar, restaurant and pastry shop) f.e.uented by my wife and 1when we first arrived in q,.
.
'"'""^ ''"'^ fascinatedDy the two americnnncj ut^« «
-^r anoa Who speak some Castilian and seen, inter-
-tea in Hi™, he so.eti.es
-resets" to add the second round onour hxu and always Keeps us supplied with peanuts or^He works si.ty to eighty hours a week and takes
.rench and
'
History courses in a private acade.y to "keep an open
.ind."
we talk about
.any things to the extent of our ability to
States really like7 Pepe is a.a.ed that two people so youn. as
we could already be married Tn c;r,„!0- . I Spam marriage is for those in
their late twenties. There are cultural reasons for this but
the main reason is economic, two cannot live as cheaply as one
when one can barely live.
Pepe has a novia (literally, an engaged woman but in
modern Spain it designates a serious relationship meant to lead
to marriage in a distant future), yet he talks of other women
in his life. "Tonight I have a date with a fantastic chick."
Pepe amplifies the adjective "fantastic" with a smile and a
rolling of his eyes which are in turn elaborated by the rising
and falling of his eloquent Spanish arms in movements that
eraphically describe his date's most appealing features.
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"But, don't you have a novia ?** I ask,
"Yes, of course.
"And you date other girls, too? Don't you
believe in being faithful?"
"Oh, you must understand, this is Spain.
Being faithful is for the women, not for the
man .
"
Despite mass attitudes, of which Pope's is just one
-example, women's liberation is a "pop" topic of discussion in
Spanish intellectual circles. Partly, this concern is a pre-
dictable by-product of Spain's emasculated intellectual elite's
preoccupation with all that is foreign. And Spanish women are
entering the labor force in geometrically increasing numbers.
But the real explanation is a familiar page from the history
of women's liberation in the industrialized national at a
certain point, men find the idea of female liberation profoundly
erotic.
Gentleman is the untranslated title of a new Spanish
magazine. For Spain it is quite a production, its layout and
appearance part Esquire , part Plavbov « The first issue features
a cover story and three articles on women's liberation a la
espanola . All the articles are v/ritten by men, there are no
women contributors to the issue (unless you count the bikini-
clad ones) and all the editors are male. A friend, probably
the most well-known social scientist in Spain, is the author
of one of the articles and sees no contradictions in men writing
about women.
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"Women's liberation is aft^r^ on kIS ter all hum^n liberation. Thisis the same argument given bv th« ki •j-ve Dy e blacks m your country
i
Whites can't understand the Blao. experience.- We
.ust not
allow this to happen with an issue as important as women's
liberation,
-Then, you don't feel threatened by the liberation of
women?"
"Threatened? Free womr.r> -pv.^^ ir men, free love, more often, more
ways? How can this be threatening?-
Fernando Diaz-Plaja has captured the essence of the tra-
ditional Spanish macho in this humorous and evocative passage
^^^^^-^-^^^E^ish^^
The sight of a woman more coquettish or
and'iJrtt\1io^"^ podScIs happiness
her wTth h • ^ Spaniard. He pursues
^i? ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^i^h ^is steps
iLoDoff^ .T'-^^'-"^" alternating^2£0£2§. (a Spanish institution wherein amale describes-outloud-the virtues of aparticular lady and what use he would maLof them given the chance) with curses on her
e^ffh^'^^P; ^^^"^^ ^^^^ ^^'^ Spaniard halstablished once and for all the maximum
amount of skin that can be revealed to hiseyes. 9nly one centimeter more seems to
^nL^""
insulting provocation, a practicaljoke, a challenge. With the facility he has
hi ^np!^;?^'''^^"? eyerythin^g in his own terms,e doesn't see m this exliibition a foreigncustom but an intention to humiliate him.
This same logic—Spanish women show what they£^£ht_to and no more—astounds Spaniards wh"inthey see drawings and photos from Paris. HowIS It possible that all this can be shown with-
out people assaulting the stage? What's wrong
with the French? Aren't they men or what?
It^s useless to explain that there exists in
this neighboring country the same proportion
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between Custom and Desire that p;ave lov to onr
^o^i'^t^rr^'/^r '^^y ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ o^'^an ankLF r the Spaniard who lives in the perDetualpresent, this isn't reasonabL! In the back oftheir minds they prefer to believe tha? the
l.^'l^'^U^"'
^^'^^ population growth, aren't
the%ame\ro;d:"3r ^^'^ ^^^^ ^^'y donU ha?e'
From a restricted, exaggerated view of the woman, the
line of thought does logically lead to an equally exaggerated
view of the male. In Spanish society, the concept of manhood
is a fragile entity not easily maintained. There is a proper,
"manly" way of performing nearly every function from lighting
a cigarette to emptying the ashtray. Threats to this "mascu-
linity" are taken seriously. Billy Graham's prescription fo:
rapists—castration—was also the procedure recommended to
by some liberal male friends for homosexuals.
The social class aspect of this mechanism of control
emerges from the characterization of Spain as an authoritarian-
conservative regime dra\vn in the first Chapter. As a counter-
revolutionary regime, franguismo found many of the traditional
social mores, particularly those of social and sexual relations,
to be suited to its goals of resisting rising lower-class con-
sciousness. It seems impress ionfetfcally true for Spain, as it
was for r.Iartinez-Alier's study of 19th century Cuba, that the
lower and most disadvantaged classes would embrace these mores
roost tightly. ^5 ^.j^^g^ identifying itself with the most
)r
me
^ Diaz-Flaja, Los Espanoles
. pp. 1^8-l'!^-9,
33
^-'See Martinez-Alier, IVarria^e
. pp. 120-124, for a dis-
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backward aspects of a machista culture, franauis.o could count
on this most traditional mechanism of social control to enforce
its own political goals. As long as the "gap" existed between
intellectuals and masses that was discussed in connection with
the incapacity myth (p.l68 of Ch. VI). there was little danger
in the liberal feminism of Gentlemen reaching and affecting
our waiter friend, Pepe.
Yet, as in all total systems, this male one contains
the contradiction that could produce its inevitable downfall.
The position of the Spanish woman is the rock upon which Spanish
society has built an authoritarian, repressive structure. As
in many other societies, the woman has been made the bearer of
traditional values but here to an unbelievable degree. The
public/private dichotomy discussed in feminist literature^^ is
a severe one in Spain. The woman's world, as we have seen in
the texts, is the private world of the family, the home and the
community. In her private world she is meant to be the guardian
of traditional morality, the prime socializer of each new gen-
eration and the refuge of her husband from the public world of
economic necessity and the contention of powerful social forces.
cussion of her reasoning behind her conclusion that status
hierarchy and control of female sexuality were linked. She
cites Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in Peristiany
(ed.). Honour and Shame , p. 49 and C. Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte
de log Caballerost A Sociological Study of a Spanish Town (Lond on
i
Oxford University Press, I966), p. S'l, as giving evidence of a
differential evaluation of honor depending on social position
in Spain.
See Jean Bethke Elshtaln, "Moral V/oman and Immoral Mam
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Pitt-Rivers has, doscribea this public-private aiohot
—
sXi^hti. Ci^erent te^s-.or the viiiJ .J """^gated I ^ mvesti-
There exists, then in +k«Of the puebli two prino?^?/''^'-^^^^^ structure
a. different aspect of^^S ? attaching to
ciples Of authority and ^nn\-i^^- P^in-is associated with the rbors. Of people who Uvrtf-^?'^^^? "^^g^-pueblo. Eau^i\+Zu ? together in the
be the essence of n^f ^i''^?^^ ^^^^^^^ to
sanctions orperLnal^on^?^^.^"^^^^^^^ the
gossip, and slTor'^^\Tslril'e iT^T'''^
^£^XEmnz3 is wha+ moi. ?. A person'sS^^H?:Ind ?heZtriJSp'r"J^^^ ^° *hese2CS££Uenza as well as th»H J-^.I?^*"'"® °f
rSltti^" are neighborly
them to Se plrticufi^iv""'""^?'' <=ause
female sex. The^HriL?^^°S"^^<^ "^^^ the
the other Aandfifpart?cul«ri °"
with the male 4pv i I f!?^^"^^ associated
liness is ?hat ^Mch iustl?5r^H'^ °^
of neighborly values fo^ ?i ? subjection
as necessarv iol ^ S5 reoORHized
enforcl'IK^rSl°e1^^?fg,^5!3|°"-i and
Pitt-Rivers- description is very similar to the "ideal"
Of male-female relations depicted in the textbooks and is the
one to Which "official" Spain gave its imprimateur. But because
the woman is the cornerstone of this value system she is the
key to its maintenance. This is why especially under Franco
and still under his authoritarian successors she can never be
allowed the sexual or social license permitted the Spanish male
and Why women's liberation was seen as a real threat to the
edition'fSLtot- I'nir.'r^iry^r'^^^im^^^ IT^'
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Franco regime.
In the Francoist system. woMan is the link that binds
the fonnal and informal mechanisms of social control. She is
on the one hand, the guardian of an "official" morality with
'
Which the regime identifies and which employs the sanction of
:^^^Mmn^ to help promote conformity. On the other hand, she
has a central position in the family which is the basic social
building block in Spain's corporatist political structure.
The Spanish woman is then, quite literally, the future of Spain
Her political and social progression is the only certain guarantee
Of a non-authoritarian alternative to replace Iraflsukffio.
Corporati gm-Paterngl ion,
It should be apparent from a reading of the chapter on
S^in- p F'^^^
IZist Manifesto Thf^^^ f «=^°^P^ the Com-
are cLefuilfw«;,.h^5\^''?^*^°'*iu''''?^?*'' °^ women's liberationarei ly atc ed by the authorities. See "iMoteq from
ppr?2:i7^' °^ Machismo." Ma. I. r(Oc?ober Wa),
Another ominous indication of the "official" view of women's
Of t^e .^^irr^ "^f^^io-^l stories in Spanish newspaperso h arrest and imprisonment of "abortion rings." In mv exoer-
.nTLT^ "embers Of these "rings" were usually^eAtirely womenand one suspects that they may, in fact, have been simple con-
sciousness-raising groups arrested on false but socially
acceptable charges.
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the I„a.es of the State that the theory of corporatism pre-
sented in the texts is in itseif authoritarian an. paternaX-
-tic and hence supportive of strict social control. Perhaps
n the ™eaio.al ti^es fro™ which corporatism supposedly springs
xne relations between rulf^-r u^^a ^ > ^ - .^^le and ruled implied by corporatism
were self-evidently beneficial for- onJ i r all concerned. However, in
20th century Spain, a country which had had extensive, practical
experience with all shades of political organization from
anarchism to fascism, a corporatist order did not appear to
every Spaniard as the ideal arrangement. It was rather main-
tained hy a judicious combination of persuasion, manipulation
and coercion.
Perhaps the most important
"contributions" of corporatism
to an apparatus of social control were the authoritarian and
paternalistic relations implied between State and Citizen by
its theoretical conceptions. Examples of this can be seen in
the emphasis of corporatism on order and hierarchy and the
peculiarly Spanish expression of "sacerdote del mundo." We
should also recall the illustrations of Ch. in, p. 88 which
diagram the ideal relationship of authorities and subordinates
with the former ordering and the latter obeying—all for the
common good. The central message of all these notions is that
the top knov;s best and the bottom least.
The theme of authoritarianism and paternalism is continued
as well in the corporatist view of citizenship, its emphasis on
duties rather than rights and its notion that obedience, knowing
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one's place and keeDino- ^^ 4.uK ping it. is the oorporatist idea of freedom.
consider also the organic idea of participation. The
Spanish conception of participation is expressed by the phrase
"participar es obedecer,"
-to participate is to obey." One does
not participate as an individual by voting or doing political
work but through groups which are structured and controlled by
political authority.
Indeed, the use of the word "participation" is itself
another mechanism of social control. It is one of a number of
rhetorical expressions which the government used when it wished
to emphasize the "liberalizing" tendencies of the regime. The
real meaning of "liberalization" in the Spanish context can be
seen by examining two recent periods of "liberalization" which
came almost exactly a decade apart.
The first period begins about I962-63 and is marked by
the appointment of Manuel Fraga Iribarne to the Ministry of
Information and Tourism. It runs, with ups and downs, until
definitely ended by the State of Exception and invocation of
emergency powers in I969. The second period can be said to
begin with the appointment of Luis Carrero Blanco as President
of the Government in June of 1973. Two events, the assassina-
tion of Carrero Blanco in December of the same year and the
June, 197^ revolution in Portugal, made this period of "liberal-
ization" much shorter.
Parallels of actors and events between the two periods
are striking. The post of Vice-President of Government from
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whlcH Crrero Blanco ,oss to .e the rirst P.esiaent of Covern-
-nt was create, in the cabinet s.ume of 1962-63. Pra.a Iri-barne, Minister of Informati ^ mmiorma on and Tourism and symbol of the
young, technocratic face of th« n^^,- ^ , .the Cabinet during the first period,
was, in 1975. Ambassador to England tv.^iingian . The author of the law
re.ovin^ prior censorship i„ the 1960.3. he was in the 1970.3
author of a refonn proposal rejected by the regime. 37
However, the most important similarity between the
two periods was the seemingly contradictory combination of in-
creased repression with "official" liberalisation. A brilliant
student Of the regime. Max Gallo. has captured the essence of
"liberalization"!
This, then, was liberalization! within the
^^^syim:^_o£_tM_XMzim, which coUId "t bl
?n?!f divergences would be
^ii^^}^'^' ^e'^tai" professional claimsallowed. AS Fraga Iribarne clearly stated!The government is convinced that its prlnlcipieo
. . . constitute a sure and definitive
mlJItanTch^i.'??''"''"''^ 'P^^^^^ and fund'a!'entally Christian.... The government will
grlssion?"^' '"^'^'"^ imply retro'
n!j;^f.^^^^ ^t^^"^^ P^^'^'"^^ opposition,provided It was never challenged or attacked.Anyone who sought to go further would soonbe made to see reason, as in the past, byGeneral Camillo Alonso Vega, Minister of theGobernacion (Security), General Martin Alonso
and his army, the fiuMlMa^Civil and the mili-tary tribunals. Manuel Fraga Iribarne andMunoz Grandes (former head of the Blue
Division, Spanish volunteers who fought with
the Nazis, now Vice-President) did not
37
A .
Giniger, "Franco Regime Losing Its Grip on Span-iards," New York Time.g . March 3, 1975, p. 1.
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the new, cSementJrJ^^ '/'^^ °"
authority which wf+h '^^ ^^^^'^ °f an
and a seLe ofsooil? „^°"^™?t^ shrewdnessties, was prena^ert ?i "t Political reali-
controlled conce^^lo^ '"^^'^ limited and
Which it cou!nS;r»:."^^^"^^<i^Ptations<-o j.a annul and canalize at will. 38
A decade later the newp<!t -hk
in si.n .
liberalization" was describedm milar terms
»
Change is freedom ofpofi??^^ """^ "^j'T
c^^po^?a?ivTaL%1S " >>r?h°:\^^^^^^^^
repressive habit a^ J^ ^""^^? "^"^^ by
thSse Who want it mos?.'' °^
thT"Le?ion%^j:'ri'^'^^ ?^ ^-^^ ^-^gi-e is
allowed ms fSedof'™'"^"^"!?" "^^^
Of the liberals Ind l^Kisfr^i!^"'^have been wedded '?o tf.'rllLi:'^'''
Thus, the so-called periods of "liberalization" were
consistent with the "carrot-stick" approach to social control
Characteristic of other ™echanis.s. Calls for "participation-
were in the Spanish context ulti.atu^s to the regi^o-s opponents.
"Official" Spain will give one more chance to becon,e one of
its "adherents ",^° those who do not avail themselves of the
38
197'f). p.%iT^^°' SfiaiilJJndeiiJiaiico (New York. E.P. Dutton,
39Giniger, New York Tlmp«, p. i,
oTLnrX'llTL'nliZ'l^' political Ir intelfecCl cImStent.une mignt a so ment on the phrase "canalize" in the Gallo quote
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opportunity win risk being designated the anti-Spain, one of
those social cancers that ™ust be cut out of the organic state.
The reality and brutalness of this stick of repression was not
missed by the Spanish opposition. For in these two periods of
•liberalizatio„"-periods marked by calls for "participation"
and "adhesion"-there remains one last parallel, the execution
Of an "anarchist** by /rarrote vil
TM^J^HyL as Political Met..npho-r
Throughout this study the preeminence of the family as
political metaphor has been apparent. As seen in Chapter II.
there is nearly an "imperialism" of the family in Spain because
of its monopolistic role in the socialization process. And in
the chapters on the Images of the State, the Individual and the
Citizen the family is repeatedly used as an "ideal-type" and
metaphor for multiple social and political relations.
Family, religion and the school served, in fact, as
models for the Spanish political order. The supposed need for
hierarchy
J subordination, and obedience in the institutions of
the family, the Church and the School were used as rationali-
zations and justifications for the authoritarianism and
above. "Official" Spain was forever talking about establishing
"cauces (canals or channels) of participation." The phrase is,
again, richly descriptive of the way in which participation was
conceived of by the regime.
Garroting is a form of execution in which an iron collar
is fastened around the condemned 's neck and slowly tightened
until death occurs by strangulation or the crushing of the spinal
coluiim. Julian Grimau was executed in April of 19^3 after world-
wide protests. After similar international pleas for clemency,
Salvador Puig Anticli was executed by garroting on March 2, 1974,
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paternalism of the DoH + i^oi
,
p lit cal order. Spaniards were viewed aspolitical children who n^PH +w«n eed the guidance of a father-figure
the £audillo. Opponents of x
^^S^"^^' li^e naughty children,
must be taught the error r»f +v, •
.
'^^""^ °^ ^'^^^^ their own good and.
their
.xsdeeds were too great, would be politically
..dis-
owned ,
"
Of course, it ™ust be remembered that it was actually a
certain kind of family, a certain n,,^ •
^ kind of religion and a certainhnd of schooling with which the regime aligned itself.
Through propaganda, laws and repression if necessary the regime
sought to promote that version of family, religion and school
Which would provide the proper context for its dictatorial rule
and with Which it could identify, if this identification were
complete, opposition to the regime would entail opposition as
well to the most basic values and institutions of the society.
Chaos from Order and the Consumer Society
We cannot leave this Chapter on social control without
some final qualifying statements. The first concerns a com-
parison of the harmonious order of the textbooks with actual
Spanish politics and the second refers to the political-economic
context of the apparatus of social control viewed in the texts.
Social control in Franco Spain was not so effective that
peace and tranquility did, in fact, always prevail. Spanish
•reality was then as now marked by strikes and shutdowns, protest
and confrontation by workers, students, priests and others. And
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some of this "disorder" wac,a s tacitly accepted by the regime.
How could this be possible?
One answer can be obtained by reference to the analagous
area of sexual mores. In contrast to the virtual prohibition
Of sex in Spanish textbooks and catechisms, Spanish reality is
r^arked by a preoccupation with the subject. This is not to say
that workers strike in order to taste of some forbidden fruit
but that laws and principles are in the Spanish context ideals
held up as goals yet honored more in the breach than in prac-
tice. For whatever reason-human nature, free will, con-
cupisence-order and disorder, prudery and license were under-
stood by moral and political authority to be opposite sides of
the same coin. True threats to the established order would be
crushed without hesitation but before this point was reached
there existed an area of understanding that principle and
practice were not necessarily connected.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that in concen-
trating on a Spanish ideology as conveyed by the textbooks some
of the more material supports of the regime have been ignored.
Chief among these was the economic "payoff" of a rising standard
of living which the regime had been able to provide since the
early 1960»s. In the final chapter there will be more critical
comments made on Spain's economic "miracle." Here it is
k2
Hov/ard Wiarda, "Law and Political Development in LatinAmericai Toward a Framework for Analysis," The American Journal
.of Qomparative Law. Vol. 19, Summer 1971, pp. 43^-'^63.
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important to note that the drive towards a Western consumer
society was a major factor in obtaining compliance with the
regime. The ideas and concepts examined until now formed the
moral and intellectual justifications for the regime. It is my
belief that Francoism could not have survived for nearly four
decades without this ideological apparatus and its mechanisms of
social control. Yet it is probably equally true that at least
since Spain's international reemergence in the 1950's, continued
economic growth was a vital prop of the status quo.
In the final chapter we examine more closely the role
that ideology and economics will play in a future Spain,
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C H A P T E R VII
POST-FRANCO SPAIN: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE REGIME
In a manner of speakinf^, an authoritarian
• ITelV^^jV ^^^i^%^?i^ts in order to dL-
?r«H?^;n 1
^^-^cessful, it will turn into at aditional consei->vative regime as the old
able "once more to
constitute the legitimacy base and the
cnannels of communication in the polity,
^
We return now to a consideration of the point at which
this thesis began: the typology of authoritarian conservative
regimes. Our task was to develop a perspective on the Spanish
regime which could account for its counterrevolutionary
ideology and which would highlight the various mechanisms of
social control used to maintain it. It was argued in those
early Chapters that the prevailing characterization of Franco
Spain as an authoritarian regime deflected one's attention from
the regime's origins in a class struggle, the Civil V/ar, and
its continuation of that war against rising working class con-
sciousness by other means. Although brutal physical repression
was no stranger to the Franco regime, our contention was that
.franquismo remained more than just a naked dictatorship even
after the heady fascist rhetoric of the 19^0 's was discarded.
'"Blondel, Comparing Political Systems , p. 22?.
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In an analysis of Spanish political education textbooks we
established the existence of a coherent and consistent Prancoist
ideolo,. Which had served the interests of the re.i.e by puttin,
elite intellectual critics on the defensive (Selective His-
torical Analysis, Myth of Incapacity, Corporatism-Paternalism)
and by appropriating traditional mechanisms of social control
(Social Pessimism, Sex and Social Control, Family as Political
Metaphor) for use against the mass of the population.
However, as was stressed at the conclusion of the last
Chapter, this ideological apparatus of social control functioned
within a particular political economic context. This political
economy in my view was itself an expression of the class nature
of the regime yet, as in the case of the authoritarian regime
typology, a critical view of the Spanish economic "miracle" is
not a part of the "conventional wisdom" about Spain. Therefore,
a review of a key debate within the political economic litera-
ture will be necessary in order to stake out a perspective on
the Spanish economy at odds with the prevailing idea that
Spain in the 1970 's possesses the socio-economic basis for a
liberal-democratic capitalist system on a Western European
model. This review of the modernization versus development
debate leads to a confirmation of the class nature of the
regime on the political economic as well as ideological level.
It requires, however, some revision in the original authoritarian-
conservative regime typology as outlined by Blondel.
Finally, this critical evaluation of the political
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economic and ideological apparatus of the Franco regime leads
inexorably to speculation on the future of a post-Franco
Spain. It is on this speculation over alternative futures
for Spain and the Spanish people's capacity to determine their
own future that the thesis concludes.
Socioeconomic Change and the Authoritarian
Conservative Regime
As was seen in the typology of the authoritarian-conser-
vative regime developed in the first chapter, a regime such as
Franco Spain tends to arise as a reaction to the evolving break-
down of the status quo. The challenge to the status quo stems
from demands for socioeconomic development (and participation
or liberalization) which are opposed by traditional groups.
If the strength of these traditional groups is sufficient they
will be able to fight back such demands and reimpose an earlier
order in which traditional values predominate.
Yet how can a regime supposedly founded on the rejection
of socioeconomic development be marked by the economic pros-
perity which Spain has apparently achieved? Doesn't Spain's
modernity undermine its designation as an authoritarian-
conservative regime?
To answer these questions one must look more closely at
Spain's "economic miracle."
Any understanding of the evolution of the Spanish
economy over the last thirty-five years must begin with a
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Increase In Industrial Production, 1929-1959
'
—
- *
Years Electricity Iron
Chemical
Products Textiles
1929-31
1941-45
1946-50
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
100
171
230
319
362
380
395
471
534
551
610
610
100
79
84
100
113
112
135
150
152
165
195
216
100
76
95
129
183
199
214
217
214
233
258
259
100
98
98
81
99
105
96
101
106
113
128
114
Source: Stanley Payne, A History
of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 690.
of Spain a nd Portugal, Vol
.
2 (Madison: University
Table II. Variations in Spanish Agricultural Production, 1940-1958
(1931-35 = 100)
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955
1958
Index of
agrarian
production
82.8
72.5
86.5
104.9
117.3
Population
level
106
110
115
119
122
Agrarian
production
per capita
78.1
65.9
75.1
88.2
96.1
Source: Payne, Spain and Portugal
, p. 691.
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recognition of the disastrous economic consequences of the
Civil War. Perhaps the clearest indication of this are the
accompanying tables which show that in several key sectors the
Spanish economy virtually stood still for the twenty years
from 1930 to 1950,
Other measures of economic growth are equally dismal.
The per capita income of I929 was not surpassed until I954.
The gross investment ratio in Spain between 19^0 and I958 was
lower than any European country except Portugal. On many
important indicators of a "modern" economy such as percentage
of labor employed in agriculture, percentage of employment in
manufacturing or the contribution of the manufacturing sector
to the Gross National Product (GNP), Spain at least until the
mid-1950 's must be ranked with or below countries such as
Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia.^
The record of these years is not only an indication of
the effects of the Civil Wart it is also a commentary on the
adequacy of the Franco regime's response to the War, It is
said by some that Franco had few if any ideas about economics
other than the assumption that somehow the economy would right
itself after the War,^ Indeed, it is an important question to
2 /Manuel Roman, Th e Limits of Economic Growth in Spain
(New Yorki Praeger, 1971), pp. 19-22, passim .
3
-^Payne, Fran c o's S pain, pp. 25-26. Charles Anderson put
it differentlyi "Most observers seem to agree that Francisco
Franco was guided by no rigid economic orthodoxy and that his
approach to economic problems was flexible, adaptive, and prag-
matic." (The Polit ical Economy of Modern Spain (Madison 1 Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1970)) p. 27,}
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ask oust how .uch effect government policy has had on the post-Civu war economy. The motive forces of the economy seem to
have been largely outside governmental control.
The economic development of Spain before
major ?Ss!° "iT <l«Pe"denrupon two
fb^ ^ # rP-? ^-°^^"--iyf-1 ^
If^hL ?ypamics internal to the structure
1960?^ L?^ ^^^J^^^ist revolution of the
ten^io;. traditional structural
IhTtT '^^J^^J'^''^'''^^' accentuated bythe magnitude of the forces acting upon it--
for iLnt^h ^^"^^ "^^^ European Common Market
n? ?
laboj^ and the resulting depletion
industrj?^'" '^"^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^P--^
As Roman comments at a later point:
Z5_7he transformation of the Spanish economy
responded m substance to the pattern of
resource allocation determined by the inter-play of market forces originating outside the
systemj (1) Flows of foreign exchange deter-
mined m the mam the poles of growth and the
rate of capital accumulation. (2) The rate
of labor absorption in Western Europe deter-
mined the position of the supply schedule forlabor available to Spanish enterprise and in
conjunction with (1) determined the wage rate(and correspondingly the rate of profits).
Was this development path substantially
affected by planning? The evidence shows it
was not. For the various development plans
were simple projections and more-or-less
reliable forecasts of events which would
otherwise have taken place independently
through the internal logic of the market
forces unleashed by the tourist revolution
if y
Roman, Limits of Economic Growth , p. 22.
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Often outpaced the projections of the plans
to'th^t'rffj^f^edl^ t'he'";?' ? Patter^'s^^^Uarthis sense, then t? 1^ o^^f^cial plans, in
question thp 2? ^PP^ars legitimate to
other ?h.^ significance of such planning
t\'nILn'intended"?o^'L'"' T^"^"^^^
accustomed to the thQn,rh+ usually
in charge. 5 T^fto"Ght of someone being
Thus, Whether one looks at the autarchic period of the
Spanish economy-which led to near backruptcy in 1959--or the
subsequent
"liberalization-.-when the government tried not to
interfere with the market forces of tourism and labor export
-economic growth has occurred despite or irregardless of
governmental policy.
This evaluation suggests that some of the contradiction
between Spain's apparent modernity and the authoritarian-
conservative regime typology may be mitigated by the quality
of Spain's economic growth which occurred in spite of not
because of the regime's policies. Perhaps the kind of economi
growth that Spain has experienced is one which does not threat
that directly the central values of the authoritarian-conserva-
tive regime.
To pursue this question of the nature of Spain's economic
growth, let us turn to a debate that specifically concerns
modernization and development in the Spanish economy.
c
en
.
Ibid 0
, pp. 112-113, Besides giving the impression ofDelng m charge the plan also allowed the regime to take creditfor whatever growth occurred.
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in
Modernization and Development
A series of articles and rejoinders contained in several
^^^"^^ gQ"^Parative_Studie^in Society .nd H^.tn>.y tea]
directly on the question of the nature of economic growth
an authoritarian-conservative regime/ The central points of
debate, and those which are of concern here, are (1) the vi-
tality of corporate group structures in Catalonia and (2) the
nature of economic development in the Catalan region (and Spain
in general). At this point we will be dealing primarily with
the debate over the nature of Spanish economic development
while dealing in the final part of the chapter with the question
of the vitality of corporate group structures and their rela-
tionship to economic development.
The debate over Spanish economic development begins with
Schneider et al. distinguishing between "modernization" and
"development" t
Modernization refers to the process by which
an underdeveloped region changes in response
to inputs (ideologies, behavioral codes, com-
modities and institutional models) from
already established industrial centers; a
process which is based on that region's con-
tinued dependence upon the urban-industrial
metropolis. Development refers to the pro-
cess by which an underdeveloped region attempts
Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen,
"Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and
Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative
Studies in Society and History
. 1^, 3 (1972), pp. 328-350? Oriol
Pi-Sunyer, "Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Medi-
terranean! A Reconsideration of the Catalan Case," CSSH , 16 (1974),
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.he
.,3tincUo„
.aae Sc.nei.er^
T"V"
aeveXop.ent is unu..aX in ..a. i. attributes so.e3i.„.ncant negative
.actors to t.e process o.
.oaerni.ationm contrast to the e:enprp n.r -^x
^
"'"^^^^^ positive, prescriptive aspects ofthe modernization literature ^ Trv •x . in their view development isClearly a „ore
.esira.le process for the Xo„g-ran,e weXl-.ein,
Of a nation although they feel pessimistic about the possi-
bilities for development e-iven thP -Hnr^.-v,.gJ- e dominance of American and
Soviet military, economic and political fn-r.cc .uxxc i lorces over most of
the Third World....
Pi-Sunyer-s objection to Schneider ei_al^ is that in their
article they project a "wildly erroneous" i.age of Catalonia
and, by implication. Spain as an "economic backwater . "1°
p. 340.
^"^^"^^^^^ et^, "Modernization and Development,"
ana the Comparative Study of Societies," Conmarative Studies in
fi^h '^"Th^ F^ot?7' (1973), pp. 199-226, and Christopher
io^etber'a?. i;75rpp!l7!^^:'^ l^^w
York R.view of Roog..
9Schneider et al.^, "Modernization and Development," p. 349.
Pi-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 125.
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Citin, a variety of historical and statistical information.
Pi-Sunyer
.akes a case for significant industrialization (in
the industrialized regions of Spain).
SDL?^h^^^n''^\^''^^^^^^°" contemporary
the Dast ?wf "^r^ recognize that over
ali.^?fL ^^^^d^s the pace of industri-
between 6 pnH ^"^^^"^^^^^ have fluctuated
thaT hL >. ^ P^"^ ''^^^ year, a rhythm
counties :'?h.r^^^"'"^^^ ^^^^^ European
o^ooofi ^^"^^ P^"" capita income has in-
?g60 a^f'^^'" T^^^ '^^^^ ^^^^ $1,000 since
lltoe in the ^^^^ ^ave taken
wp?l ni^, ^^J"""""^^ are reasonablywell-documented
... and it is in the
develoDrnenfP Catalonia that industrialpment has been most successful H
And what can our perspective on the debate contribute
to its resolution? In the first place, it appears that Pi-3unyer
has, for whatever reason, ignored the distinction which
Schneider et al, have drawn between modernization and develop-
ment. They do not, in fact, argue that there has not been
significant industrialization in Spain; on the contrary, they
argue that Spain and Catalonia are in the process of moderniza-
tion. What they do argue is that modernization is not the same
thing as development and that
. .in modernizing societies
the nation and the region, and their respective elites, are no
longer the prime movers .... ""^'^ There is support for this posi-
tion of Schneider et al^ from Spanish as well as other sources.
The Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado, has, for example,
''••'•
Ibid,
. p. 126.
12Schneider et al
.
. "Reply," p. 239.
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distinguished between modernization »„h < .t^rnizati and economic development in
ways very similar to Schneider et al^
According to Furtado increases in the income of a com-
munity may result from at least three different processes.
a) economi^develoM which he defines as the accumulation
Of capital and adoption of more effective productive processes,
b) the depletion of nonrenewable natural resources, and c) re-
allocation of resources aiming at geographic specialization,
through the pursuit of comparative advantages in a system of
international division of labor. Modernization is the process
whereby new patterns of consumption (the introduction of new
products) are adopted as a result of an increase in income
generated by the type of changes referred to in (b) and (c)
above , ^-^
Using Brazil as an example of an underdeveloped country
caught in such a process of modernization, Furtado goes on to
examine the implications of modernization in the areas of income
distribution, technology transfers, foreign domination and
growth J
In sum, a certain profile of demand, corres-ponding to an increasing concentration in thedistribution of income, and to an increasing
gap between the levels of consumption of the
rich minority and that of the mass of the
population, entails a composition of invest-
ments that tends to maximize the transfer of
technical progress through MNCs /Multi-
national Corporations/, and to increase the
13Celso Furtado, "The Post-1964 Brazilian 'Model* of
Development," Studies in Comparative International Development .
8. 2 (1973), p. iW.
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inflow of f6reign resources. The policy
al^o^'tPn^ ^^^^ demand profile will^s e d to maximize the expansion of GDP/Gross Domestic Product/. 1^
Therefore, Pi-Sunyer's figures on growth (GKP) and
income do not tell us in themselves that real economic develop-
rnent has occurred in Spain. In fact, the "problem in the area
of income distribution''^^ mentioned by Pi-Sunyer is just one
indication that Spain may be involved in a process of moderni-
zation similar to that described by Furtado and Schneider
et al
.
The Spanish economist, Ramon Tamames, cited approvingly
16by Pi-Sunyer, would seem to see foreign control of industri-
alization in Spain more critically than Pi-3unyer. Analyzing
the 25 largest businesses (by sales, 1970) in Spain, Tamames
comments
,
It is interesting to note that of the 25
enterprises under consideration, Ik have
participation by foreign capital and in
7 of them the participation is total or
majoritarian, which is equivalent to their
complete control from outside /the country/
• • • .
'
1^ .Ibid.
. p. 125.
^•^Pi-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 126.
'"^'Ramon Tamames
. , . has vvritten a series of readable
and objective books on economic questions." Ibid
,
. p. 126,
footnote 5.
17 / /
'Ramon Tamames, Introduccion a la economia espanola
(Madrid I Alianza Editorial. 1972), p. 19O, It should also be
noted with regard to Catalonia's primacy as regards industriali-
zation that of the ten largest firms, seven are located in Madrid
and one (SEAT, the largest) in Barceloniaj of the 25 largest firms,
13 are in Madrid and six in Barcelona.
lerni-
Although not utilizing the distinction between mod,
zation and development, Tamames discusses the effects of foreign
influence in terms not unlike those of Furtado or Schneider
et alf I
Between 1959 ... and 1971 foreign invest-
ment has quadrupled. This contribution of
external capital, even though it has un-doubtedly contributed to the economic pro-gress of the last years, also includes somedangers. Given a continuation of this
tendency, at the same pace, it can have as
a consequence within some years a severe
reduction in the initiatives of our entre-
preneurs, being overwhelmed by the greater
means of foreigners. In the last few years
there have been many Spanish entrepreneur!:^
converted from industrialists to simDle mer-
c|iaiLt.s_->-_into mere representatives for th e
Spanish market of a line of merchandise
res emblin/T that which they have stopped
J£E5duMll£L-2ILj!or^/h
reduced their volume of production .^^
•« * *
In sum, one can state that there are very
few Spanish enterprises of any size which
are not penetrated by a direct form of
foreign capital. Technologically the pene-
tration is even greater ... ,19
To contrast Pi-Sunyer's view of foreign control with
that of Tamaraes and Schneider et al
.
. one need only refer to
the paragraph quoted below. To place it in context, one should
be aware that Pi-Sunyer in his original "Reconsideration" had
cited the production of nearly a half-million automobiles in
Spain as evidence of the degree of industrialization. In their
reply Schneider et al. contend that this production is not
•^^Tamames, Economfa espanola . p. 39^. Emphasis added,
•^^Ibid. . p. 398.
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Spanish but foreign ('fiTL'v ru^FIAT, Chrysler and Leyland). Pi-Sunyer
in turn replies,
Apparently what matters is not thepresence or absence of an indUs^rial basenot the presence or absence of c^tntJ '
manpower, npt the fact't'Sat ?Lse products
III ra?her'?H'^^P^^^ exported'^abroad!out t r the degree to which caT^it^^iand advanced techLlogy is of foreign originLest I be misunderstood
. let n,e raakfi? clear
ish) Ldullrl^}?^""?? '^^^'^l^" Span!n^ industrialization had evolved in avacuum, nor did I address myself to theadvantages or disadvantages of differentroads to industrializatiSn and deve^opment.^O
Once again Tamames provides evidence that foreign control
is not merely a matter of different paths to development but
rather that the path of foreign control may not lead to develop-
ment at allt
If one reviews the principle firms of the
automobile line, of motorcycles, of elec-trical machinery and electric appliances,
of pharmaceutical products, etc., it is easyto thmk^that the major part of the articlesOf some importance produced by Spanish firmsm those sectors are done under foreign
patent.... / Tj/here is no doubt that ourdependency is excessive, even unnecessary in
many cases, bringing a total stop to the
exportation of the production of several
industrial sectors, since the ovmers of the
patents only grant them—normally—for the
Spanish market. Saving honorable exceptions,
the Spanish businessman prefers the easy road,
of mediocre results, of acquiring a patent,
instead of looking for the technicians who
can study and construct a prototype to his
orders; it seems as if that almost grotesque
sentence of Unarauno weighs upon our entre-
preneurs? Let others invent!
20
Pi-Sunyer, "Reply," p. 242. Emphasis in original
21Tamames, Bconomj'a espanola . p. 212.
216
Even in the case where there is production for export,
as in the production of automobiles, communications equipment
and electric appliances, it represents the increased penetra-
tion and/or consolidation of foreign capital in the exporting
industries.
Some anecdotal notes may shed further light on this
issue of foreign control. The automobile sector mentioned by
Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is an interesting illustration
of the nature of Spanish economic growth, Spaniards themselves
refer to different automotive lines as more or less Spanish
with foreign marques such as Mercedes-Benz, which is manu-
factured elsewhere and assembled in Spain, being among the
least Spanish and SEAT (FIAT) among the most Spanish. For
example, the "most" Spanish, mass-produced car in Spain in 1973
was the SEAT 1^30, a very pleasant vehicle which had a combina-
tion of a FIAT-designed engine in a FIAT-desimed body that was
not available in Italy itself. Yet in another tidbit from the
automotive news of 1973 » Citroen, the French automotive firm,
piqued Spanish nationalism by manufacturing its newest model
in a Catalan plant for sale only in France, Spaniards had to
wait for more than a year to purchase a car made by Spanish
hands in a Spanish factory.
The issue between Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is
2?
Ibid.
. p. 213,
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clearly not that Spain's ranking as the fifth European indus-
trial nation has no importance whatsoever. The question is
how one evaluates the fact of Spanish hands operating imported
dies to press imported raw materials into an item not to be sold
in Spain. The question that Schneider et al, seem to be asking
is what would happen if all of Spanish industry were nation-
alized tomorrow? Certainly Spain would find itself possessed
of productive capacity and the skilled manpower to operate it.
But it would probably find itself without managerial talent and
initiative and absolutely dependent on imports of foreign cap-
ital, capital goods and technology to activate production.
Such a situation approximates the definition of modernization
given by Schneider et al. Although Spain's economy is not
unlike other developing countries in this regard, it is unlike
those of the first-industrialized nations and also inany of i,he
socialist countries which have undertaken the proceos of with-
drawal and development contrasted with modernization by
Schneider et al.
If then, the Spanish economic "miracle" can be said to
be more modernization than development, how does this relate
to the issue of socioeconomic change and the authoritarian-
conservative regime typology? It would appear that modernization
is a type of change more easily tolerated by an authoritarian-
conservative regime than development because it is less threat-
ening to its system of rule. One indication of this is the fact
that, as we have seen, modernization came to Spain in spite of
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or irregardless of official government r.m .
^
^
policy. The most s^ni-ficant policy undertaken bv th. ^ -
the waves or rorei.n inl
"^^ "
resisting
^^^^^^"^
"—
Yet there is a more centraT ^^.+
^
l feature of modernization
tha
.a.es it le.s t.reatenin, to an aut.orUa.ian-oonservative
regime, the political position or the working cla.s unde.
moaernization. This political position is a result or the
differential effects of modernisation on social classes,
.oc-
ernization as described by Schneider et^ i, obviously a
dependency relationship between the developed and underdeveloped
countries; dependency "theory in turn offers one insights into
the asymmetrical effects of dependency on different social
classes .-^
In the case of Spain, dependency "theory" would lead ore
to expect that Spain's "national bourgeoisie" would experience
the loss Of capitalist "virtue" described by Tamames in which
they becon,e "simple merchants" and "mere representatives" of
foreign capital. This "emasculation" of a country's entre-
rseraecio (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
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preneurial elite certainly makes development (as opposed to
modernization) more difficult, if not impossible, in the long
run, but this elite is. of course, well-rewarded materially for
their loss of initiative and control. Only the "psychological"
stimulus of an aggressive nationalism should impel this ••lumpen-
bourgeoisie" to question its dependent status.
The working class, on the other hand, faces a much more
complex position. Its relationship to political and economic
power is similar to that in other industrializing nations in
that it must engage in confrontation with capital backed by
the authority of the state to gain social and economic bene-
2kfits. In many cases such a confrontation is between labor
and the representatives of foreign capital. Moreover, in Spain
as elsewhere, the source of this foreign capital is often a
multinational company v/hich is possessed of superior bargaining
powers in its ability to tolerate lost production in one sector,
promote wage competition between different national working
classes, shift production to less "troublesome" sites, etc,^^
2kOf course, the Spanish working class is at a special
disadvantage in this confrontation since strikes are illegal
(though more tolerated in recent years if they do not raise
political issues) and labor is officially organized into verti-
cal 3 indicates dominated by the Falangist bureaucracy. Despite
continuing "liberalizations" under the current Suarez regime and
the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party, the legal posi-
tion of the Spanish working class has not been altered.
^^For a general description of big capital's advantage
relative to labor in overcoming national barriers see Ernest
Mandel, Europe vs. America. Contradictions of Imperialism (New
Yorkt Monthly Review Press, 1972), especially Chapter 10.
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This situation contributes to a weakening of the poli-
tical position Of Spanish labor in several ways. First of all,
under Franco, the working class was in an inferior bargaining
'
position relative to international capital for the reasons just
described and because of the restrictions placed on its right
to organize and strike. Secondly, already in a paternalistic
relationship with the State through the corporatist system,
labor had to be even more dependent because the State was the
only mediating agent between labor and international capital
upon which the working class could exert some force. Thus the
dependent position of Spanish labor is due not only to its
corporatist relationship with State authority, as described by
26Frederick B. Pike, but to the process of modernization itself.
Modernization in these terms, then, is a kind of economic
growth which does not absolutely challenge the counterrevolu-
tionary goals of the authoritarian-conservative regime. In
promoting the dependency of the working class, that is, in
decreasing its freedom of political maneuverability, moderniza-
tion contributed to the goal of the demobilization of rising
working class consciousness, a central aspect of the authori-
tarian-conservative regime typology developed in Chapter I.
Modernization may be an "easier" type of economic growth
in other ways as well. Economic development, as described by
Schneider et al
.
. would require consensus about the need to
26
Pike, "Capitalism and Consumerism in Spain of the 1960»s
What Lessons for Latin American Development?," Inter-American
Economic Affairs , 26 (V/inter, 1972), p. 31.
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sacrifice for capital accumulation. It v/as inherent in the
nature of the Franco regime that such a consensus would entail
a willingness to work for a common goal the results of which
would be distributed unevenly. ^"^ Modernization requires no
broad social consensus; rather the dislocations and distortions
produced by an essentially unplanned growth (or one "planned"
by foreign capital) were felt as individualized phenomena.
Thus, the regime was never forced as far into the contradiction
faced by other authoritarian-conservative regimes of eliciting
support for a national effort (war in the case of Italy and
Germany? development in the case of Spain) while attempting to
? ftdemobilize and depoliticize the underclass.
The process of modernization in Spain, therefore, does
not appear to be inconsistent with the authoritarian-conserva-
tive system of the regime. Hov/ever, the authoritarian-con-
servative typology set forth by Blondel and v/hich, as I have
indicated in the first Chapter, offers a more accurate evalua-
tion of Spain than that given by other conceptualizations,
needs to be modified.
As Blondel indicates, the Authoritarian-Conservative
'Of course, as is typical of countries undergoing a
process of modernization, governmental efforts to fit the domes-
tic economy to the production profile of the multinationals rely
primarily on indirect taxes for funding. Such a regressive tax-
ation policy results in forced savinp;s by the lower classes to
fuel the modernization process. See Furtado, "Brazilian 'Model,'"
p. 120 1 Schneider et al. , "Modernization and Development," pp.
and Pike, "Capitalism and Consumerism," p. 22,
^^See Chapter I, p. 29.
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i.ng
regime arises as a react Inv, -h^ion to pressures for socioeconomic
change and seeks to impose an oo>,t •'"^^^^ ^^^lier order less threaten!
to tradit.onal groups and less susceptible to revolutionary
e.ands
.et. the developmentalist climate o. the mid-twentieth
century has made the fa^v n-p +u
^
t sk Of these retrograde regimes exceed-
mgly more difficult. If SDain i« + ^bpam is typical of the response by
authoritarian-conservative
rerimeq to t-h^ox gj.m s this dilemma (and the
parallels between Smin ^ ux pai and such countries as Brazil and Chile
indicate that it is not a-typical). a .ind of economic growth
Which does not directly threaten its central counterrevolution
values has been adopted. For the process of modernization as
followed in Spain offers a certain kind of economic hette™ent
but one Which does not fundamentally alter the class relation-
ships of the traditional society. Because of the reasons
already discussed, modernization promotes dependency between
regions and countries while diminishing the political maneuver-
ability of the working class.
All of the qualifications and comments we have made on'
Spanish economic growth bear on the question of alternative
futures for Spain. In the next section we take up the question
of the relationship between this Spanish political economy and
the direction of politics in a post-Franco Spain.
Alternative Futures for Spain
As these words are being written, Spain is entering the
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post-Franco era. His dpath ^+o^i-r «n ae n itself a microcosm of the dictator-
ship, ^9 i3 j^^^^^ ^^^^ transition to a Movement
Monarchy dedicated to the fundamental principles of Francoism
is possible. What is not yet known for certain is whether the
Spain of Juan Carlos, Arias Navarro and, lately, Suarez will be
Francoism without Franco, as the radical opposition contends,
or whether it will change or be changed into something else.
One point of view on post-Franco politics with which I
would like to deal at length is that represented by some Span-
iards and the American Liberal press. The argument being
made by these observers is that the death of Franco has removed
the major stumbling block to Spain's European evolution towards
a liberal, pluralist democracy. Finding the class and ideo-
logical conflicts that produced the Civil War muted if not
eliminated by passing time and Spain's economic advancement,
they call on the new king to break with the ultra-right old
guard and get on with the liberalization for which everyone is
waiting.
29
In a country with only one hospital bed for each 1,748
persons, a team of 32 medical specialists spent over a month
attempting to prolong his life. Meanwhile the Spanish right
took advantage of Franco's borrowed time to execute Operation
Lucero, a return to the darkest Franco years of censorship,
arrest, intimidation and terror by the old guard. (See Claire
Sterling, "The Nightmare Spain Doesn't Want," New York Times
Wlaprazine
. December 14, 1975, P. 18.)
30See the article by Claire Sterling above, also Barbara
Probst Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," Now York Review of Books
,
XXII, 19 (November 27, 1975) » PP. 22-27 and reporting of Flora
Lewis and Henry Giniger from Madrid.
22k
Much of what passes for analysis in these arguments
amounts to no more than wishful thinking, of the kind that
pictured Juan Carlos as a closet democrat. But what true
analysis is made consists of a rather off-handed equation of
Spain's economic progress with the conditions necessary for
political democracy.
Such an equation of politics and economics is not unusual
in the case of Spain and has been a justification of the dic-
tatorship which, by concentrating on economic growth, promised
to elevate the capabilities of Spain's "underdeveloped" citi-
zenry; we have already seen this view in the "myth of incapacity"
and the textbook theme of social pessimism. Politics and eco-
nomics have been so closely linked in the regime's nationali-
zations, that a Spanish minister at one time specified the
level of per capita income which would allow liberalization.
Although this kind of simple-minded economic determinism
imbues some of the optimistic interpretations of Spain, there
is a more sophisticated analysis which argues that economic
growth creates the material basis for a liberal democratic
31 The most eminent developraentalists of our country
have recently acknowledged that v/e have taken a
giant step toward economic take-off, though not
politics, and that with our 800 dollars of per
capita income we must wait for $1,500 to be able
to completely modernize politically.
—de Miguel, Eg pan
a
. p. 286.
De Miguel goes on to suggest that rather than wait for
the avera^re per capita income for Spain to reach $1,500, that the
regime grant civil liberties regionally with the wealthiest
regions of Madrid and Barcelona receiving them first.
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society and strengthens the middle class, held to be a critical
factor in promoting liberal democracy.
The "proof offered to support the imminent triumph of
a new and modern Spain is the general economic •'miracle" dis-
cussed in the first part of this Chapter. Examples of such, to
my mind, naive views include the following
j
After suffering the violence of the Civil War
agd the aftermath of isolation and privation,
/.the Spanish people/ have entered into aperiod of relative prosperity with /~a_7booming economy.
As a result, almost everyone agreed, the
average Spaniard appears to want a peaceful
change. Most do not want a return to civil
disorder} in the country as a whole extrem-
ist groups that do resort to violence apiDear
to have little support.
With prosperity, people have entered the con-
sumer a^e, buying homes, cars and appliances,
often with time payments. This drives them a
further interest and stake in stability. 33
*
All of these viev/s on the social requisites of democ-
racy in Spain agree with the seminal article on the subject by
Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Poli -
tical Science Review
. 53 (March, 1959}| pp. 69-IO5.
In Lipset 's opinion, democracy (what I call liberal
democracy) was most likely in those countries which combined
effectiveness (essentially provided by economic development)
with high legitimacy of political institutions. The middle
class was important because it ". . . plays a mitigating role
in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and
.democratic parties and penalize extremist groups." Ibid .
,
p. 83.
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enSchPrt^?^^*'^^ become
fi" ? considerable way in all fields.
£^a;:-!--,L-|-!:i-iL^-!---n,
responsible, technologically advanced anddeeply conscious of its social importance.
Vl^^o^r ^P^i":, entirely different from that
1936 \h.n t^? "^P- ^^gan. and that of, whe the Civil War began, is the bestlegacy that Generalissimo Francisco Francohas left his people, because it implies the
S^o^^S?'"'' ^
sociological base that makespossible and necessary a democratic power
structure. 3^
The question of modernization or development is raised
again by reference to these indicators of economic growth and,
from the point of view expressed above, of the "sociological
base of democracy." For as we have seen argued earlier by
Schneider et_al^, the fact of economic grov/th may not necessarily
imply the structural changes in the polity and society that
true development entails.
While it is beyond the scope of this concluding chapter
to undertake an analysis of Spanish class structure, it would
be useful to examine the claims for a "new middle class" in
Spain and the importance of this class for Spain's political
development.
33
-"-"Henry Giniger, "Spaniards Are Hoping for a Peaceful
Shift," New York Times . October 26, 1975, p. 1.
Jose Maria de Areilza, "Spaini Thinking about the
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In their first article on "Modernization and Develop-
n.ent... Schneider^ ,^,,,3, ^^^^ consequences or the
modernization process which help to outline the differences
between modernization and development. 35 First among these
consequences is the incorporation of distorted metropolitan
life styles by dependent regions. Contrary to the self-imposed
isolation one might expect of a developing country, moderniza-
tion opens the doors to a vision of the good life conveyed by
tourists, by multinational managers or through residence in the
emigrant workers' ghetto of some nothern industrial country.
The modern world as glimpsed from these perspectives is in many
ways unreal and while the diffusion of blue jeans and rock music
is not such a great horror, cultural imperialism and Coca-
colonialism can at times have a more serious impact on a
modernizing society. 3°
Secondly, the financing of modernization through income
concentration, tourism and emigration strengthens the depend-
ence of a region or country on metropolitan centers without a
radical reordering of either society. While creating new
Future," New York Timer,. November 21, 1975, p. 1*3. Senor Areilzawas Foreign Minister in the first post-FraAco cabinet!
^''"^^^
35
v,v. oM?^^^^^^^ et_al^, "Modernization and Development,"pp. jJM-JJ-^^fif,
36For example, "modernizing" Mexico has seen the replace-
ment of corn meal and milk as staples of the peasant diet byCoca-cola and Wonder bread—far less nutritious substitutes.
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markets for goods produced in the metropolis, modernization
relieves the social pressure of rural-urban migration and unem-
ployment through the service and construction jobs provided by
tourism and, in the case of Spain, by emigration to industrial
centers.
Finally, modernization is an inherently unstable process.
As has been shown in the recent world recession cum oil crisis,
significant and rapid declines in tourism and the demand for
emigrant labor are possible. Such instability is the inevitable
consequence of dependence and has its affect on the modernizing
middle class:
Because it is unstable, modernization creates
a middle class which has the power to consume
but not to create new sources of capital. It
is a class without autonomy or leverage.
Typical of the new bourgeois type is his under-
standable tendency to invest in sectors of rapid,
but short-range profit; to speculate at the
expense of planning and to eschew industrial
or agrarian enterprises v;hich would require
heavy capitalization. The predominant economic
activities of such a type include real estate
speculation, commerce appropriate ^ to the new
consumer markets which modernization engenders,
and perhaps agricultural or light industrial
production, cautiously capitalized because of
its vulnerability to fluctuations on world oo
markets.... Excluded is capital accumulation.
A glance back at Ramon Tamames ' description of Spanish
entrepreneurs in the first part of this Chapter will show general
support for the assessment made by Schneider et. al < of the
modernizing middle-class.
^"^Schneider et al. , "Modernization and Development,"
p. 3^^.
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Is there, then,- a Spanish middle class which will play
a democratic role by, in Lipsefs words, rewarding moderate and
democratic parties and penalizing extremist groups? It would
appear that liberal observ^ers of Spain have been drawn into
the same confusion over the middle classes that has plagued
Latin Americanists for some time. Beginning nearly two decades
38
ago. students of Latin America forecast an important role
for emerging middle "sectors" in Latin America. As today in
the case of Spain, the emerging middle class was supposed to
be the best hope for a liberal democratic reform of Latin
America that would ameliorate its poverty and underdevelopment
without revolutionary violence.
In retrospect many of these studies seem to have con-
fused the growth of a middle range of income with the emergence
of a more or less cohesive middle class or sector possessed of
its own identity and able to fulfill the moderating role it
has supposedly played in democratic societies. The experience
of the development decade of the 1960's led to a reevaluation
of this middle class v;ith more critical assessments. Wow the
Latin American middle class could play an antidemocratic role
00
John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America
(Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1958). For additional
studies on the attitudes and behavior of the middle classes in
Latin America see Richard N, Adams. The Second Sowinp:i Power
and Secondary Development in Latin Anicr'ica (San Francisco
Chandler. 196?) ; Luis Katinoff, "The New Urban Groups 1 The
Middle Classes," in S.M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin
America (New Yorkj Oxford University Press, 19^7), pp. 61-93
and James F, Petras. Politics and Social Structure in Latin
America (Mew York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) » PP' 3?-53.
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at t5.„es,39
,
,„^.„^ ^^^^^ development'^'' and, in period.
Of heightened class conflict, virtually disappeared . ^1
Simplistic comparisons of Spain with Latin America as
a Whole or even with the most industrialized Latin American
nations would lead to error •and confusion. Yet one must wonder
.f a valid comparison cannot be made between the
.elf-servin.
optimism that characterised Korth American interpretations of
Latin America in the Ijeo-s and similar observations about
Spain today. In both cases, the middle class is seen as the
best hope for a non-revolutionary solution to economic and
political problems.'*^ Could it be that the new Spanish middle
^1
"Another thing that has confused us is the mis-taken notion that a middle class exists in Latin
anlirdpft' \^ ^^^^^ ^ "^^^^1^ sector, andill-defmed one at that. In Chile, for example-they always boasted that they were politically '
stable because they had a strong middle class, a
M L^"^^^ identity and characteristics.'Now they are coming to see that their belief was
anj^th. What they were talking about has provedto be a mere appendage of the upper class. Thelower stratum of semiprofessionals and white-
collar workers has nowhere to go except to the
working class. What emerges is a dominant class
and a dominated class, an oppressor and a mass
of oppressed . "
—quoted by Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Doo;r
(New Yorkj Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 19?l),p.83.
^
In the case of Latin America, disllusion with the
reformist tendencies of the middle class has not led to the
on
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clauH will prove to be- as disappointing in providing the
sociological basis of democracy as has been its Latin American
counterpart?
Clearly, the definitive answer to this question will
como only at some critical juncture of Spanish politics. For
the moment we have only the views of Schneider et al
.
and
othcrs^^^ that a dependent middle class such as that produced
by modernization will not play the moderating role forseen for
it by Lipset. And, as I have tried to show, we also have rea
to brieve that indices of per capita income, TV sets per house-
hold, literacy rates and other marks of modernity may signal
modernization not development; the growth of a middle income
group not a middle class.
V^e are left, then, with a picture of Spain in which
liberal democracy cannot be predicted—on the basis of economic
growth—as inevitable. V/ith its dependent middle class, hesitant
bourgeoisie and politically repressed working class, Spain in
1976 most resembles the class profile of contemporary Chile,
Brazil or Argentina which are surely not examples of the ease
of creating liberal democracy.
abandonment of reformist approaches to change but to the search
for new agents of reform: the military and, lately, the Church,
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Or3p:ins of Dictatorship
flI}.Cl_iI^ mocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, I966) offers a sophisti-
.i;ated version of the Lipset argument in which the relative
independence of the middle class is a critical factor in deter-
mining its ability to bring about fundamental transformations
Of <j.lass structure.
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What is the future of bpain? To give our answer to this
question we must look at two more levels of Spanish reality:
the flow of the main Spanish ideological currents and, finally,
the capacities of the Spanish people themselves for self-rule.
Ideolo^ and the Mod el of tho. Two Spains^^
Especially since the latter part of the 19th century,
Spain has often been spoken of as constituting two levels or
dimensions of reality. Whether dichotomized along ideological
or cultural lines, there have been a multitude of models of the-
two Spainsi rich and poor, industrial and agricultural,
official and real, etc. However, two of these dichotomies
represent historical tensions that have had the most significant
impact on Spanish political development. One is the ideological
tension between left and right and the other a regionalist
tension between centralist political organization (led by
Madrid) and the demand for regional autonomy and rights,
V/ith these two dichotomies, Amando de Miguel has con-
structed a typology which represents most of the ideological
currents of recent Spanish history and those which would be
most likely to figure in post-Franco politics.
The typology is as follows
»
Left Right
Regionalism Type 1 Type 2
Centralism Type 3 Type 4
^\his section is based upon ajnodel and typology
developed by Amando de Miguel in Espana , pp. 280-286,
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le anar-
According to de
-Miguel, type 1 corresponds to the
chist tradition and the majority of the Republicans. It
represents, he says, "the heroic and broken Spain, the
impossible Spain of Utopia.
Type 2 comprises the bourgeoisie regionalist parties
(the Catalan Li^. the Valencian Regional Right), Carlis™ and
a certain sector of the "pre-technocratio ideology" of the
Primo de Rivera dictatorship. It speaks for a small segment
Of the population.
Type 3 encloses a large part of the Regenerationists (of
1898), Ortega y^Gasset and nearly all the Communists and Social-
ists as well ac a significant sector of the intellectuals of
the Institjic^^
nv/hile having enormous
spiritual influence, it has had scarce political impact. "^7
Type 4 is composed of the early fascist parties (the
JONS and Falange) which were merged into Jose Antonio's Falange.
Accion Espanola (Spanish Action) and groupings from CEDA (Cath-
olic right of Gil Robles) and other monarchists. It includes
the basic components of the National Movement, successor to
the Falange, Spain's only "party,"
^^Ibide
. p. 285.
See Vicente Cache Yin, La Institucion Libre de Ensenanza
(Madrid, 1962). ^
4?
'de Miguel, Espana . p. 285.
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If this typologi^ does, in fact, approximate the ideo-
logical currents of Spanish reality, liberal democracy once
again seems far from inevitable.
Type 1, left-regionalism, was attempted as a liberal
democratic coalition in Spain under the second Republic. It
had its notorious problems and was decisively defeated in the
Civil War. More importantly, the current regime was founded
on opposition to the basic principles of this left-regionalist
tendency. How, then, is the right-centralism of Francoism
without Franco to "evolve" into left regionalism?
Type 2, right-regionalism, can be dismissed as having
little potential political impact even given the resurgence of
regionalist pressures in Spain.
Type 3. left-centralism, has, at first glance, possi-
bilities as a viable liberal democratic coalition. Recent
developments in neo-Stalinist Communist parties in Western
Europe indicate a willingness to effect the "historic compromise"
of participation by the Western European CP's in governments of
ho
a liberal-moderate, social democratic type.
However, once again the nature of the current regime
places obstacles in the path to such a coalition. Even the
48For points of agreement and disagreement between the
Italian Communist Party (PCI), closest to such an "historic com-
promise," and the Spanish Communist Party see Kevin Devlin,
"'Differences' between Italian and Spanish CP's on Attitude to
Soviet Union," Radio Free Europe Background Report . No, 155
(November 11, 1975)
•
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most "reformist" member nf thoo the Anas cabinet, Fraga Iribarne,
denounced the idea of recognizing the Spanish CP.'*? yet
because of PCE strength in the trade unions (through the'
illegal workers- Commissions), any acceptance of independent
trade unions or the right to strike will .ea„ automatic recog-
nition Of the communist party. 5° Therefore, we are likely to
see a continuation of the labor conflicts which marked the
first part of I976. When such contradictions between liberal
principles and defense of class position arise, we will
.ost
likely see their resolution by a resort to Francoism without
Franco,
We are left with Type ^, the current regime, which will
attempt to continue essentially unchanged with superficial
liberalizations but no abandonment of its right-centralist
ideology and, despite its rhetoric, no "evolution" toward a
pluralist, liberal democracy on a European model.
49
4- ^-^^..S"
}J^^?^iew with the French daily Le Fip:aro . Fra^acommented, /'Spain is moving toward the establish^ient of 'a demS-cratic society but the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) will
remain outside of the political arena," quoted by David Frankel,
r^iounting Pressure in Spam to Finish with Francoism," Int-r-
continental Press, lif, 2 (January 19, 1976), p. 1^2.
^
50See Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," p, 2?,
Fraga Iribarne has also commented on the connectionsbetween the trade unions and the PCEi "/"T/he Workers Com-
missions are an organization dominated by the Communists, whohave entered the trade-union system with a precise objective:
to convert it into an instrument of a party, for the good of
only one party," quoted from the November 24, I975 issue of
the Buenos Aires daily La Opinion by Frankel, "Mounting Pressure,"
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ment Itn^l f
?
One may still ask. why accept this fascination with
liberal democracy? Is Spain faced only with a choice between
.ome variant of the status ,uo and a problematic liberal democ-
racy? While recognizing that in responding to this
.uestion
"
one moves from the level of analysis to polemic (in the best
Latin sense), my answer would be, no. m our discussion of the
process of political socialization in Spain, the analysis of
political education textbooks and an examination of the Franco-
ist strategy of social control, we have seen time and again a
closed, authoritarian, patrimonial ethic which, if embraced
by all Spaniards, would forecast a dismal future for democracy.
Yet, as we have stressed from the very beginning, this is the
ethic of
-official" Spain not all of Spain and. in this regard,
I agree with those Liberal observers of Spain we have just dis-
cussed. Argument breaks out over whether this "official" Spain
is really just some dead, dried out skin covering a new. brighter
Spain that has been struggling to break out of its old covering
and was held fast only by Franco and his ultrarightists
. I
have, in a sense, been persuaded that Spain is, in fact, differ-
ent? that the "middle v/ay" for Spain has no better prospects
now than it did forty years ago. To put it another way, the
tensions and contradictions that produced the pre-revolutionary
conditions of the 1930 's have in my view not been eliminated
by modernization and the consumer society but merely papered
238
over
However, an assertion such as this must rely on an
examination of more than just the elite viewpoints expressed
in "official- political education textbooks or on the equally
elitist perspective offered by the typology of ideologies drawn
earlier. Inevitably one returns to the question first raised
as an epigraph to Chapter 11, is Spanish society more authori-
tarian than the government itself? 51
One intriguing response to this question comes from
survey data reported on in a paper by the head of the Spanish
national opinion institute (Institute de la Opinion Piblica),
Kafael L6pez-Pintor.^^ Based on a national sample of 1,000
males, the survey revealed 4 types of personality clusters
which Lopez-Pintor has labeled (1) "the politically alienated
majority": 1^9% of the population; (2) "a rising democratic
generation"! 37% of the population; (3) "The authoritarian
establishment": 12^^ of the population; and W "the servants
51
^
In addition to the epigraph, see the longer discussionby de Miguel, " La sociedad espanola mas autoritaria que lasinstituciones?" in Cuadernos para el Dialop-o
. extra number 35(June, 1973), pp. 75--7T.
52 ^Rafael Lopez-Pintor, "The Political Beliefs of Span-
iards » The Rising of a More Democratic Generation," paper pre-
sented at the Sixth National Meeting of the Latin American
Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-28, I976.
53
-^^The sample is biased towards those likely to show
greater political interest and involvement, i.e,, males over
15 living in cities with ^0,000 or more inhabitants.
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of the authoritarian master": 254 of the population. with
certain reservations. 55 these survey results indicate that only
a minority are as authoritarian or more authoritarian than the
refcime itself.
Yet for reasons presented in the previous chapter (see
the discussion of the "Myth of Incapacity"), we cannot solely
rely on survey research for an answer to this question? diffi-
dence and submission to authority are still too much a test of
loyalty to any Spanish regime for the appearance of such
responses on questionnaires to be taken at face value. The
answer sought is, however, not merely an exercise in speculation
for we have both a theoretical debate and an empirical case
study upon which to base our inquiry. For the debate we turn
again to the series of articles and responses by Schneider et
al_t. and Fi-3unyer; for the case study, the revolution of
5k
Ibid
.
. p. ^, The first three clusters are self-expla-
natory. The final one is a group v/hose conservatism and poli-
tical authoritarianism do not fit their social status or
personality. They appear to be lower class beneficiaries of
the regime who are aping what they perceive to be the "party
line" or what we have called the "official" images of the
regime
.
-^-^The reservations concern the significance of the "no
response" and "alienated majority" categories taken to be indi-
cative of little or no interests in politics. An interesting
comment on the context in which surve;;y^ research operates in
Spain was communicated to me by Dr. Lopez-Pintor in a private^
conversation. Since Franco's death, survey watchers have noticed
a fairly close correspondence betv/een the "no response" catep;ory
and public violence. Surveys taken contemporaneously with vio-
lent political confrontations have a high degree of nonresponse
(over 6C^); during periods of relative peace the nonresponse
returns to low (for Spain) levels. Clearly, lack of a response
2^o
flowers in Portugal, Spring 19?^.
Cor-porate GroupR and Powpr
It might be recalled that the debate over the nature
of Spanish economic growth engaged in by Schneider et al. and
Pi-Sunyer was paralleled by a debate over the question of cor-
porate group vitality in Spain. Let us first set out the
vocabulary and substance of this debate and then examine its
relevance to alternative futur® for Spain.
Schneider et al
.
define a corporate group as one which
has "... legal status, i.e., it is chartered, and controls
property which is vested in the group per se
. Furthermore, the
corporate grou:^ has a life of its owni it may well antedate
and survive any particular set of members. "^^ Examples of
corporate groups would include organizations such as political
parties, a bureaucracy or the local 4h Club.
A noncorporate group is not chartered although it may
have rules of entry and conduct for its members. Individual
members of a noncorporate group retain control over their
property, "In short, the noncorporate group may be a coali-
tion, clique or patron-client chain, in which individuals pool
resources and skills."-^'
to surveys, especially those conducted by the Institut e de la
Opinion Fublica , a government agency, is measuring something
besides low political interest.
^'^Schneider et al
.
.
"Modernization and Development,"
p. 33^.
^"^
Ibid. , p. 33^.
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Schneider et_al. postulate that corporate and noncorpo-
rate groups exist contemporaneously in all societies, that is.
that one type is not more Modern" or "traditional- than
another. Rather, the predominance of a particular type of
group relates to the distribution of power in a system, "it
is our hypothesis that noncorporate groups occur where the dis-
tribution of power in a system has not been routinized, struc-
tured by more stable corporate institutions. By way of contrast,
corporate power is a function of consolidated political systems
in which large segments of the population are irrelevant to
the power field
.
The authors suggest that in a society such as the
United States, noncorporate groups proliferate at the very top
and bottom of the social order-where power is fragmented and
fluid. In contrast, the regions of the Western Mediterranean
are marked by fragmentation of power throughout the social
59system. This fragmentation was promoted in the past, they
argue, by the growth and/or imposition of a preindustrial form
of capitalism. In the present, it is perpetuated by the non-
indigenous industrialization imposed from without which
Schneider et al
^
call "modernization."
Pi-Sunyer's critical response is not directed against
these interesting but speculative contentions made by Schneider
^^Ibid.
. p. 334.
^^Xbid.. pp. 335-336.
2^12
seetn
^i^. but on a .ore empirical level. His objections
to be (1) that Schneider ei^ depict Catalonia as ••.
society bereft of corporate institutions and stable socio-
^
political structures
. .
.• when an alternative historical
Picture can be drawn,^° and (2) that even (l)f there is a
dearth of Catalan corporate groups in 1972 /the date of the
research?, the reason does not lie in the fact that Catalan,
prefer not to operate in terms of such structures or that there
are no historical antecedents for then,, but rather that such
structures are more proscribed today than they have ever been
before." ^ Thus, Pi-3unyer finds Catalonia to be more cor-
porate than Schneider et^ i„ the past (he does not appear to
question their "facts" but adds new "facts" and a more benign
interpretation) and argues that any lack of corporateness in
the present can be attributed to the political repression of
the Franco regime not to some intrinsic Catalan heritage or
foreign economic domination. Finally. Pi-3unyer alludes to
the Fortuguese case in which corporate groups proliferated
overnight with the removal of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship,
a similar occurrence, he intimates, is to be expected with the
end of Francoism in Spain. This eventuality, he concludes, is
not accounted for by Schneider et al, 's analysis.
60,,,
... ,,
^'-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 119. Pi-Sunyer offersthis alternative history on pages 119-120.
IbidLj.. pp. 120-121.
2i^3
As previously in our examination of the modernisation
vs. development debate, our third perspective can help to
clarify the issues of contention over the vitality of corporate
groups that separate Schneider et^ and Pi-Sunyer. m this
case our evaluation findo pfd i s Pi-Sunyer more suooesfsful in his
response to Schneider et al .
It may be recalled that in Chapter H we discussed the
poverty of associative life in Spain with reference to the lack
Of significant socialization agencies beyond the family-the
"imperialism" of the family in the socialization process.
Pi-Sunyer is right in attributing the lack of corporate group
structures to the dictatorship for it was a function if not
direct effect of Francoist rule. Dionisio Ridruejo, the Djilas
of the Franco regime, has described the connection between
Franco's corporatist state and the lack of corporate groups
this way J
.
. .
(W)e are seeing occur the opposite of whatthe conquerors of liberal political pluralismforesaw, when they thought— I will say more
correctly we thought— that on doing away with
electoral, ideological or party procedures,
natural" groupings, founded on the concerns
of everyday life or upon the most profound
necessities of man, would take on a special
force of cohesion. Nothing like this has
happened and on the contrary we note the lowest
index in the vi^or /tono7 , never verv high in
Spain of the spirit of association. 6S
Ridruejo has described as well the result of this
Ridruejo, Escrito en Espa'na . p. I32.
associative desert in, political life, the proliferation of
non-corporate groups based on personal power. Thus,
Our system of living together is reduced toprivate relations, actually egoistic or gen-
erous, and in order to prove it, it would be
enough to cite the excessive importance whichhave acquired among us family nepotism, on the
one hand, and on the other, the ties of friend-
ship and favor.... But now this vice—which
contaminated to a greater or lesser degree the
old systems of personal powers-has become custom
and even a total system.... Today everything
IS obtained in Spain
. . . because one has a
friend. ^3
Pi-Sunyer, himself, quotes a similar conclusion drawn
by the Spanish historian, Salvador Giner, "Under post-Civil
War circumstances, with no political parties and without a
dynamic polity the traditional networks of patronage have
hardened into official and semi-official hierarchies."*^^
However, despite Pi-Sunyer's correctness in emphasizing
the important influence of the dictatorship on the vitality of
corporate groups, there appears to be more agreement between
Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al« than either party is willing to
admit. From our third perspective, the analyses of Schneider
et al. and Pi-Sunyer appear to complement rather than contradict
each other on the question of corporate group vitality.
To see how, we must emphasize the hypothesis of Schneider
^^Ibid.
. p. 13^.
^^Salvador Giner, "Spain" in M.S. Archer and Salvador
Giner, eds., Contemporary Europe. Class. Status and Power (New
York! St, Martin's Press, 1971), PP. 125-161.
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^"^ about the importance of the distribution of power to
the corporatenesn or noncorporateness of a social system. As
may be recalled, Schneider et al
.
argued that corporate groups
predominated in a system in which relationships of power had
been routinized and consolidated? power was controlled by non-
corporate groups when it was fluid and fragmented throughout
the social system, as was the case, they argued, in Spain.
Yet, is there not a jjaradox apparent in describing a
dictatorship as being marked by fluid and fragmented power
relationships? Surely, the concentration and centralization
of power must be the greatest under such systems? In fact,
the resolution of this contradiction lies in understanding
exactly how centralized, concentrated and personal the power
of Franco was.
Joaquin Romero Maura has provided just such an under-
standing in an insightful essay on post-Franco politics. In
response to the question of where power lies, Romero argues
that, "Analysts of Franco's regime, using the models of poli-'
tical science or the Marxist frameworks, have all along been
exaggerating the suj^posed pluralism of the regime. "^^
Much of this exaggeration, Romero feels, was due to a
misperception of the relative importance of the various groups
that have been associated with the regime at different periods,
Joaquin Romero Maura, "After Franco, Franquismo?i
The Armed Forces, The Crown and Democracy," .apvernment and_0j2l)O-
^ition 11, 1 (Winter, 1976), pp. 35-6^*-.
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such as the Falan^e. Opus Dei and others.
=^irL?--hirj^^?\-f^f -
weif^ht calibre of competitorr. vyinfnot fn.^
In a sense, Romero is being more cynical than Ridruejo
about whether Franco nnp r.-r nrx , o e of the "conquerors of liberal poli-
tical pluralism--ever really
-foresaw- the emergence of more
••natural" groupings to replace "electoral, ideological or
party procedures." The proscription of such corporate groups
has promoted (though not necessarily created) the fragmentation
of power to which Schneider et al. refer. Within this frag-
mented arid fluid power field (noncorporate) groups have at times
wheeled and dealed but always within the limits set by Franco
himself. For while most corporate groups have been abolished,
one such group has not; rather it has been strengthened and
professionalized to a greater degree than ever before. And it
is from this group— the Armed Forces—that Franco has always
drawn his power. ^''^
Thus, a fluid and fragmented power field lacking vigorous
corporate groups except for that one v;hich Franco controlled
66t.-u • jiDJ-a
.
t f p. 37, emphasis added.
67 .
IMlLir pp. 38-39. The special conditions of the Civil
^War which created this relationship and the reasons why the armed
forces have allowed Franco to draw upon their power with practic-
ally no interference is discussed in the Romero article itself.
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has served the dictator well. Beyond himself and that corpo-
rate group with which he had a special relationship, groups
were called to favor and dismissed with relative ease.^^
Parties and other corporate groups that had the potential to
mobilize countervailing power were banned. In their absence
what social resources remained were mainly organized by a suc-
cession of noncorporate groups utilizing the instruments of
corruption, nepotism, patronage and personalismo described by
Giner, Pi-Sunyer and Ridruejo,
Neither should it be surprising, that a special kind of
industrialization should develop or bo allowed to develop in
this system. This is, of course, precisely the argument
offered by Schneider et al. in designating Spain as an example
of modernization rather than development. If, then, Schneider
et al. ought to acknowledge the influence of the dictatorship
on corporate group vitality, Pi-Sunyer should consider the
possibility that the kind of dependent, foreign-dominated
industrialization or modernization which marks Spain may under-
mine corporate group vitality as well. Surely the pressures
of real economic development (in capitalist terms) for legal
trade unions, collective bargaining Rud certain liberal poli-
tical forms would be unwelcome in Franco Spain. Such pressures
68 Throughout the history of the regime, an almost
almighty state has been presided over by an
almost almighty Generalissimo Franco, who may
not have used all the time all the political
and administrative resources at his disposal,
but who never found them lacking whenever he
wanted to make use of them.
--Romero, "After Franco," p. 3B.
2^8
have come to some degree even with modernization rather than
development but because of the differential effects of moderni-
zation on the working class and the bourgeoisie discussed
earlier (see pp. 218-22), these pressures have been more easily
resisted. I am arguing, then, for consistency in our analysis
of Franco (and perhaps post-Franco) Spain: neither liberal
pluralism nor liberal capitalism are consistent with Francoism.
And what does this mean for the future of Spain and the
capacities of her people for self-government? In the period
since Franco's death we have witnessed in Spain what Pi-Sunyer
insisted could be predicted from the Portuguese case; despite
the policies of continuismo and the severe restraints still
imposed on political organizations and activity in Spain, there
has been a rebirth of political life. Political groups have
emerged on all parts of the political spectrum; labor militancy
has risen and the largest and most successful strikes have
included political as well as economic demands. Even without
the complete removal of the fascist legacy as in Portugal,
Spain is experiencing an impressive display of corporate group
vitality.
Yet there remain a series of structural and political
constraints that predict a difficult not a rosy future for
Spain. The first of these structural constraints is that con-
nection between modernization and corporate group vitality which
we have just discussed. The question still to be answered is
whether a Spanish (or for that matter, an Italian or Greek)
2^9
liberal democracy can be built on top of a foreign dominated,
monopoly capitalist economy. As we have tried to ahow, the
Spanish economy has •modernised" not "developed", it Is. there-
fore, especially vulnerable to the revision that the Western
economic order has been undergoing for the last decade. Infla-
tionary growth fueled hy foreign investment, tourism and emi-
gration has ended for Spain and can probably not begin again
in this same form. The steps required to implement a new pro-
gram of capitalist growth have yet to be defined in Spain,
Moreover, as some have argued. ^9 ^j,^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
require the kind of "discipline" that only an authoritarian
regime could impose.
If Schneider et al
,
are correct, Spain's modernization
will also tend to reinforce and perpetuate the fragmentation of
power in Spanish society that has been of such imporoance to
the maintenance of the dictatorship and will frustrate the
emergence of effective corporate group structures in the future.
The legalization of political parties, for example, will be
meaningful only when it becomes clear that party activity can
lead to the real exercise of State power. For this to occur
there must be changes in the role of the armed forces, v/hich
69James Petras, for example, has tried to make a case
for generalizing from post-Allende Chile that capitalist develop-
ment in the less developed countries requires a program of terror
and repression such as that followed by the junta. See James
Petras, "Terror and Economic Depression! The Chilean Junta's
Formula for Success," New Politics. XI, 3 (Winter, 1976), pp.
59-68.
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still holds the key to' power, and the bourgeoisie, which under
conditions of modernization does not fulfill its "national,"
moderatin*^, function.
The political constraints involve the continuismo of
the Arias regime. Unfortunately for Spanish democracy, the
themes and concepts of corporatism that we have discussed
throughout the thesis continue to be woven into public life.
The "reforms" announced by the regime have that vague and tenta-
tive quality so characteristic of the "political alchemy" of the
Franco years. The family, the syndicate and the municipio con-
tinue as the official trinity of Spanish political life. Even
the nev; bicameral legislature--one of the regime's most highly
'For an excellent discussion of the dimension and nature
of the class stru,";gle in post-Franco Spain see Ronald Fraser,
"Spain on the Brink," New Lef t Review 96 (march-April, 1976),
pp. 3-33. Fraser makes the following comment on the bourgeoisie
which confiiTns their inconsistent class position:
Objectively, it would appear in the interests
of Spanish capital, or certain sectors of it,
to make the ruptura /rupture, i.e., a break
with the franqui3ta_heritage to inaugurate a
bourgeois democracy/: re-establishing its^
hegemony on a new and "uncontaminated" basis,
via a "social pact" such as the right wing
of the PCE /Spanish Communist Party/ has pro-
posed; inaugurating and fortifying a bourgeois
democracy as rapidly as possible and integrat-
ing this into the EEC. But the weight of
history (in the shape of the specific form of
capital accumulation in the Spanish state—
and the peculiar mentality this has given
Spanish capitalists) suggests that /the bour-
geoisie in general is instead placing only
what it sees as the safest short-term bets,
in the hope that the present stake can be
•doubled up' for the future. (p.
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touted reforms—will apparently be elected by "universal,"
••equal," "direct" and secret suffrage among "representatives
of the family." As Triunfo, a weekly Spanish journal, has
commented
,
What significance does this phrase /repre-
sentatives of the famil:^, pronounced lightlyin the context of the speech /of Arias INavarro
to the nation, April 28, 1976/, have? That
only heads of family will be elected, the sole
electorate in the referendums of the regime
that this current one wishes to continue?
One knows what are the resonances of the
introduction of the word "family" in politics
»
those of corporatism. Corporatism is another
name for fascism, as Mussolini conceived it and
pursued it so completely , 71
Thus, the analyses of this thesis have yet to become
history; "official" political socialization has not drastically
changed with the death of Franco.
The final political constraint refers most directly to
the future of Spain. It is suggested by the course of events
since the Revolution of Flowers in Portugal and is the most
direct response to the question of whether Spaniards are more
authoritarian than the regime itself,
Portugal has shown the incredible capacity of a people
to preserve values of free political activities despite decades
of repression. The exuberance and enthusiasm of the Portu-
guese people in the first year after their revolution was a
tribute to the human spirit as well as to the Portuguese them-
^^"Antidemocracia, " Triunfo . 693 (May 0, 1976), p. 6,
_
The quotation itself is an interesting gauge of the current limits
of the political press in Spain, Linking corporatism and
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selves.
Yet the second year of Portugal's revolution has demon-
strated the inability of the Portuguese to create a political
system founded on the energy and spirit produced by liberation.
It appears that the authors of the American Voter could extend
their conclusions: apathy is not only good and necessary for
liberal democracy} it is apparently a requirement for social
democracy as well. The failures of the Portuguese left--not
just the successes of the right—have dissipated that tremendous
commitment the Portuguese people had to a new and better future.
The Spanish had to pay for a few months of transition
with more loss of life than the Portuguese had to pay for a year
of their revolution. The future seems to hold more of the same»
unlike in Portugal, the Spanish ultra-right is in power--not
in exile. For all its years of repression, the left is not much
more unified than in the Civil War it lost through internal
struggle
,
Are the Spanish people more authoritarian than the regime
itself? This is a question to which there is no true answer.
v;hat is certain is that any party or group that would construct
a future, better Spain must answer the question negatively.
Any other response is, intentionally or not, support for a con-
tinuation of the past, of the myth of incapacity and social
fascism with the current regime is apparently tolerated. However,
the connection between fascism and Franco can apparently
not be
made directly.
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pessimism.
My own suspicion, born of studying the Spanish, living
with them and coming to some personal and at times unexpressible
understanding of them, is that the best future for Spain lies
in the direction of what Amando de Miguel called "the heroic
and broken Spain, the impossible Spain of Utopia. "72
Spain of the local and personal but also of workers' self-
management and collective aericultnrp t+ io o q •ctgxx j.xure. it is a Spam without
an imperial vision but one that is most human.
In the past this Spain was most often though not most
consistently represented by the anarcho-syndicalist tradition.
If this tradition survives today it has not yet expressed itself
in any concrete form; no group of anyveight on the left speaks
to it yet.
This thesis has in many ways been a story of the suc-
cesses of the right. One should not be surprised for the
history of Spain is, as Antonio Ramos Oliveira has said, the
history not of revolutions but of counterrevolutions. The point
at which I end—at the "heroic and broken Spain"— is not, I hope,
just the product of my own prejudice and ideology. Rather, I
believe, it comes from an understanding of that counterrevolu-
tion led by Francisco Franco and v/hat the final defeat of the
de Miguel, Es paha
. p. 285. He refers to left-region-
alism in his typology of the two Spains presented earlier in the
chapter.
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right will require. Spain can begin her history of revolution
if she seeks that "impossible Spain of Utopia."
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